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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1882 Almon Brown Strowger bought an undertaking business in Topeka, Kansas.
After some successful years business started to decline. When Strowger learnt a
friend of him died, he was shocked: not only by the loss, but also to ﬁnd the funeral
arrangements were being made by a competitor. Being a suspicious man by nature,
Strowger investigated and would later claim his ﬁnancial trouble was accountable to
a speciﬁc switch-board operator who was romantically involved with (according to
some stories, she was actually married to) his competitor. Strowger suspected the
switch-board operator was connecting calls meant for him to his competitor, thereby
providing the ﬁrst known instance of an impersonation attack on the telephone sys-
tem [101, 168].
Almon Strowger thought it was ridiculous that callers had to rely on switch-board
operators to connect them to the right person and trust these operators to not listen
in on phone conversations. He decided to do something about the weakest element
in the phone system and set out to remove the human component: the switch-board
operator. Togetherwith his nephewWalter Strowger he invented the Strowger switch,
an electromechanical phone switch allowing users to select the phone they wish to
connect to (initially from a set of a 100 contacts) without the intervention of an op-
erator, by sending electrical pulses over the phone lines. On March 10, 1891 he was
awarded the patent (US Patent No. 447918 10/6/1891) for his invention and on Novem-
ber 3 1892 the ﬁrst Strowger switch was taken into use in La Porte, Indiana. This was
quite an occasion, celebrated with a brass band and a special train run from Chicago.
Apparently Almon Strowger described his revolutionary system as being “girl-less,
cuss-less, out-of-order-less, and wait-less.” By automating his phone system Strowger
removed the untrusted switch-board operators and replaced them with automated
machines, trusting the automation instead of the person.
Automation, however, still leaves the customer at the hands of the people in-
stalling and maintaining the automated devices. Furthermore, automated systems
lack any sense of context or sanity checks, which allows users to trigger behaviour
that makes little sense within the current context, but nets the user some beneﬁt. An
example of this is phone phreaking, which started when Joe Engressia found out that
whistling a tone at 2600 Hz (for piano players the fourth E above middle C) during a
phone conversationwould drop the current conversation, but keep the line open [147].
This could be exploited by starting a call to a toll-free number, sending the 2600Hz
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tone, and then dialling the actual number you wished to call. The resulting call would
not be billed to the user, as the phone switch regarded the user’s phone line as used
for a free call. Joe Engressia was gifted with perfect pitch, but other less or otherwise
gifted individuals started looking for reliable ways to generate the required tones. In
a more humorous example it turned out that the toy whistle that came in a box of
Cap ’n Crunch cereal could produce the exact 2600 Hz tone needed when one hole
was covered. In the end several tones were found which inﬂuenced switches and
some people started making devices, called boxes, to generate the right tones for the
required durations. The best knownof thesewere the original blue boxes, which inﬂu-
enced the call routing, but many different boxes appeared, such as red boxes (faking
coin drops in a payphone) and black boxes (allowing other people to call you for free).
Phone phreaking had its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The weakness
at the heart of these attacks was that the control signals where transmitted over
the same connection as the user data and this so-called in-band signalling allowed
attackers to insert fake control signals over their phones. When phone companies
switched to out-of-band signalling in the 1980s, phone phreaking pretty much went
away, although the drop in costs for domestic phone conversation probably also re-
moved a lot of the incentive [148]. Currently, practically all of the switched phone net-
work uses out-of-band signalling; still, it was discovered in 2005 that common police
wiretapping equipment was backwards compatible with the old in-band signalling,
which could be used to stop the recording of phone conversations by this equipment
by transmitting the 2600 Hz signal [153].
The two examples discussed above illustrate that the telephone network has al-
ways been under attack and naturally this did not change when mobile telephony
was introduced in the latter half of the 1980s. The ﬁrst generation of cellular tele-
phonywas analogue andhadno real authentication [148]. Mobile phones simply iden-
tiﬁed themselves with a serial number transmitted plain text over the air (the U.S.
system required an additional number to identify the subscriber). This led to e.g. call-
sell fraud, where an attacker would capture the serial numbers of mobile phones off
the air and re-program their phones with these serials. The attacker would then sell
phone minutes on his phone to people wanting to make cheap phone calls.
In a recurring story for (mobile) telephony, the lack of security and resulting fraud
didnot hamper the success of the technology. Theprognosis of 500,000 subscribers by
1990 was greatly exceeded by the actual number of 10 million subscribers in 1990 and
15 million in 1992 [101]. This enormous and unforeseen popularity caused a degraded
service for costumers as the large numbers of subscribers within urban areas caused
congestionon thewireless part of thenetwork. This drove theneed for adigitalmobile
telephony system, since digital systems can use data compression and allow for the
shared use of frequencies over several phones at the same time. Additionally, digital
systems improve transmission quality, somore users can enjoy a better servicewhen
switching to a digital system. However, seeing the large amount of fraud occurring
in the analog system, the designers of the different digital systems were given the
explicit design goal of adding security. Which ﬁnally brings us to the subject of this
thesis: the security of mobile communication.
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1.1 Research question
Now that we have come to the subject of this thesis we come to the research question:
How secure is mobile communication in practice?
Now this is of course a rather vague question, which requiresmore speciﬁcity onwhat
ismeant by “secure” and “mobile communication.” Aswe discuss inmore detail in the
rest of this section, by mobile communication wemean the 3GPP family of networks,
and as attacker model we consider an attacker with access to the wireless interface.
But ﬁrst, lets consider the “in practice” part of the research question. This thesis cov-
ers some practical work, e.g. by verifying how difﬁcult it is to eavesdrop conversa-
tions in practice in Chapter 3, but this qualiﬁcation signiﬁes that we do not just want
to analyse the theoretical strength of security and theoretical improvements, but we
also want to consider the practicality. So, for instance, when we look at the encryp-
tion used to protect mobile communication in Chapter 4, we look at the encryption
used in our local networks at that time, not the much better encryption proposed –
but either not supported or simply unused in our local situation. Also, when suggest-
ing possible improvements to the mobile networks in Chapter 8, we take care that
these improvements can be added to the current network infrastructure without too
much trouble. In fact, we are currently working on getting the improvements from
Chapter 8 introduced in the ofﬁcial speciﬁcations, so they can bemore easily adopted
by manufacturers.
1.1.1 Mobile communication
There aremany different kinds ofmobile communication technologies, such as satel-
lite telephony, DECT, and WiFi. It is therefore necessary to deﬁne the scope of this
thesis, with respect to mobile communication. In this thesis we will only look at
global cellular technology. That is technology in which the geographic area being
served is divided up into cells. These cells allow for frequency re-use between non-
neighbouring cells. Because of interference, two neighbouring cells can never use the
same frequencies. This is schematically shown in Figure 1.1, which also shows that
cells can differ in size, for instance to accommodate a densely populated area. This
ﬁgure is a simpliﬁcation of the practical situation in which one cell tower often con-
tains three transmitters, each handling 120◦ angle around the tower. This does not
change anything about the general working of a cell tower, it just deﬁnes a smaller
cell. The advantages of a cellular network come at a cost. The providers need to do
extra book keeping to know in which cell a subscriber is currently located, in order to
be able to route incoming trafﬁc to the correct cell. The cellular approach also requires
extra protocols in order to allow a subscriber a continued uninterrupted service as he
moves around between cells. So, the often used term (also in this thesis) of “mobile
networks” is thus something of a misnomer, since the networks themselves are not
mobile, but they allow the subscribers to be mobile.
Even within cellular technologies there are way too many systems to discuss all
of them in this thesis. This is whywewill only look at themost popular digital mobile
communication technologies, the 3GPP or GSM family of networks, named after the
3
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Figure 1.1: A schematic division of frequencies in a geographical area, with four different frequencies
(F1 - F4).
consortium maintaining the speciﬁcations (3GPP – 3rd Generation Partnership Pro-
ject) and after the ﬁrst network in the family (GSM – Global System of Mobile com-
munication), respectively. So this excludes the analogue cellular networks and the
earlier competing digital systems, such as the Japanese PDC and the American IS-95.
As ofApril 2016, over 7.7 billion subscriptions are using theGSM family of networks for
around 4.7 billion unique subscribers [89]. Moreover, the biggest remaining compet-
itor for the GSM family, Qualcomm’s CDMA family of networks, halted development
of their fourth generation, after Qualcomm favoured GSM’s fourth generation LTE in-
stead. This makes the GSM/3GPP family of networks the most popular global digital
cellular networks by far.
The 3GPP family of networks consists of several different types of networkswhich
are usually designated to a speciﬁc generation, starting with GSM as 2G –the second
generation– in order to differentiate it from its analogous predecessors. These net-
works are summarised in Table 1.1 and are discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.
Not all chapters in this thesis consider allmobile standardswithin theGSM family,
so Table 1.2 shows which chapter discusses which technology.
Mobile telephony networks are operated by Mobile Network Operators (MNOs),
Table 1.1: Overview of the different networks within the 3GPP family, with their usual generation desig-
nation and major improvements they brought
Generation Name Improvement
2G GSM First digital mobile phone system of the 3GPP family.
2.5G GPRS Support for package switched data is added.
2.75G EDGE Higher bandwidth.
3G UMTS Higher bandwidth and mutual authentication.
3.5G HSPA Higher bandwidth.
4G LTE Higher bandwidth, all IP based and forward secrecy.
True 4G LTE-Adv. Higher bandwidth.
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these are the companies that own and maintain the cellular infrastructure. Users
or subscribers have a subscription with a MNO, or a MVNO (Mobile Virtual Network
Operator – a provider offering mobile phone services to users, but using the network
of a MNO). MNOs and MVNOs are colloquially known as providers or telco’s, and we
will use the term provider in this thesis, instead of the more vague acronyms.
There are many different components in each of the 3GPP networks, and most
have interesting responsibilities from a security perspective. However, in this thesis
we will focus on the wireless interface of mobile networks, as this is the part of the
network that anyone with a good enough transceiver has access to. This wireless
interface is also referred to as the air interface or wireless link.
Figure 1.2 shows the model we will consider for most of this thesis, where the
phone and SIM (Subscriber Identity Module — here meaning a generic piece of sep-
arate hardware securely storing the subscriber’s credentials, not speciﬁcally the SIM
used in GSM ) connect wirelessly to the cell tower which connects directly into the
“Network.” In essence the cell tower is simply an antenna for the network. The net-
work in turn routes data to the correct recipient, keeps track of subscribers within
reach of its cell towers and generated authentication tokens.
Section 2.2 provides a more detailed version of this model.
Cell Tower NetworkPhone
SIM
Figure 1.2: The focus of this thesis lies on the wireless interface of mobile networks.
1.1.2 Attacker model
Before we address what we mean by security in this thesis we will ﬁrst deﬁne an
attacker model.
The previous subsection already established that this thesis concerns attacks on
the wireless interface. This means we disregard the providers or other insiders as
potential attackers, as well as any attacks directly from or on the network, when they
did not originate on the wireless interface or the end points (phones and cell towers).
We also consider the phones, SIMs, cell towers and network themselves as trusted, so
they are out-of-scope of our attacker model.
When we look at the wireless interface of the 3GPP networks from a security-
oriented view, we candistinguish several levels of abstractionswhich could be a point
of attack:
• Radio signals
• Protocols, which make use of cryptographic primitives
• Protocol and crypto implementations
5
1 Introduction
• Additional services
At the lowest level all information transmitted through the air is essentially radio sig-
nals and an attacker will need to be able to generate and receive these radio signals
to attack over the wireless interface. This level mostly represents a “physical” hurdle
for other attacks, where it is interesting to see how hard it is to access this level, but
where likely the only meaningful explicit attack is a denial of service attack through
jamming.
The different 3GPP protocols are speciﬁed using these radio signals and crypto-
graphic primitives, so we recognise the cryptographic primitives and protocol abstrac-
tions as a different level, as an attacker might ﬁnd a weakness in the cryptographic
primitives used in the protocols, or a weakness in the protocols themselves. Espe-
cially at the protocol level, one typically assumes a Dolev-Yao attacker [41] who has
complete control of the wireless interface. An attack found at this level will have the
highest impact, as it is applicable on all instances using the speciﬁc cryptographic
primitive or protocol, and will be vary hard to patch in all implementations.
An attacker might also ﬁnd weaknesses in implementations of these protocols and
cryptographic primitives involved. The 3GPP protocols are very complicated and ex-
tensive, with lots of options, making it very likely that the actual implementations
containmistakes. An attacker can always choose to try and exploit one of thosemis-
takes in one of the endpoints, even if the protocols themselves are secure. Such at-
tackswould only impact speciﬁc implementations, but there are only a fewvendors of
cell towers and mobile phones, so one would expect a security vulnerability found at
this level to still have a major impact. Additionally, getting access to one of these im-
plementations could prevent an attacker from having to ﬁddle around with the radio
signals and directly attack the logical protocol layer.
On top of the implementations of the 3GPP protocol are additional services that are
being deployed, using the 3GPP protocols as a basis, but which were often not ima-
gined when the 3GPP protocols where designed. Examples of these services can be
payments being transferred over SMS (such as in many African countries), or using
the mobile phone as an additional factor in online authentication. An attacker could
simply be interested in 3GPP networks because the service he is targeting is deployed
on top of one of those networks. Thismeans attacks at this level are very application-
speciﬁc.
This thesis will look at each of these levels of abstraction presented here, as is
summarised in Table 1.2.
One level not discussed in this thesis is the design and implementation of the
mobile phone operating systems and applications. This is a very interesting and im-
portant security subject, but veers closer to traditional operating system security and
is easily a large enough subject to ﬁll a thesis on its own.
Another way to look at the attacker model, is to examine the resources required
for an attack or to look at the goals of the attacker. These resources can be both in
terms of ﬁnancial resources and time needed, but also in terms of the required level
of expertise.
The revelation of the Snowden documents have proven what many already sus-
pected, namely that state actors are capable of attacking mobile communication se-
curity in almost any way. State actors can hack into the heart of the providers net-
works [150] or simply order taps, but also run fake cell towersmounted on drones [104]
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or steal the keys from SIM cards [105]. In at least one instance, the NSA was capable
of intercepting and storing all telephone communications from a single country in a
month [12]. While it is very interesting research to consider ways to protect the mo-
bile networks against state agents such as theNSA, the question of how securemobile
communication currently is, is uninteresting against such a powerful attacker, as the
answer is obvious. Therefore this thesis is mostly interested in attackers of limited
means, by which we mean motivated attackers that have basic technical skills, but
not the ﬁnancial resources to buy off-the-shelf attack equipment such as fake cell
towers.
About the possible goals of the attacker, we donotwish tomake toomuchassump-
tions. These goals will, for the most part, be simpliﬁed to breaking one of the security
goals, as doing so is either a goal in itself, or most likely a prerequisite for a higher
level goal, e.g. ﬁnancial gain.
1.1.3 Security goals
Before we continue with the in-depth look at security of mobile communication, it is
essential to discuss what it means for a cellular network to be secure. In this thesis
we will narrow the deﬁnition of what it means to be secure, to several security goals.
These are:
• Confidentiality, of data transmitted on the wireless link. This can be explicit user
data (e.g. voice or IP packets) ormeta data such as identiﬁers. We recognise two
special forms of conﬁdentiality, namely:
– Untraceability, of user activity in the network.
– Location privacy, of the user’s geographical location.
• Integrity, of user and signalling data on the wireless link.
• Availability, of the wireless network and of the user device (phone).
• Authentication, of the user to the network and of the network to the user.
The traditional security goals from the well-known CIA acronym, also play an im-
portant role in the security ofmobile networks. Here it should benoted that one stand-
ard attack against availability is always possible on the wireless interface of mobile
networks, namely jamming of the frequencies used for communication. This obvious
attack is not regarded in this thesis.
Another important security goal in mobile networks is Authentication, authentica-
tion both of the network and of the subscriber. Authentication of the subscriber by the
network is both important to prevent theft-of-service, but also to prevent impersona-
tion attacks. Authentication of the network by the subscriber protects the subscribers
against network-impersonation attacks, e.g. Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
Security goals that are more speciﬁc for cellular network security are Location pri-
vacy and Untraceability. Essentially, an attacker should not be able to identify which
users are currently at a geographic area, nor should he be able to track a subscriber
through the network, neither by observing wireless network trafﬁc nor by generat-
ing trafﬁc himself. The network needs to know where every SIM is, so that incoming
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Table 1.2: Overview of the thesis’s contents divided over mobile technologies and layers within that
technology.
GSM UMTS LTE
Services on top of mobile networks Chapter 7
Mobile phone implementation Chapter 6
Cell tower implementation Chapter 5
Cryptographic primitives Chapter 4
Transport layer protocols Chapter 8
Radio Signals Chapter 3
transmissions can be routed to the correct location. As such, location privacy and
untraceability are impossible to guarantee if the attacker controls the network.
To achieve these high level security goals listed above, additional, more detailed,
security requirements have been speciﬁed by the 3GPP consortium, such as integrity
of signalling information, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.
1.2 Contributions and outline of this thesis
This section describes the organisation of this thesis and highlights the contributions
by the author. Table 1.2 provides an overview which shows for each chapter which
level of abstraction within the wireless technology is examined and which wireless
3GPP technology.
Chapter 2 provides some background for the interested reader. It contains inform-
ation which is not essential for understanding the rest of the thesis, but can
provide the reader with a deeper insight. The chapter gives a more detailed
overview of the different 3GPP networks, the elements they contain, and their
air interfaces. It also gives an overview of the different types of hardware that
were used during the more practical parts of this research.
Chapter 3 examines how feasible it is to break conﬁdentiality on the wireless link
of mobile telephony in practice. This can either be done passively (eavesdrop-
ping) or actively (Man-in-the-Middle attacks) and both approaches are invest-
igated. This means this chapter focuses on the physical and protocol layers of
the wireless connections as well as on the security goals conﬁdentiality and
authentication.
In the case of GSM the practical feasibility is tested by examining the effort re-
quired in catching and interpreting GSM signals using commodity hardware.
The choice to focus on GSM in this part was a simple practical matter, as this
was the only mobile telephone technology at the time where we could con-
ceivably access the wireless network using generic radio transceivers. Finally,
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this chapter also looks at the available countermeasures against these attacks
against conﬁdentiality on the wireless link.
This chapter is an updated version of the paper Eavesdropping on GSM: state-of-
affairs (F. van den Broek [173]), presented at the 5th Benelux Workshop on In-
formation and System Security, WISSec 2010. An earlier version was presented
at BruCON 2010 [174]. Since, the paper was over six years old, it needed to be
updated to the current situation. I have independently performed and written
down the research described in this chapter.
Chapter 4 focuses on Time-Memory Trade-Off attacks against A5/1, the main cipher
used in GSM. When using a passive eavesdropping attack against GSM, an at-
tacker will likely end up with A5/1 encrypted data. A Time-Memory Trade-Off
attack is currently the best known attack against this cipher, which was at that
time by far the most widely used cipher in GSM, which in turn was the most
widely deployed mobile network. The much stronger A5/3 cipher has seen ad-
ditional roll-out in recent years, though at the moment of writing, A5/1 is still
most prevalent. The newer mobile telephony technologies use much stronger
cryptography, but as phones can be forced to the weaker GSM, these conﬁden-
tiality attacks are most important.
Conﬁdentiality is the primary security goal investigated in this chapter. Since
the attacks discussed in this chapter retrieve the session key, they also impact
integrity and authentication. The chapter compares different Time-Memory
Trade-Off techniques anddelivers theﬁrst analysis of theFuzzyRainbowTables
used against A5/1. It combines with the previous chapter in looking at the difﬁ-
culty of breaking conﬁdentiality on the wireless link in practice.
This chapter is based on the paper A comparison of time-memory trade-off attacks
on stream ciphers (F. van den Broek and E. Poll [176]), presented at the 6th In-
ternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Tech-
niques in Africa, AfricaCrypt 2013. I was the main contributor in this research
and wrote most of the resulting publication.
Chapter 5 looks at possible attacks coming from a corrupted type of cell tower, spe-
ciﬁcally femtocells. Femtocells are cheap, consumer-owned mobile telephony
base stations, which extend the coverage of mobile networks within a small
range. These devices have signiﬁcant implications on all the security goals of
mobile networks, which this chapter examines in depth. The choice for look-
ing at the possible dangers of corrupted femtocells is again a practical choice,
as it is much simpler for an attacker to obtain a femtocell then to get access to
an actual cell tower. Additionally, this chapter examines how hard it is for an
attacker to obtain access to an actual femtocell, by testing the security of the, at
that moment newest, commercially available femtocell.
This chapter is based on the paper Femtocell Security in Theory and Practice (F. van
den Broek and R. Wichers Schreur, [178]), presented at the 18th Nordic Confer-
ence on Secure IT Systems, NordSec 2013. The practical analysis of the femto-
cellwas performedwith thehelp of RoelVerdult andJoeri deRuiter. I performed
most of the theoretical security analysis independently and wrote most of the
resulting paper.
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Chapter 6 focuses on the security of the actual protocol implementations on mobile
phones. Withinmobile phones a speciﬁc chip (or computing corewithin a chip),
called the baseband chip, is responsible for the handling of the mobile network
protocol. Although the speciﬁcations of the mobile network protocols are pub-
lic, they are very extensive and the implementations of the baseband stacks
are closed-source and notoriously complicated. We tested several of these im-
plementations in actual mobile phones, using our own base station and a tech-
nique called fuzzing – in essence automated, largely random, security testing
– focusing on two parts of the GSM protocol: Short Message Service (SMS) and
the Public Warning System (PWS). Besides ﬁnding attacks at the protocol level,
an attacker can also attempt to ﬁndweaknesses in the implementations, which
can also have a large impact if said implementations have a large install base.
Although, in this chapterwe also found that there aremany differences in base-
band stacks, even from the same vendor, which decreases the impact of ﬂaws
found at this level.
This chapter is based on the paper Security Testing of GSM Implementations (F. van
den Broek, B. Hond and A. Cedillo Torres [175]), presented at the International
Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems, ESSoS 2014. The re-
search for this chapter was part of the Master theses of Brinio Hond and Arturo
Cedillo Torres. Brinio Hond’s master thesis discussed the fuzzing of SMS mes-
sages and Arturo Cedillo Torres’s master thesis was on the fuzzing of broadcast
messages, speciﬁcally PWS (Public Warning System) messages. As supervisor
to both projects I was heavily involved with the direction of this research, as
well as setting up the practical experiments with phones. I wrote most of the
resulting publication as a summary of the results from both theses.
Chapter 7 looks at the use of mobile phones as an additional authentication factor
and the use of security-sensitive applications on mobile devices. In particular,
it looks at so-called server-based signatures, which should also provide non-
repudiation. With server-based signatures a user’s private key is stored in a
server (instead of say a smartcard that is under direct control of the user) and
users send documents they want to have signed to this server. Naturally, such
an approach requires strong remote authentication. Mobile phones are popular
solutions to use as an additional element during authentication. Usually, the
authenticating server thereby implicitly trusts the authentication provided by
the 3GPP network. This chapter analyses whether mobile phones can provide
an appropriate level of security for this assumption.
This chapter is based on the article Digitale handtekeningen: nieuwe technologie &
nieuwe wet- en regelgeving (F. van den Broek and E. Poll [177]), published in the
Dutch journal “Privacy en Informatie”. I was the main contributor in this re-
search and wrote most of the resulting publication. Some of the research re-
ported in this chapter was done for a practical risk assessment on a system
were users could view theirmedical data online. For this systemSMSmessages
were considered as an additional authentication factor. This risk assessment
was commissioned by the DutchMinistry of Health [144]. Based on this assess-
ment, this authentication mechanism was judged to be too weak for securing
access to this medical data.
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Chapter 8 looks at ways to improve the security offered by current mobile networks.
Speciﬁcally, this chapter proposes a solution against so-called IMSI catching,
which is an attack whereby an attacker can wirelessly retrieve the long term
identiﬁer inside every SIM card in the vicinity. IMSI catching is among the old-
est attacks possible in mobile networks, but it still persists, even in the most
modern 3GPP protocols. IMSI catching is clearly an attack against location pri-
vacy and traceability, so those security goals are the focus in this chapter. Addi-
tionally, our solution for 2G technology actually strengthens the authentication
procedure, by providing the SIM the possibility to verify if a challenge was cre-
ated by its homenetwork. The solutions offered are compatiblewith the current
speciﬁcations of themobile standards and requires only limited changes to the
SIM and the authentication server, both of which are under control of the user’s
network provider. Therefore, any individual (virtual) provider that distributes
SIM cards and controls its own authentication server can deploy amore privacy
friendly mobile network that is resilient against IMSI catching attacks, without
requiring any changes in the infrastructure, or in the interveningmassively de-
ployed network equipment. We are currently working with the Fraud and Se-
curity Architecture Group (FSAG) of the GSMA to get this solution into the 3GPP
speciﬁcations.
This chapter is based on the paper Defeating IMSI Catchers (F. van den Broek, R.
Verdult and J. De Ruiter [179]), presented at the ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS 2015. I was the main contributor in this re-
search and wrote most of the resulting paper, except for the formal veriﬁcation
of our solution using ProVerif, which was performed by Joeri de Ruiter.
Chapter 9 draws conclusions and provides directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
The background information presented in this chapter is here purely for complete-
ness sake and is not essential for understanding the rest of the thesis. For the inter-
ested reader this chapter gives an overview of the different generations within the
3GPP family of mobile networks. It also presents a more detailed, but still very gen-
eric overview ofmobile networks and gives an overview on the speciﬁc hardware that
was used for the more practical research presented in the rest of this thesis.
2.1 Generations
Currently, providers are rolling out the LTE network globally, which is also called 4G,
where the G stands for generation, to imply that this is the fourth generation of mo-
bile telephony. Most mobile networks have had these designations to a certain gen-
eration. This started with GSM and IS-95, which were called 2G networks, thereby
retroactively naming the preceding analogue systems 1G.
We will now shortly describe the major generations within the 3GPP family. This
information was also summarised in the Chapter 1 in table 1.1.
2.1.1 2G – GSM
GSMwas the acronym given to the research group in charge of creating a new digital
cellular mobile phone standard, Groupe Spécial Mobile. When GSM started getting
world wide popularity GSM’s long formwas changed to Global System ofMobile com-
munication.
GSM was developed in the late 1980s and deployed in most Western countries in
the early 1990s. GSM saw its ﬁrst deployment in 1991 in Finland. Since then GSM has
seen an enormous rise both in its coverage and in the number of subscribers, making
it perhaps the most successful technology of the last twenty years.
When GSMwas ﬁrst deployed there was some security research, whichmostly fo-
cused on the speciﬁcations and the reverse engineering of the secret and proprietary
encryption algorithm [25]. Several weaknesses in GSM’s protocols and cryptographic
primitives where quickly identiﬁed, though practical exploits of these weaknesses
proved complicated because of all the signal processing involved. This changed
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around 2010 with the arrival of cheap hardware [49] and open-source software [26]
which provided easy access to the GSM spectrum. This immediately led to some high
proﬁle attacks, such as the release of the Time-Memory Trade-Off tables for breaking
GSM’s standard encryption [132]. These attacks are discussed in Chapter 3.
GPRS
GSM has no support for packet-switched data, as the phone network was still circuit-
switched when GSMwas developed. There are some techniques to actually run an IP
stack on top of SMS, but the performance of this is rather dreadful. This is where Gen-
eral Packet Radio Service (GPRS) comes in. GPRS is a backwards compatible update
for GSMallowing for packet-switched data, such as IP protocols to be transmitted over
GSM. The peak speed of GPRS-based data is 114 kbit/s.
EDGE
EnhancedData rates forGSMEvolution (EDGE) is an improvement onGPRSand there-
fore also known as Enhanced GPRS (EGPRS). EDGE can manage a peak bandwidth of
473.6 kbit/s. As you can read below on UMTS, this bandwidth qualiﬁes EDGE as a 3G
technology. Still, it is usually still designated within the second generation, saving a
generation upgrade for non-backwards compatible technologies. EDGE is being de-
ployed on GSM networks since 2003.
2.1.2 3G – UMTS
For the third generation of mobile telephony the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) — a United Nations agency responsible for telecommunication issues,
such as coordinating the global use of the radio spectrum and helping in creating
worldwide technical standards— speciﬁed some standards formobile technologies to
be considered 3G.Most important in these speciﬁcationswas an information transfer
rate of at least 200 kbit/s.
In order to establish a 3G mobile phone system based on GSM, telecommunica-
tions associations started collaborating under the name 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP). Later on they also became responsible for maintaining the GSM, GPRS
and EDGE speciﬁcations.
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) was 3GPP’s ﬁrst tech-
nology to be classiﬁed as 3G. It was introduced in 2002 and started out managing an
information transfer rate of 384 kbit/s. UMTS introduced Code Division Multiple Ac-
cess (CDMA), a channel accessmethod inwhichmultiple parties canuse the same fre-
quency simultaneously by assigning codes to each connection used within the mod-
ulation. Confusingly, the name CDMA is also used to describe Qualcomm’s family of
mobile networks, which also use the CDMA channel access method, as opposed to
GSM’s Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) where the same frequency is shared by
dividing it into different time-slots. This switch to the CDMA channel access method
effectively meant that new phones and cell towers were needed for UMTS, as it made
UMTS non-backwards compatible with its pre-decessors.
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The most important security change incorporated in UMTS was the mutual au-
thentication procedure between phone and cell tower, meaning that, as opposed to
the earlier technologies, the SIM now also authenticates the network. Additionally
UMTS introduced a longer secret key (now 128 bits) and better and publicly available
cryptography. UMTS security is discussed in detail in Section 3.5.
HSPA
TheHigh Speed Packet Access (HSPA) is a family of upgrades possible within existing
UMTSnetworks, which are being deployed since 2006. They are usually subdivided in
two upgrades HSDPA (Downlink) and HSUPA (Uplink), with HSDPA achieving down-
link speeds of up to 14.4 Mbit/s and HSUPA achieving uplink speeds of up to 5.76
Mbit/s.
AfterHSPA therewasanother improvement calledEvolvedHSPA, orHSPA+. HSPA+
has a theoretical maximum downlink speed of 672 Mbit/s and an uplink speed of 168
Mbit/s.
Neither HSPA or HSPA+ included any security improvements.
2.1.3 4G – LTE
The designation of Long Term Evolution (LTE) as 4G is controversial. Again, for the
fourth generation the ITU deﬁned a peak speed requirement. This time the require-
mentwas 100Mbit/s for fastmoving targets such as users in cars or trains and speeds
up to 1Gbit/s for slowmoving targets, such as pedestrians. LTEmanages a peak down-
link speed of 300 Mbit/s and a peak uplink speed of 75 Mbit/s. This would mean LTE
does not qualify as 4G. However, since LTE switches to an all IP network and uses Or-
thogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) as a channel access method,
thereby not being backward compatible with its predecessors, and since LTE was
already being marketed as “4G”, the ITU decided to name LTE a 4G technology. LTE
is being deployed since 2010.
Security-wise the most important change is the introduction of forward secur-
ity, by deriving extra keys during the authentication procedure, as explained in Sec-
tion 3.5.
LTE-Advanced
LTE-Advanced improves the speeds of LTE to a peak downlink speed of 1 Gbit/s, with
a 100 Mbit/s for fast moving targets. This caused the ITU to consider LTE-Advanced
as “true 4G”. Some small LTE-Advanced test networks have been rolled out since 2013,
but major commercial deployment is not yet underway.
2.2 Network overview
In Chapter 1 we discussed a very simpliﬁed model for cellular networks focusing on
the wireless interface. That model is shown in Figure 1.2.
Mobile telephony networks have manymore components. Figure 2.1 gives a gen-
eric but more detailed overview of the 2nd and 3rd generation of 3GPP networks. The
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model presentedhere is still very generic and shouldnot be used as anoverviewof the
actual layout of any 3GPP network, but rather as a generic idea of common elements
between these networks. In an attempt for this thesis to use as little terminology as
possible, all the names in Figure 2.1 are generic names instead of the actual terms.
We choose to use generic terms because the different generations of 3GPP networks
introduce new names for each component. For instance, cell towers are called “Base
Transceiver Station” (BTS) inGSM, “NodeB” inUMTSand “eNodeB” in LTE. It is therefore
simpler to introduce generic, hopefully self-explanatory terms for these components
rather than switching between terms when we discuss different networks.
SIM
Phone
Cell Tower
Cell Tower
Cell Tower
Controller
Visitor
Controller
Visitor
Controller
Home
Controller
Auth.
Server
Gateways Internet
PSTN
ACCESS NETWORK CORE NETWORK
Figure 2.1: Generic overview of 3GPP style networks.
The 3GPP networks are usually divided in at least two domains: the access net-
work and the core network, as is shown in Figure 2.1. Sometimes an additional sub-
scriber domain is deﬁned and sometimes the subscriber domain is included in the ac-
cess network. The subscriber has some 3GPP supporting mobile device, in the ﬁgure
represented by a phone, and a SIM. The SIM (Subscriber IdentityModule), a removable
smart card securely storing the subscriber’s unique serial number, secret keys and au-
thentication algorithms, was a unique feature for GSM and is often named as one of
the main reasons why GSM’s popularity outgrew its competitors [101]. It is also the
only actual GSM term we use in Figure 2.1, since this term now seems ﬁrmly estab-
lished in common language. Indeed, the SIM’s successor, UMTS’sUniversal Integrated
Circuit Card (UICC) containing aUSIMapplication, is still colloquially called a SIM.Mo-
bile phones are recognised within a network based on the serial number within their
SIM, which is provided by the subscriber’s provider.
The mobile phone connects wirelessly to cell towers, which are relatively dumb
devices, mostly forwarding every message to their controllers. These controllers can
serve one or more cell towers, managing the radio channel setup and handovers
between connected cell towers, and watch the status of the cell tower’s hardware.
The real logic of the mobile network starts at the Visitor Controllers. These con-
trollers have a database in which they keep track of all mobile phones within their
area. They handle handovers between cell tower controllers and store authentication
records generated by the Authentication Server (Auth. server in Figure 2.1). When a
mobile phone enters a cell under control by a another Visitor controller, this Visitor
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Controller will inform the Home Controller, who will store the current Visitor location
of his subscriber and inform the previous Visitor Controller to remove the subscriber
from its database.
TheHomeController andAuthentication Server are both part of the homenetwork
of the subscriber’s own provider, while the rest of the network could be part of another
provider. If this is the case a subscriber is said to be roaming.
If a new authentication is required, the Visitor Controller will request authentica-
tion records from the Home network’s Authentication Server. The contents of these
authentication records depend on the actual 3GPPnetwork, but at least they contain a
challenge, a response and a session key, generatedwith the authentication algorithm
and secret key present in both the Authentication server and the SIM. This leaves the
provider some freedom to choose his own authentication algorithms since he con-
trols both the contents of the SIM and the Auth server in his back-end. It also allows
visiting networks to authenticate the SIM without learning the secret key.
There are several gateways that connect everything together and connect themo-
bile network to other networks, such as the internet and the Public Switched Phone
Network (PSTN).
LTE Network Overview
The 2nd and 3rd generation of 3GPP networks have fairly similar network topologies,
but for the fourth generation there were some major changes, which are reﬂected in
Figure 2.2. As before, the names provided for the network entities are self-chosen
names and not the actual names as deﬁned by the 3GPP consortium. For the LTE
SIM
Phone
Cell Tower
Cell Tower
Signaling
Gateway
Home
Controller
Auth.
Server
Internet
PSTN
ACCESS NETWORK CORE NETWORK
Data
Gateway
Figure 2.2: Generic overview of LTE style networks.
style networks, the cell tower controllers have been incorporatedwith the cell towers.
This makes the cell towers “smarter” devices than their previous generation counter-
parts, which are now capable of communicating directly with each other when dir-
ectly connected. In this way handovers within the area of one Signalling Gateway
can be handled efﬁciently between connected cell towers.
The other major difference is the explicit splitting of signalling and user data
ﬂows, whereby the former is handled through a Signalling Gateway and the latter by
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a Data Gateway. This split of the different information ﬂows also allows for different
security measures per ﬂow, as will be explained in the next section. Additionally, all
the links within the access and core network are now fully IP based.
2.3 Authentication within the network
Authentication on the different 3GPP networks will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3. However, there are some interesting interplays between the network to-
pologies, the authentication and the different conﬁdentiality and integrity protected
links for each of the 3GPP generations, which did not ﬁt within the scope of Chapter 3,
where the focus lies solely on the air interfaces. These interplays are summarised in
Figure 2.3, where for the three generations of 3GPP networks the authentication steps
are shown, as well as whether the user and signalling data are encrypted (the padlock
symbol) and have a MAC (the seal symbol). Please note that this ﬁgure, nor this sec-
tion provides any judgement on the strength of the cryptographic algorithms used for
each generation. A discussion on that can be found in Chapters 3 and 4.
For all three networks shown in Figure 2.3 there are signalling messages that are
unprotected. Additionally, all three networks support a null-cipher for the user data.
So, only the protected information ﬂows are shown in the ﬁgure. The ﬁgure illustrates
the differences between the 3GPP generations in terms of (mutual) authentication,
and what data is protected in between which network entities.
For all 3GPP networks the authentication procedure also establishes session keys.
The authentication server and theSIMshare a secret key, which is usedby the authen-
tication server to compute the response, and session keys based on a fresh random
challenge. In the case of UMTS and LTE the authentication server also computes a
token which proves knowledge of the secret key. These computed values are them
moved on to other network components. It is up to a speciﬁc gateway to compare the
SIM’s response with the response provided by the authentication server and forward
the session keys to the correct place in the network.
AlthoughUMTS and LTE havemutual authentication between subscriber and net-
work, this authentication does not happen between the exact same entities. The SIM
veriﬁes the authentication token it receives, which essentially provides a MAC over
the challenge and a sequence number (to prevent replay attacks) using the secret
key. The SIM thereby authenticates this token coming from the authentication server,
while the SIM’s response is veriﬁed at the respective gateway.
UMTS and LTE also provide explicit integrity protection on certain messages,
through computing aMAC over thesemessages using an extra session key: the integ-
rity key. GSM only has encryption on its messages, which, since the encryption key
results from the authentication process, is assumed to provide some authentication.
Since encryption in GSM is provided by XORing keystream with plaintext, there is
no integrity protection; simply ﬂipping a bit on the ciphertext will ﬂip the underlying
plaintext bit. In other words the cipher is malleable.
There is also a difference how far into the network the connection is secured. In
GSM the encryption key is forwarded to the cell tower, which decryptsmessages com-
ing from the phone and encrypts messages going towards the phone. For UMTS the
3GPP consortium chose to secure the user link all the way to the ﬁrst gateway within
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Figure 2.3: Authentication, confidentiality and integrity in 3GPP networks
the core network. LTE has a secured signalling connection between the phone and
the signalling gateway and a separately secured user data connection between the
phone and the cell tower. Additionally, all connections within the provider’s network
are to be secured by IPSEC [69]. This setup was chosen to allow cheaper handovers
between connected cell towers, as the encryption and integrity key for the user data
connection can be forwarded between directly connected cell towers.
2.4 Equipment and software used
During this researchwe used several different pieces of hardware and different open-
source software projects; these aremost prominently used in the practical sections of
Chapters 3 and 6. This section describes the hardware and software used and some
of their limitations. The different combinations are ordered by their capabilities.
19
2 Background
2.4.1 Analysis and eavesdropping of the air interface
There are several options for analysis and eavesdropping on the GSM air interfaces.
For the other 3GPP protocols, this is more complicated. Hardware is available for
catching air interface signals of UMTS or LTE, but we found no software driving this
hardware. Also, as will be explained in detail in Section 3.5, the newer generations air
interfaces are not as susceptible to eavesdropping as GSM is.
USRP + AirProbe
The Universal Software Radio Peripherals (USRPs) are a series of generic transceiver
devices developed byMatt Ettus andwhich canbe ordered throughhis companyEttus
Research [49]. Originally, these deviceswhere introduced as open hardware, although
it is unclear where the designs of the devices can be found. The different models
cost somewhere between 600 and 4000 euros, with the base USRP1 model costing
615,- euros. The devices are transceivers that can be linked to a computer and can be
tailored to speciﬁc frequencies by extending itwith daughter boards andattaching the
appropriate antenna. TheUSRPs contain a programmable FPGAwhich can be used to
perform some signal processing, some digital-to-analog (DAC) and analog-to-digital
(ADC) converters and a communication port for the connectionwith a host computer.
Depending on the model, the converters and the computational power of the FPGA
range in quality. The communication port also ranges between a USB2.0, a USB3.0 or
single to dual Gigabit Ethernet connections. We used the USRP1, then simply known
as the USRP, as it was the only model available when we started this research.
The USRP can be extended with a daughter board in order to receive the correct
frequency spectrum. We have used several daughterboards:
• a DBSRX, a 800 MHz to 2.4 GHz receive-only board,
• a WBX, a 50 MHz to 2.2 GHz transceiver board, and
• twoRFX1800, 1.5 to 2.1 GHz, ofwhich theﬁrmware canbeﬂashed to change them
into RFX900s, 750 to 1050 MHz transceiver boards.
For eavesdropping and analysis of GSM frequencies all boards functioned with sim-
ilar results. In Section 2.4.4, we detail why the USRP was incapable of following GSM
signals over multiple frequencies (frequency hopping).
GNU Radio [82] is a free software toolkit licensed under GPL for implementing
software-deﬁned radios. It was started by Eric Blossom. Basically GNU Radio is a
library containing lots of standard signal processing functions, such as ﬁlters and
(de)modulations and offers a general interface to a transceiver. GNU Radio mainly
functions as the driver of the USRPs. GNU Radio, out-of-the-box, does not offer much
in terms of GSM snifﬁng capabilities. However, GNU Radio can be used by other soft-
ware packages, such as AirProbe, to perform the low level functions of GSM snifﬁng,
such as reception and demodulation.
AirProbe [29] is an open-source project aimed at learning the details of GSM tech-
nology, helping people who develop other open GSM technology and demonstrating
the insecurity of the current GSM standard. Currently, AirProbe supports snifﬁng on
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single frequency GSM downlink (cell tower to phone) trafﬁc and it can interpret sev-
eral types (but not all) of bursts (GSMpackets). There has not beenmuch development
for AirProbe in the last three years to add the missing functionality.
Motorola C123 + OsmocomBB
OsmocomBB [139] offers a new ﬁrmware for the Texas Instruments Calypso baseband
chip (the closed source component inside phones, handling the 3GPP protocol). One
of the phones containing this baseband chip is the Motorola C123. This phone (as
well as most Calypso phones) has a 3.3V serial port on its 2.5 mm audio jack. Using a
converter cable the phone can be connected to a PC’s USB port.
With theOsmocomBBsoftware it is possible to re-ﬂash thephone, with codehand-
ling only the lowest layer of the GSM protocol. All higher layers then run on the con-
nected PC. This allows a user to change the phone’s behaviour to, for instance, listen
to GSM channels destined for other phones. While the OsmocomBB project offers
interesting capabilities, it is not an out-of-the-box eavesdropping project, as several
necessary parts for this have not been released. Section 3.3.1 details the use of the
OsmocomBB project within an eavesdropping attack.
Nokia 3210 + Gammu
We also made extensive use of a Nokia 3210 GSM phone, connected to a computer,
also via USB, running the open-source Gammu [2] project. This combination enabled
us to force the Nokia 3210 in a debug mode that transparently logs all packets sent to
and from the phone.
The Gammu + Nokia phone method has much better reception than the USRP +
AirProbe. This makes sense, since after all the mobile phone is speciﬁcally made to
receive these signals. Since this only uses functionality already present in the Nokia
3210, you only see the messages to or from the speciﬁc phone connected to the com-
puter. You cannot see any message for other phones, nor is it possible to change the
phone’s behaviour in this manner. So, Gammu with a Nokia 3210 is a great practical
aid to get a better grasp of the GSM protocol and to ﬁne-tune the USRP, but it lacks the
versatility to be useful in a eavesdropping attack.
2.4.2 Running our own GSM network
We ran our own GSM network for several different research goals. Next to the insight
provided by running your own network, it allowed for testing the difﬁculty of eaves-
dropping on single frequency cells, and our fuzzing research discussed in Chapter 6.
Again for the newer generation 3GPP networks there is little availability of open-
source software for running your own network. There is commercial LTE software
available which requires a USRP [14], but this software is not open-source, making it
harder to make changes in its operation for, for instance, fuzzing.
In the Netherlands, the regulatory body for frequency spectrum use within the
Dutch ether, the Agentschap Telecom [1], decided to make a small part of the GSM
frequency freely available. This spectrum, speciﬁcally 1782.1 to 1784.9 MHz for the
uplink and 1877.5 to 1880MHz for the downlink can be used for running you own GSM
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network. Doing this does not require a license, but you should register your network
use.
USRP + OpenBTS
The USRPwas discussed earlier in this section. Using the USRP as a GSM basestation
required some adaptation. The USRPs have a 64MHz crystal oscillator internal clock,
while most GSM phones use a 13MHz symbol clock with a much better accuracy. Of
course the 64MHz samples can be re-sampled to (a multiple of) 13MHz, although this
brings an extra computing complexity. Also the USRP’s oscillators are much less ac-
curate and can showquite somedriftwhen compared toGSMsystemclocks, resulting
in bad reception. Using amore accurate external clock providing a pulse at (amultiple
of) 13MHz solves these issues. We used the programmable Fairwaves Clocktamer for
this [71].
OpenBTS [26], founded by David Burgess, offers an open-source cell tower im-
plementation for GSM using the USRP as a transceiver. Some of the logic normally
present in a cell tower controller is placed inside OpenBTS. The OpenBTS software
can be connected with Asterisk [7], which is an open-source software project imple-
menting a telephone exchange, and has the option to connect to a VOIP network.
2.4.3 SIM cards and the SIM-phone interface
While not directly a subject in this thesis, the phone-SIM interface is interesting, if
only to observe. This can for instance tell you when a phone has to re-authenticate
to a network without having to observe the air interface. This makes this method of
research often the only available option when investigating UMTS or LTE networks.
The SIM-Phone interface uses a standard ISO 7816 smartcard interface.
RebelSim Scanner
The RebelSim scanner [146] provides passive eavesdropping between the phone and
SIM card. This is achieved by providing a SIM to smartcard holder, which allows the
original SIM card to be inserted in a smartcard reader. This smartcard reader then for-
wards all communication to dummySIM-shaped connectorswhich can be inserted in
the phone and meanwhile also copies all communication to a serial port connection
which can be observed on a PC. This setup is shown in Figure 2.5. These SIM-shaped
connectors are used by several other projects aimed at examining the Phone-SIM in-
terface, discussed below. These connectors allow access to the phone-SIM interface,
while the phone is in operation. A detailed photo of such a connector is shown in Fig-
ure 2.4. The RebelSim connectors are only available in the standard SIM size and not
in the currently much used micro or nano SIM shape.
There are some tools out there, such as SimParser.pl [80], which help understand
the output given by RebelSim Scanner.
SmartLogic Tool
While theSIM tracer only allowspassive eavesdroppingon thecommunicationbetween
SIM and Phone, the SmartLogic Tool [37] can actively insert commands. It is a sniffer
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Figure 2.4: The RebelSim SIM shaped connector.
Figure 2.5: The RebelSim Scanner setup, which uses a SIM shaped connector to eavesdrop the com-
munication between SIM and Phone.
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Figure 2.6: The SmartLogic setup, which uses the RebelSim setup, but extents it by simulating a SIM
card. Optionally an actual SIM card can be read through a card reader.
and MitM tool for smartcard communication, originally designed for bank cards.
The SmartLogic tool uses an FPGA board to essentially emulate a SIM card within
the RebelSim setup, as is shown in Figure 2.6. Optionally, an actual SIM card can be
read by a card reader connected to a server. The SmartLogic FPGA board can either
fully implement a SIM card, relay all communication to the SIM card at the server,
or anything in between. This allows for listening to and manipulating of SIM-phone
trafﬁc. In our experiments it turned out that this was mostly successful with older
phones [81]. It seems the speeds of communication of SIM cards is much higher than
of bank cards, which caused unreliable connections with the SmartLogic tool.
Bladox Turbo SIM
The Bladox Turbo SIM [18], is a thin sheet with SIM connectors on both sides and a
small chip. It can be inserted inside a phone, between the SIM and the phone, and
will Man-in-the-Middle the trafﬁc between both, based on the programming of the
chip. A part of the original SIM card will usually need to be cut off, to accommodate
the chip, as can be seen in Figure 2.7.
This offers, for instance, the ability to add new functionality to the SIM, without
having actual access to the SIM, but it can also change the commands and/or re-
sponses between SIM and phone. It is convenient in that thewhole setup is contained
within a phone and so does not need any wires sticking out. However, programming
the Turbo SIM can be quite a hassle and debugging is very hard. It is also not very
useful for simple observation of the SIM-Phone interface, due to limited storage.
2.4.4 Problems using the USRP to eavesdrop on GSM
Many GSM cell towers transmit on multiple frequencies. To achieve an average sig-
nal reception quality, most data connectionswith phoneswill switch rapidly between
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Figure 2.7: Picture from the Bladox website [18] showing how to cut the SIM card to place the Turbo
SIM in between SIM and phone.
these frequencies, a process referred to as “frequency hopping”. While not a secur-
ity measure per se, the hopping sequence, which is often negotiated conﬁdentially,
makes eavesdropping on GSM frequencies much harder, especially when using gen-
eric equipment like the USRP.
In its standard conﬁguration a USRP1 creates 16 bit I and Q samples when receiv-
ing a given frequency. These are complex samples, with the real part (Q) describing
the cosine of the signal, and the imaginary part (I) describing the sine of the signal
plus 90 degrees. One sample is thus 32 bit long and can be sent to the host computer
through the communication port, for further processing. The USRP1 can receive a
bandwidth of 32MHz and can transmit on a bandwidth of 64MHz. It transmits the
samples to the host computer via a USB2.0 connection, which has a practical max-
imum data throughput of 32 Mbyte/s. Other USRP models can receive and transmit
on a bandwidth of up to 120 MHz, but the costs rise quickly.
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the internal clock of the more affordable USRP1 has
a too imprecise internal clock. An issue that can be solved by using a more accurate
external clock.
The main problem for reception is the channel hopping used in most GSM net-
works. Using the AirProbe software out of the box helps you receive a single carrier
on the down link (messages from cell tower to mobile). In order to capture an en-
tire conversation when channel hopping is used, you will need a way to gather all the
bursts on all the different frequencies. There are two general approaches to achieve
this:
I. Let the USRP follow the hopping sequence.
II. Capture all possible frequencies and attempt to follow the sequence afterwards.
Approach I requires a lot of processing inside the USRP’s FPGA. All the parameters for
the hopping sequence need to be retrieved from certain bursts, then the hopping se-
quence needs to be calculated and followed for every burst. There are three possible
conﬁgurations for mobile networks in which to transmit the hopping sequence para-
meters. In one of these the parameters are transmitted in the clear. In the other two
conﬁgurations these parameters are transmitted after encryption has been enabled.
During our experiments we only ever observed cell towers that use so-called “early
assignment”, inwhich the hopping parameters are transmitted under encryption. Be-
sides, the network can always command a new hopping sequence under encryption,
irrespective of which conﬁguration is used. This necessitates breaking the encryp-
tion really fast in order to follow the hopping sequence in time. This is currently not
possible. The USRP’s FPGA only samples a certain frequency at a certain rate and
sends these samples to a computer. So having the FPGA decrypt and interpret the
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bursts in order to follow the hopping sequence will require a lot of implementation. It
is questionable whether even the faster FPGA offered by some USRP models will be
able to decrypt messages and then compute the hopping sequence in time. This ap-
proach might need additional FPGAs, and thus additional costs, to pull off. Also the
tune delays of the USRP’s hardware (the time between a “tune” command and themo-
ment the USRP retrieves usable samples from the desired frequency) seem too large
at the moment and need to be brought down. However, it is an approach that should
work for every cell tower and regardless of the amount of trafﬁc.
Approach II requires the capture of large amounts of data, namely to log all chan-
nels and determine the hopping sequence later. The problemhere lies in reducing the
data theUSRPsends on to the computer. Ahopping sequence canhopbetween64 car-
rier frequencies at maximum. These carriers are all 200 KHz wide, and can be spread
out evenly on the entire GSM spectrum. So, worst case the attacker has to capture
the entire GSM band (for GSM900 this is 25MHz for the up or down link). The problem
here is data throughput to the PC. Each sample of a USRP is represented by two 16 bit
numbers. For the USRP1’s USB2.0 connection this means that the maximum band-
width that can be sent to the computer is around 8MHz (8MHz ×2× 16 = 256Mbit/s).
The USRPs with a GBE connection can manage around 30MHz, which is enough for
one sided capture of GSM900. The top model USRP X-310, with two GBE interfaces
could capture the entire uplink and downlink frequency bands with a single device.
Thiswould require the host computer to be able to process 100MByte/s of data (25MHz
×2 × 16 = 800Mbit/s) and even 200 MByte/s for both up and down link, which is too
much for most PCs.
Of course someoptimisations are possible. A single cell towernever serves the en-
tire GSM frequency band. This means that you can already discard all carriers above
the top frequency and all carriers below the lowest frequency of a speciﬁc cell tower.
However, that approach will not work for most situations, since the maximal number
of carriers (64) for a single cell tower is still too large for theUSRP. Also, since theUSRP
can only receive a continuous frequency band, if the top and bottom frequencies are
too far apart, this approach will not work.
Another optimisation would be to have the FPGA discard all channels that have
no trafﬁc on them. This will of course only be effective if only a few phones are active
–as in calling – at the same time. It would be even better to have the FPGA interpret
enough of the bursts, so it can already drop some that are not a part on the conver-
sation the attacker tries to capture. This optimisation does see the same problems as
those with the ﬁrst approach because it requires a lot of FPGA computation – though
less so, because the FPGA does not need to crack A5/1 in the second approach.
The objections stated above, however, do not formaproblem if the cell tower under
attack does not employ channel hopping, or only transmits on a few frequencies in
a tight spectrum. On such cell towers eavesdropping using an USRP is a genuine
possibility. It is not clear howmany, if any, of the cell towers in operation, match one
of these conditions. This makes it hard to estimate the risk in the current situation.
During this research only a handful of cell towers were observed, but none of those
fulﬁlled these conditions that would allow eavesdropping using the USRP.
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2.4.5 Interesting hardware we did not use
There is a lot of hard and software availablewhichwe did not use during this research
and which looks interesting. The most notable of these include:
• RTL-SDR [149] is a project where you can make a transceiver for a software
deﬁned radio out of a $20 TV tuner. The website reports success in using this
transceiver for snifﬁng GSM signals.
• Osmo SDR [162], the Osmocom Software Deﬁned Radio, is much cheaper than
an USRP, and should be an able replacement for GSM research. Currently, the
ﬁrmware is not ready.
• OpenBSC [189] is an open-source software project for running your own GSM
network. In essence it implements the Cell Tower Controller from Figure 2.1.
Theproject requires a cell tower andcurrently supports several options, amongst
which is their own OsmoBTS project, which implements a cell tower and can
even run on two OsmocomBB phones.
• Osmocom SIMtrace [140] can be used to monitor the phone-SIM communica-
tion, but also emulate a phone or SIM, or be a Man-in-the-Middle between the
phone and SIM. While the hardware supports all these modes, only the mon-
itoring aspect has been implemented in software. SIMtrace also uses the SIM
connector from the RebelSim to connect to the phones, but recently they made
their own connectors, including a micro SIM connector.
• Other USRPs [49]. As we discussed in Section 2.4 on USRPs, there are currently
manydifferentmodels ofUSRP.Althougha lotmore expensive thanother trans-
ceivers discussed in this list, these USRPs are probably also higher quality and
more versatile.
The fact we did not use any of these devices should not be taken as a negative,
as these devices where simply not available at the time we started this research. So,
these might be useful to consider for any researcher wanting to start with practical
research into mobile telephony.
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Chapter 3
Security of the wireless interface
This chapter looks at the “physical layer” and protocols used on the wireless inter-
face of mobile telephony networks. We discuss the current state of conﬁdentiality
of communication over the wireless interfaces of the 3GPP networks. The bulk of
this chapter discusses attacks against GSM, since attacks on the newer technologies
UMTS and LTE, can often be reduced to an attack on GSM, by jamming the frequen-
cies used for UMTS and LTE. Some of the attacks against GSM involve a Time-Memory
Trade-Off attack against the cryptographymost commonly used inGSM,which is dis-
cussed at length in Chapter 4.
This chapter discusses different attacks, both passive and active, and assesses
the difﬁculty to perform these attacks using available hardware and software. Al-
though this chapter focuses on conﬁdentiality, authentication is also an important
property as weaknesses in the authentication allow for the active attacks. We ana-
lyse theweaknesses in GSM that lead to these attacks and showwhich of theseweak-
nesses are resolved by the newer generation networks: UMTS and LTE.
This chapter provides a ﬁrst comprehensive account of (often partial) attacks dis-
cussed in [10, 13, 132], taking into account both theoretical aspects and the practicalit-
ies of actually intercepting or spooﬁng wireless 3GPP trafﬁc.
This chapter is based on the paper Eavesdropping on GSM: state-of-affairs, presen-
ted at the 5th Benelux Workshop on Information and System Security, WISSec 2010
[173]. It has been updated extensively to accurately represent the current state of mo-
bile telephony security in early 2016. The original publication only considered the use
of universal radio reception equipment (speciﬁcally the USRP) for eavesdropping at-
tacks. Since then, these attacks were demonstrated using modiﬁed mobile phones,
the description of which has been added for this chapter. An overview of the differ-
ent active attacks was also added compared to the original publication, as was the
description of the added security offered by newer generation networks.
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3.1 Introduction
At the end of 2009 look-up tables usable for a brute-force attack against the main
cipher used in GSM where released [135]. Chapter 4 will discuss the exact method
behind these tables in detail. At that time it was thought that these tables could be
combined with open-source hardware and software, which were capable of captur-
ing the GSM frequencies, to eavesdrop on GSM conversations. In 2011 the practicality
of these tableswas demonstrated in an attack, but nowusing four speciﬁc phones and
newly written software [13].
We use the common term ‘eavesdropping’ above, but in this chapter we are in-
terested in any possibility of breaking the conﬁdentiality of the wireless link. At-
tacks against the conﬁdentiality can be classiﬁed in twomajor categories: active and
passive, that is to say eavesdropping or Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The Man-in-the-
Middle attacks are possible because of weak authentication, which is therefore the
second security goal this chapter focuses on. We solely focus on attacks against the
wireless connection in this chapter and fornowdonot look into the endpoint security.
Both the end points of the wireless connection, the mobile phone and the operator’s
network, will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
We review the known passive and active attack against conﬁdentiality on GSM’s
wireless link in Section 3.2. We then discuss the feasibility of performing these at-
tacks using easily available software and off-the-shelve hardware in Section 3.3. This
discussionwill introduce somespeciﬁcs ofGSM’s air interface, butwill not give a com-
plete overview. For such an overview we refer the reader to [172] or 3GPP’s speciﬁc-
ations [164]. Section 3.4 analyses the weaknesses in GSM that enable the discussed
attacks. This section also discusses the possible countermeasures within GSM. We
then look at the newer generation 3GPP protocols and how they implement secur-
ity measures that protect against the conﬁdentiality attacks on GSM in Section 3.5.
Finally we draw conclusions in Section 3.6.
3.2 Attacking GSM wireless conﬁdentiality
There are two major ways to attack conﬁdentiality on the GSM wireless link:
1. active,
2. passive.
With active wemean those attacks in which an attacker at some point transmits sig-
nals himself. This is in contrast to passive attacks where the attacker only ever re-
ceives messages. Active attacks are noticeable due to the attacker’s transmissions,
while passive attacks are completely undetectable.
It is not a question if it is possible to break the conﬁdentiality on the wireless link,
offered by GSM. For years there has been commercial equipment available capable
of eavesdropping conversations or textmessages [157]. How this equipment achieves
this is not publicly known. In 2011 researchers demonstrated an eavesdropping attack
[13]. This section focuses on how such attacks can work. In Section 3.3 we examine
how feasible these attacks are using readily available equipment and software.
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3.2.1 Passive attacks – Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping on GSM, or probably any communication system for that matter, can
be broken down into three stages:
1. Capturing the signals.
2. Decrypting the captured signals.
3. Interpreting the decrypted signals.
This section will look at these steps in more detail.
Capturing the signals
This ﬁrst stage was a major obstacle for many years. Specialised equipment to cap-
ture the GSM signals has long been around, but was very expensive and often propri-
etary. GSM can be used on several frequency bands, but most commonly used are the
GSM-900 and GSM-1800 bands. The frequency bands are divided into channels of 200
KHz wide each. In a typical conversation two of these channels will be used at any
given time for a mobile phone to communicate with the cell tower, one channel for
each direction. These channels are separated by a constant offset.
One part of a phone conversation in a GSM network, e.g. 20ms of speech data, is
transmitted in four packets, called bursts in GSM. These bursts are modulated radio
waves transmitted in a time slot of 576.9 µs. Most GSM networks employ channel hop-
ping, which is used as a signal qualitymeasure, and causes the transmission to switch
to a new frequency after every single burst. The challenge in capturing the GSM sig-
nals lies in receiving the bursts on time and in demodulating them correctly, in other
words: to be able to follow the channel hopping sequence with enough precision.
SMS messages, on the other hand, are usually transmitted over control channels
which can be easier to capture, as these control channels often do not use frequency
hopping.
Basically, capturing these signals requires any form of radio receiver capable of
receiving signals on the required frequency and then either following all frequencies
currently being used, or being able to follow the hopping sequence fast enough. Ori-
ginally, thoughts went out to using general reception equipment such as the Univer-
sal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP). This failed to defeat the channel hopping prob-
lem and so only worked on single frequency cells. However, a solution was found
in one speciﬁc baseband chip (baseband chips are the closed-source dedicated hard-
ware component running the GSM protocol in mobile phones), of which the source
code had appeared online several years before. The knowledge of this code made it
possible to reverse engineer this chip and ﬁnd a way to ﬂash the chip with new soft-
ware, allowing the capturing of GSM signals and feeding these back to a computer.
This attack requires several phones in order to bypass the frequency hopping prob-
lem. Usually two phones are used for the up link and two phones are used to monitor
the down link frequencies. These hardware approaches are detailed in Section 3.3.1.
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Decrypting the captured signals
Assuming that encryption is enabled on the GSM network, decrypting the captured
bursts is the next step. Otherwise, the decryption step is unnecessary. There are
three encryption algorithms deﬁned for GSM: A5/1 and A5/2, both stream ciphers, and
A5/3, a block cipher. Of these three A5/2 is by far the weakest and can be broken
in less than a second on a personal computer with only a few dozen milliseconds of
ciphertext [10]. TheA5/3 algorithm is considered the strongest encryptionof the three.
A5/3 saw a theoretical break in 2010 by Dunkelman et al. [42]. This attacks requires
226 chosen plaintext messages encrypted under related keys. For now this does not
lead to a practical attack on A5/3, though it is cause for concern since this weakness
does not exist in MISTY, the cipher that A5/3 was based on. At the moment of writing
no attack on A5/3 is feasible, the future will tell whether this remains so.
A5/1 has been the main encryption algorithm used in most Western countries.
Even though its successor, A5/3, has been recommended for use since 2004, we are
only seeing serious adoption since the public attack on GSM from 2011 [13]. January
of 2016 was the ﬁrst time we saw more than half of the mobile networks in the Neth-
erlands support A5/3 [88].
A5/1 is a streamcipherwith three registers that clock irregularly (the internal state
is shown in Figure 4.7 on page 69) and have a combined size of 64 bits —which is also
the size of the session key. The A5/1 algorithm was the ﬁrst encryption algorithm
used in GSM. It was originally kept secret and was only disclosed to GSM manufac-
turers under an NDA. In 1999 though, Marc Briceno reverse engineered the design of
both A5/1 and A5/2 from a GSM phone [25]. Several attacks against A5/1 have been
published since then [86, 10, 9].
The best cryptanalytic attack against A5/1 is by Golic in 1997 [86], which recov-
ers the initial internal state of the A5/1 cipher from 64 successive keystream bits, by
guessing several bits of the internal state and ﬁnding the rest by solving, on average
240.16 equations. The most practical attack available to anyone is a Time-Memory
Trade-Off attack, for which the look-up tables are now available on-line. We discuss
this attack and the available software in Section 3.3.2.
Interpreting the decrypted signals
After the signals have been captured and deciphered they still need to be interpreted.
The payload of the bursts needs to be reordered and can be checked for transmission
errors. Besides the cryptography, all the speciﬁcations of GSM are public, so this does
not require any reverse engineering. Several projects that implement a GSM stack are
discussed in Section 3.3.3 and can be used to interpret the decrypted signals.
3.2.2 Active attacks
We described active attacks on the wireless link as attacks in which the attacker
transmits signals. These could for instance be jamming the frequencies to achieve
a Denial-of-Service, or fuzzing attacks, weremalicious packets are transmitted to net-
work equipment to trigger undeﬁned behaviour, as is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
However, in this chapter we are focusing on attacks against conﬁdentiality on the
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Figure 3.1: A schematic representation of authentication in GSM. A successful authentication will also
result into both sides having the same session key.
wireless link, which leaves us with three more-or-less separate attacks: a full MitM
attack, a sort-of one-way MitM attack and an active key-retrieval attack. These at-
tacks will be detailed in the following sections, where we assume an attacker is cap-
able of interpreting the signals he intercepts, e.g. by way of the open source projects
discussed in Section 3.3. We discuss the available software for running an active at-
tack in Section 3.3.4.
All of these attacks are possible because in GSM the mobile phones (actually SIM
cards) do not authenticate the cell towers. Figure 3.1 shows the authentication steps
between a SIM card in a mobile phone and the mobile phone network. Such an au-
thentication is always triggered by the network and is based on both the network and
the SIM card (handed out by the network provider) knowing the same symmetric key
(Ki ). Before the authentication starts the network needs to knowwhich SIM it is deal-
ing with, so at some earlier point in time the SIM has to have identiﬁed itself. Usually
the SIM will identify itself by transmitting a temporary pseudonym (called the TMSI,
for Temporary IMSI), but at least the very ﬁrst time the SIM identiﬁes itself to the net-
work, or any other time when the network does not recognise the TMSI, the SIM will
transmit its unique identiﬁer, the IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity). The
network transmits a challenge (Rand) and upon reception of the challenge the SIM
computes a response (Res) using the challenge, the secret key and an authentication
algorithm (A3). The network veriﬁes the response and if found correct then the SIM
card (and by extension the mobile phone containing the SIM card) is authenticated.
After a successful authentication both parties also end up with a shared session key
(Kc) based on the challenge, which can be used to encrypt further communication.
Both the authentication procedure and command to start encrypting the commu-
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nication are initiated by the network alone. The authentication and key-generating
algorithms are called A3 and A8, respectively. In essence, both need to be cryp-
tographic hash functions. Providers can choose whatever they want for these al-
gorithms, since they control both the SIM card and the network server generating
the challenge and resulting response and session key. Some example algorithms are
provided for combined A3/A8 calculation by ETSI, which are called COMP128, which
in time-honoured tradition were kept conﬁdential. These were quite popular in the
early days of GSM, but after being reverse engineered by Briceno et al. they proved to
be simple to break [24]. The reverse engineering of A3/A8 also showed that COMP128
actually delivered a 54 bits session key with ten appended zeros. Now it is assumed
most providers stopped using these weak authentication algorithms. Indeed, of all
the SIMs that were examined during this research project – around ﬁfteen of them
– only one pre-paid SIM still generated 54 bit keys. 3GPP proposed new algorithms
for A3/A8 for 3G capable (U)SIMs, leveraging the much better algorithms provided by
3G [60]. These algorithm have all been published and have thus far withstood public
scrutiny.
The encrypt command includes the choice of encryption algorithm, which can be
a null-cipher (A5/0), the original A5/1 cipher, the much weaker A5/2 or the strongest
cipher A5/3. For this section we will assume the network uses strong encryption (i.e.
A5/3) as otherwise the whole exercise of an active attack is less useful.
Man-in-the-Middle
In aMitMattack anattacker placeshimself in betweenaphoneanda cell tower, acting
as the cell tower towards the victim’s phone and as the phone towards the cell tower.
Figure 3.2 gives a schematic overview of the MitM attack.
Assuming the attacker cannot break the authentication algorithm, and the chal-
lenges are not repeated, the attacker can not provide the correct response to the chal-
lenge himself. All he can do is forward the challenge to the actual mobile phone, and
forward its response back to the network. After this step both the network and the
phone will have a shared session key for encryption, which remains unknown to the
attacker.
For all communication that follows, no explicit authentication step is performed,
the identity of the phone is assumed by the network if it knows the shared session
key, until the network decides to re-authenticate the phone.
Retrieving the session key can be done by initiating some false incoming commu-
nication to the phone, which is encrypted with the very weak A5/2 algorithm. This
communication can be anything, e.g. a silent SMS, so the victim remains unaware of
the attack. The attacker, acting as the valid cell tower, will issue a command to start
ciphering to the phone (CIPHERING MODE COMMAND), which includes the chosen
cipher (e.g. A5/2). after which the phone will respond with a success message (CI-
PHERING MODE COMPLETE) encrypted with the chosen cipher. Since the contents
of this success message can be guessed almost completely, the attacker can retrieve
the key used for encryption, as described in Section 3.2.1, which is the session key
shared between phone and network. After obtaining the key and closing the connec-
tion with the phone, the attacker is in a MitM position between phone and network,
capable of intercepting any communication until the next authentication command
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Figure 3.2: A schematic representation of the MitM attack.
from the network.
Barkan et al. [10] argued the possibility of attacking the authentication step in
much the sameway. This attack is illustrated by Figure 3.2, where the speciﬁed delay
between the network’s challenge and the phone’s response – a whole 12 seconds – is
long enough to retrieve the session key in the sameway as in the attack above, before
sending the response on to the network. This is a stronger attack, as any authentica-
tion command is immediately defeated.
There is anotherMitM attack possible, which is also presented by Barkan et al. [10],
wherein the attacker changes one of the initial messages sent from the phone to the
network detailing the phone’s capabilities. This so-called class-mark message con-
tains among others, the ciphering capabilities of the phone. By removing the phone’s
ability to support A5/1 and A5/3, the networkwill have no choice but to default to A5/0
or A5/2.
One-way MitM
The previous scenario showed a classicMan-in-the-Middle attack. In this easier vari-
ant the attacker only acts as a cell tower towards the victim’s phone, but not as the
victim’s phone towards the network. This means that this MitM attack will only help
the attacker listen in on outgoing trafﬁc (i.e. trafﬁc instigated by the mobile phone)
and not incoming trafﬁc [142]. This attack is represented schematically in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: A schematic representation of the one-way MitM attack.
Here, the attacker acts as a fake cell tower (fake BTS) and when the victim phone
connects, starts the standard authentication procedure. Since, the attacker does not
know the correct response to his challenge, he will simply accept any response com-
ing from the victim. Then, once the mobile phone wants to start a call (or send out a
text message), it will notify the attacker’s cell tower of this. The attacker’s cell tower
simply behaves as a normal cell tower, but tells the mobile phone not to use encryp-
tion. The attacker will then need a different channel through which he forwards the
call. This can for instance be another mobile phone, or a VOIP connection. The at-
tacker then sets up the connection to the callee, using the encryption required by the
medium he is using, encrypting the data stream of the caller and decrypting the data
stream of the callee. In this attack the callee could notice the incoming call originat-
ing from a different number than normal. Therefore, the attacker should use a hidden
number; This could still deviate from what the callee expects, but would be less sus-
picious.
Active key-retrieval
As a last, partly active attack we consider the active key-retrieval attack. In this at-
tack an attacker obtains both the initial authentication command from the network
and the subsequent encrypted communication to and from the victim’s phone. The
attacker does this either by passive eavesdropping, or through a MitM attack. The at-
tacker can then, at any moment in time, present himself as a cell tower to the victim
phone, re-using the captured authentication command. As the resulting session key
is derived from just the random and the secret key, this results in the same session
key. The attacker can then start any form of encrypted A5/2 communication with the
victim phone to retrieve the session key and then decrypt the encrypted communic-
ation obtained earlier [10].
This attack is essentially the same as the ﬁrst MitM attack, except for the timing
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of the key-retrieval. Also, this attack reduces the time the attacker has to be active.
3.3 The practical implementation
Eavesdropping on GSM is possible — equipment can be bought that allows for eaves-
dropping on A5/1 and A5/2 encrypted conversations [157], but this equipment is sold
restrictively to lawenforcement agencies andmilitary, andat ahighprice. But attacks
using readily available equipment and some open-source software1 against conﬁden-
tiality on GSM’s wireless link were presented in 2010 [132] and demonstrated in 2011
[13]. This section covers the current landscape of such hardware and software.
As we discussed in the previous section, a passive attack requires the means to
(1) capture the signals, (2) decrypt the captured signals and (3) interpret the decryp-
ted signals. For an active attack, the only extra functionality needed is to act as a cell
tower and possibly as amobile phone. Wewill look at each of these separately. We re-
viewedmost of these hardware components and software projects in the background
section 2.4.
3.3.1 Capturing the signals
For capturing the GSM signals, there are currently two open-source options:
• AirProbe combined with a USRP, or
• OsmocomBB combined with speciﬁc phones.
Of these two options the second one, OsmocomBB, is currently clearly the best.
Capturing using AirProbe and a USRP
AirProbe [29] is an open-source project implementing an air-interface analysis tool for
the GSM (and possibly in the future also later 3G standards) mobile phone standard.
It uses parts of the GNU Radio library for its signal processing. One part of the project
handles the reception of GSM signals (using the GNU Radio functions) while another
part can also be used to interpret the GSM signals, which is why we will get back to
AirProbe in section 3.3.3. Currently AirProbe is only able to listen to the down link
(cell tower→mobile phone) of conversations, so some development is still required.
GNURadioworkswith several different types ofRFhardware, suchas soundcards,
but it is mostly used in combination with the Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP). In the background chapter (Section 2.4.4) we already discussed the problems
using theUSRP as a generic GSMeavesdropper. In short, the standardUSRP1 can only
support eavesdropping on cell towers that do not use frequency hopping. Improved
versions of the USRP might be able to overcome this limitation, but the prices also
increase to over $2,500. Using these newer USRPswould also require quite some extra
software development effort, but it seemsmost development on getting the USRPs to
workwithAirProbe to eavesdropGSMcommunicationswas haltedwhen it turned out
eavesdropping also works with a couple of $15 phones and the OsmocomBB software.
1With an eye on responsible disclosure not all required software was released to the public.
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Capturing using mobile phones and OsmocomBB
Every GSM-capable mobile phone is by deﬁnition capable of capturing GSM traces of
the air. However, within every GSM capable phone there is a baseband chip which
connects to the phone’s transceiver and handles the GSM protocol. These baseband
chips are all closed source, making it very complicated to direct a standard mobile
phone to listen to frequencies and time-slots outside of those designated to that
phone.
This problem was overcome when the registry level manuals of the Texas Instru-
ments Calypso baseband appeared online for some time. Thesemanuals helped some
researchers to re-ﬂash a functioning Calypso baseband chip with new ﬁrmware. The
newﬁrmware, calledOsmocomBB [139], runs the lowest layer of theGSMwireless pro-
tocol stack on the baseband and the layer two and three on a computer connected to
the baseband. This allows the computer to order the baseband to tune to speciﬁc fre-
quencies and time-slots. The Calypso baseband chip is available through several old
and cheap mobile phones, such as the Motorola C115, C117, C118 and C123, the Sony-
Ericsson J100i and the Pirelli DP-L10. The OsmocomBBwebsite contains instructions
on how to connect several of these mobile phones to a computer. These phones are
limited to capturing downlink (cell tower to phone) trafﬁc; hardware ﬁlters prevent
them from receiving the uplink channels. Again, there are instructions on the Osmo-
comBB website to remove these ﬁlters.
The OsmocomBB software then offers several command line tools to interface
with the phones. There are tools to dump the common broadcast channels of cell
towers. The actual tools to capture the signals belonging to a speciﬁc phone on direc-
ted channels are not released within OsmocomBB.
3.3.2 Decrypting the captured signals
A project was publicly announced in August of 2009 suggesting a way to efﬁciently
break the A5/1 cipher. This project runs under the, slightly unimaginative, name A5/1
[130]. However, in July 2010 the look-up tool for this project was released and named
Kraken. To avoid any confusion with the cipher we will refer to the A5/1 project by the
name Kraken.
The Kraken project mainly consists of creating large tables in a generic time-
memory trade off. This had been proposed before [122], but the distinguishing factor
of this new project is that instead of computing the tables at one place, everybody on
the internet could join in and compute a table and then share themvia bit torrent [133].
The code to compute these tables can be downloaded and it runs on certain types of
NVIDIA and ATI graphics cards.
These tables and the exact Time-Memory Trade-Off technique used here is dis-
cussed and analysed in detail in Chapter 4. In short, the idea behind these tables is as
follows. The contents of several bursts that are sent through the air, after encryption
is enabled, can for a large part be guessed. This gives known plaintext samples. XOR-
ing those plaintext samples with the actually captured ciphertext reveals keystream
samples. The tables now function as a code book with 64 bits of keystream that are
mapped to internal A5/1 states producing that exact piece of keystream. Since stor-
ing all possible 64 bits of keystreamwould be infeasible, these tables store a subset of
these possible samples, making this attack probabilistic.
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In 2010 a set of tables, named the ‘Berlin set,’ was released togetherwith the look-up
tool, Kraken. The tables were distributed via bit-torrent in a special transport format.
Currently this is around 1.5TB of data. This transport format can then be transcoded
into the actual read format, which takes just under 1.7TB disk space. If the key is
in the tables, then Kraken will typically ﬁnd it within a few minutes (around 1 to 4
minutes) on a Intel Core2 Quad 2.33GHzmachine with the tables divided over several
disks. Using solid state memory instead of conventional hard drives for the table
storage signiﬁcantly improves on this look up time, at the expense of an increase in
the ﬁnancial costs.
In the attack that was demonstrated, the hackers transmitted a single SMS mes-
sage to a victim and recorded the reception of that message. Recovering the session
key from this SMS reception allowed eavesdropping on all following communication
using the same session key. It turned out that most providers keep the same “ses-
sion” key for several hours. Some refresh the session key before transmitting SMS
messages, but not before phone calls. It is currently unknown how many providers
changed this setting, which we assume should be simple to adjust.
So in this approach the attacker sends an SMS message, making this a more act-
ive attack. However, there are several (partly) known plaintext messages sent en-
crypted over GSM, also during phone conversations, to allow this attack to happen
completely passively. A knowledgeable attacker should be able to make fairly strong
known plaintext guesses based on observations of the wireless transmissions within
a cell. Software which automatically makes known plaintext guesses has not been
released for reasons of responsible disclosure.
Amajor drawback of this approach is that it requires faultless reception of 64 con-
secutive bits. A single ﬂipped bit in a captured sample will make the sample useless
for retrieving the session key using these tables. In GSM the encryption is performed
on top of the error detection codes, so the error detection cannot be used to ﬁnd recep-
tion errors before the decryption step. Currently the reception from the USRP, while
running AirProbe, does not provide the faultless reception needed by Kraken. Re-
ception with the speciﬁc TI Calypso based phones using the OsmocomBB software
provides reception that is good enough to perform this attack. Still, when generating
encrypted bursts yourself and feeding the keystream directly into Kraken, the tables
usually ﬁnd the session key once in every ﬁve bursts. With actual captured samples
this success rate dropped to about one in twenty in our experiments.
3.3.3 Interpreting the decrypted signals
After the demodulation and decryption steps the bursts need to be interpreted. There
are currently several open-source projects that implement at least part of the GSM
stack. These are the OpenBTS [26], OpenBSC [189], and AirProbe [29] projects.
TheOpenBTS andOpenBSCprojects both aim tooffer a functional open-sourceGSM
network. The AirProbe project on the other hand aims to create a functional sniffer for
GSM trafﬁc. So for eavesdropping activities the AirProbe project seems the most lo-
gical choice. However, the AirProbe project is still lacking some essential functional-
ity. For one, the type of a received burst is decided following the standard, most likely,
division of the broadcast channel, instead ofmaking this decision based on the struc-
ture of the received burst. This means that the results are worse when cell towers
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use non-standard division of the broadcast channels. Also, currently the AirProbe
sniffers can only interpret some types of bursts. At the moment a lot of development
to AirProbe is still necessary in order to be able to receive and interpret all of the GSM
bursts. There does not seem to have been a lot of development into AirProbe over the
last three years.
The OpenBTS and OpenBSC software on the other hand are actively maintained,
but do not offer the functionality to read in decrypted signals from a ﬁle and inter-
preting these. Naturally, all this functionality is present in these software stacks, but
an attacker would still need to develop this ability.
3.3.4 Transmitting GSM signals
The transmission of signals is the only component of these attacks speciﬁc for active
attacks. Whenwe look at the active attacks discussed in Section 3.2.2, we can see that
all attacks require an attacker to act as a cell tower and for one speciﬁc attack (the
MitM attack shown in Figure 3.2) the attacker also needs to be able to impersonate a
mobile phone.
For this ﬁrst capability, impersonating a cell tower there are different options:
• OpenBTS software using a USRP, or
• OpenBSC software using a supported hardware device.
Both options work ﬁne and only require an attacker to implement his own MitM
logic. We used the USRP and OpenBTS combination in our research, as it was hard
to get the supported hardware for OpenBSC when we started in 2010. Now OpenBSC
also supports off-the-shelf hardware.
Acting as a mobile phone is possible using the OsmocomBB software and com-
patible phones. The “mobile” program within OsmocomBB implements most of the
required functions for a mobile phone. Again requiring an attacker to add the logic
for his attack.
3.4 Analysis and countermeasures
Reviewing the passive attack described in Section 3.2.1 and the practical implementa-
tion section above, we can pinpoint the root causes that make these attacks possible:
• re-use of session keys,
• weak ciphers,
• with a too small key length, and
• too much guessable plaintext.
Almost all of the weaknesses of the passive attack can be found in the cryptography
primitives. The A5/1 and A5/2 ciphers can both be considered weak. In the case
of A5/2 this was by design, but A5/1 was, and still is, the main cipher used in GSM.
There are several weaknesses within A5/1, but the main points that made the cipher
40
3.4 Analysis and countermeasures
breakable by a hacker’s cracking project are: (I) the internal state of the stream cipher
is made up out of a meagre (for modern eyes) 64 bits (II) the state-space of the in-
ternal state collapses after several rounds to around 61 bits. These weaknesses of
A5/1, combined with the large number of known plaintext samples led to a workable
Time-Memory Trade-Off attack, which is discussed at length in Chapter 4.
The only non-crypto weakness exploited by the eavesdropping attack is the large
source of known plaintext in the GSM protocol. Messages transmitted over the wire-
less interface are required to have a standard length. If themessage containedwithin
them is smaller, then themessage is padded to the standard length. This padding con-
sists out of a standard pattern of “2b” in hex. There is a revision to the GSM standard to
add random padding to messages [59], but this seems to be hardly ever implemented
[88]. Another source of known plaintext are the so-called SYSTEM INFORMATION 5,
5ter and 6 messages, which are standard control messages transmitted at a predict-
able interval and transmitted both unencrypted and encrypted. An attacker would
need to observe the cell in which he wishes to perform his attack in order to gain the
known plaintext of these control messages and an indication of when they are trans-
mitted. Again, because of reasons of responsible disclosure, no softwarewas released
that automates this work.
Looking at the active attacks we can identify the weaknesses within GSM that
make these attacks possible:
• lack of mutual authentication,
• support for weak or no encryption algorithms,
• each encryption algorithm uses the same key,
• the authentication can be replayed,
• unprotected class-mark message (discussed on page 35).
Most of these weaknesses are on the protocol level. The fact that mobile phones do
not authenticate the network is the obvious weakness here and essentially the root
weakness of every active attack. This allows an attacker to impersonate the network,
and possibly also the phone. The fact that GSM then allows to switch to unencrypted
modes, or weaker encryption, is unfortunate.
There are some practical considerations when performing these active attacks.
• The attacker needs to time his attack before the actual data connection he
wishes to capture is set-up. Just dropping in mid conversation claiming to be
network towards the phone and the phone towards the networkwould not work
as the transmissions of the actual phone and actual cell tower would still reach
each other. Also, the attacker would have to transmit in the correct time slot
which would interfere with the actual transmissions in that time-slot.
• By posing as a cell tower (of the victim’s provider) towards the victim’s phone,
and ensuring that his transmissions are better received than the actual cell
towers (e.g. by also jamming the original cell tower’s frequencies), the phone
will automatically switch to the attacker’s fake cell tower. As these are mobile
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phone systems, the whole design is tolerant to phones being mobile. So, the
network will not be suspicious if a phone no longer responds and the phone is
not suspicious if it sees a new cell tower.
• Since all the active attacks require the attacker to be transmitting, these attacks
could be noticed when the correct frequencies are being monitored. Also, all
attacks that trick the victim phone into using A5/0 are in principle detectable,
as this requires the mobile phone to display an open lock symbol. However,
there is an option on the SIM cardwhich preventsmobile phones from showing
this symbol [58]. There are now also phones on themarket that will warn a user
when the phone is forced to use A5/2, or to use no encryption [157].
3.4.1 Countermeasures
As we already discussed, theoretical attacks against GSM are almost as old as the
GSM system itself. So the GSM industry has had ample time to prepare for the prac-
tical implementations of these attacks. There are several possible countermeasures
against these attacks:
1. encrypt content using A5/3,
2. use random padding in GSM packets,
3. randomise control messages,
4. use newer 3GPP protocols.
These points are discussed in more detail below. These countermeasures mostly
protect against passive eavesdropping, with only the last countermeasure protecting
against active attackers, who then still have the ability to do a fall-back attack to GSM.
The GSMMap project tries to track the implementation of these countermeasures by
the different providers [88].
Encrypt content using A5/3
In Section 3.2.1 we already brieﬂy discussed the A5/3 cipher. This cipher has been
public from its inception, and as yet no feasible attack has been found. So using this
cipher to encrypt conversations prevents eavesdropping.
However, using A5/3 will not improve GSM’s security much. This is due to the
fact that irrespective of the choice of encryption algorithm, the session key used will
be the same. This, combined with the presence of a weak cipher, allow an active at-
tacker to retrieve the session key. Basically the session key is created based on the
secret key, known only to the SIM card and the home network, and a challenge trans-
mitted by the cell tower. This challenge is transmitted in the clear, so an attacker
could replay the authentication, i.e. the “Active key-retrieval attack”, or use the “Man-
in-the-Middle” attack, both discussed in Section 3.2.2. The GSMA (GSM Association)
had been advising the use of A5/3 by providers since 2004. In recent years we have
seen a deﬁnitemove towards A5/3, with 2016 being the ﬁrst year whenmore than 50%
of the mobile networks in the Netherlands offer this stronger encryption [88].
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Use random padding
This defensive strategy speciﬁcally makes the Kraken attack discussed in Section
3.3.2 harder. It revolves around the fact that the information in GSMpackets is padded
to a standard length using a standard pattern of “2b”. Some packets consist almost
entirely of padding bits – for example the “cipher mode complete”, the ﬁrst message
a cell phone transmits enciphered to the cell tower, usually has 144 of its 265 bits
ﬁlled with padding bits – which gives an attacker a large source of known plaintext.
However, the length of the information bits is already described in the packet header,
making the standard padding pattern redundant.
These padding bits can thus be randomised, and that is exactlywhatwas speciﬁed
by ETSI in 2008 [59]. This would remove a large source of known plaintext for an at-
tacker. Without known plaintext there are no known keystream samples which can
be looked up in the Kraken tables.
It is questionable how fast this change will be implemented, however. All the low
level GSM processing is done by closed source GSM stacks, so it is unknown whether
this change would affect the already deployed equipment. The mobile handsets in
the ﬁeld cannot be updated, so this change can only be made in new phones. Also,
this change will not completely remove all known plaintext from the system. Some
messages can still be guessed, such as system information messages, making the
attack described in Section 3.3.2 still feasible for longer conversations.
Randomise control messages
Another large source of knownplaintext comes fromspeciﬁc controlmessageswhose
content an attacker can learn by observing cell tower trafﬁc. These messages are
then also sent encrypted to users, usually in guessable time slots. To prevent this
known plaintext source ETSI speciﬁed the randomisation of these control messages
in 2011 [70]. This speciﬁcation is fairly recent, so not many providers have switched
to using it [88].
Use newer 3GPP protocols
This is kind of a cop-out, but amethod that is at least currently available to quite some
users. The successors of GSM, both the third generation UMTS as the fourth genera-
tion LTE, offer much better security.
In order to fully use this added security, a user should deactivate his phone’s GSM
reception, and solely use UMTS or LTE. Otherwise an attacker could force a phone to
use GSM, by jamming the UMTS or LTE frequencies. Of course the usability of this
solution will depend on the availability of a UMTS or LTE network, and might have
additional data costs. Additionally, voice calls are often not supported over LTE and
only sometimes available over UMTS.
We will examine the extra security offered by newer generation networks in the
next Section.
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3.5 Countermeasures on next generation networks
Learning from the mistakes made in the design of GSM, the designs of newer 3GPP
protocols included several security updates compared to GSM.
UMTS
UMTS provided severalmajor security updates to the 3GPP protocols. For thewireless
interface, themajor updates were the introduction of better cryptographic algorithms
and mutual authentication between SIM and network.
For the new cryptographic algorithms the 3GPP consortium decided to use a by
then more fashionable process of openness, publishing the speciﬁcations of the new
algorithm KASUMI [65]. KASUMI is a block cipher with a 128 bit key and 64 bit in-
put and output. KASUMI is based on the cipher MISTY1, which was developed by
Mitshubishi. The name KASUMI is Japanese for “mist.” This new cipher was intro-
duced in GSM as A5/3, with the only difference being a support for keys of size 64 bits
(by simply doubling the key bits). As we already discussed in Section 3.2.1, the best
known attack against KASUMI is a related key attack requiring 226 chosen plaintext
messages encrypted under related keys [42]. This is infeasible in a UMTS/GSM set-
ting, but it is cause for concern that this sameweakness does not exists in the original
MISTY cipher.
3GPP also introduced a new stream cipher SNOW 3G, which is based on SNOW, a
stream cipher by Lund University [62]. This cipher also revealed a vulnerability under
a related key attack [111]. Again this attack seems infeasible within UMTS. Both al-
gorithms have now been under public scrutiny for over ten years and no practical
attack has been found, so both algorithms should offer protection against passive
eavesdropping attacks.
In addition to conﬁdentiality on the wireless link UMTS also introduced integrity
on several messages by including a MAC. The computation of the MAC is also done
by using KASUMI, but in a different mode (a chained mode), than for encryption (an
output-feedback mode) and under a different key [66].
The most important security update for UMTS though, was the introduction of
mutual authentication between network and SIM, which prevents all active attacks
discussed in this chapter. A schematic overview of the so-called Authentication and
Key Agreement (AKA) procedure in UMTS is shown in Figure 3.4 [68]. The different f1
to f5 algorithms can be chosen by the providers, just as the A3 and A8 algorithms in
GSM. The 3GPP consortium does offer suggestions based on Rijndael, combined with
different operator codes that get XORed with the random value, for each of the ﬁve
algorithms.
Just as with GSM’s authentication (as explained earlier in Section 3.2.2), the SIM
will have to identify itself before the authentication starts. The network can then
start to create so-called authentication vectors, which consist of a freshly generated
randomwhich acts as a challenge, the corresponding response (Sres), conﬁdentiality
key (CK ), integrity key (IK ), anonymity key (AK ) and an authorisation token (AUTN).
TheAUTN token, is the authorisation proof by the network. It consists of the sequence
number XORedwith the anonymity key, the AuthenticationManagement Field (AMF)
and aMAC over SQN, AMF and Rand. Themasked sequence number protects against
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Phone
{IMSI,f1,f2,f3,f4,f5,SQN,Ki }
Network
{IMSI→ (f1,f2,f3,f4,f5,SQNi ,Ki ,AMF)}
IMSI
Lookup (f1,f2,f3,f4,f5,SQNi ,Ki ,AMF)
new random Rand
AUTN=AUTN0||AUTN1||MAC, where:
AK=f5(Ki , Rand)
AUTN0 = (SQNi ⊕AK)
AUTN1 = AMF
MAC=f1(Ki ,SQNi ,AMF,Rand)
Xres=f2(Ki , Rand)
CK=f3(Ki , Rand)
IK=f4(Ki , Rand)
Rand, AUTN
AK = f5(Ki , Rand)
SqnNW =AUTN0 ⊕ AK
verify SqnNW with SQN
XMAC = f1(Ki ,SQNNW ,AMF,Rand)
verify XMAC == MAC
Sres=f2(Ki , Rand)
CK=f3(Ki , Rand)
IK=f4(Ki , Rand)
Sres
verify Sres == Xres
ciphered communication using CK
integrity protected with IK
Figure 3.4: A schematic representation of successful authentication and key agreement in UMTS.
re-play attacks, the AMF is for the provider to use, for instance to signal a speciﬁc al-
gorithm suite, or set a time validity for a key and theMAC authenticates thismessage
coming from the network. The challenge Rand and the AUTN token are then trans-
mitted to the SIM.
The SIM, upon reception of an authentication request, will ﬁrst verify the sequence
number, by computing the anonymity key and retrieving SQN out of the AUTN token.
The SIM veriﬁes that the sequence number from the network is higher than its own
sequence number. If the received sequence number is lower, or too high, then the
SIM will respond with an error message and a genuine network will then start a re-
synchronisation setup. By how much the sequence numbers can deviate from each
other is a setting chosen by the provider.
If the sequence number falls within the range of allowed sequence numbers, then
the SIM will verify the MAC. If the f1 algorithm is strong enough, then only someone
who knows the secret key Ki will be able to generate a correct MAC.
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Once the AUTN token is found correct, the SIM will compute the conﬁdentiality
key, integrity key and response. The response is transmitted back to the network
and the two keys are stored in the phone. When the response is found correct by
the network, the network can order the use of integrity protection and ciphering. As
is explained in the background section 2.3, the authentication parameters and keys
are all computed in a separate entity within the providers network and forwarded
to different entities that verify the SIM’s response and end the conﬁdentiality and
integrity protection.
The AKA procedure had been formally veriﬁed using enhanced BAN logic and
shown to provide both authentication and conﬁdentiality [57].
Since the IMSI is still transmitted before the network authenticates itself, attacks
such as IMSI catchers (a fake cell tower retrieves all IMSI numbers in its vicinity) still
work. Also, replay attacks of the authentication token are prevented, but replaying
this token will break location privacy, as the SIM will respond differently to an out of
sync message than to an incorrect MACmessage [4]. But both the passive and active
attacks discussed in this chapter are no longer possible.
Of the weaknesses we found in our analysis of Section 3.4, a few still remain:
• There is still support for not using encryption; a null-cipher can be chosen for
conﬁdentiality (though not for integrity).
• The capabilities of the phone (the class-mark message in GSM) are still trans-
mitted unauthenticated and before integrity protection is possible.
A few other weaknesses are dependent on speciﬁc settings by the provider:
• Session key could still be re-used.
• Each encryption algorithm could still use the same key.
There is also the possibility of a fallback attack to GSM, for instance by jamming
the UMTS frequencies.
LTE
The security improvements for LTE on the wireless link are less impressive. LTE in-
troduces two new cryptographic algorithms, each with a key length of 128 bits, but
with the possibility to extend the keys to 256 bits in the future. These algorithms are
an updated version of SNOW 3G and AES (in counter mode for encryption and CMAC
mode for integrity).
With the exception of one extra parameter, the AKA procedure from UMTS is kept
entirely intact for LTE. This extra parameter allows diversiﬁcation of the keys. In LTE
there are two different security contexts, one between phone and cell tower and one
between phone and a core network component called the Mobility Management En-
tity (MME). The connection to the MME only transports signalling messages and no
user data. Both security contexts use diversiﬁed keys, derived from CK and IK .
One of the reasons for these separate security contexts is to enable cheaper hand-
overs between directly interconnected cell towers, without involving other network
components. During such a hand-over the old cell tower can transfer the keys of its
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security context to the new cell tower. However, the LTE security design requires two
additional security features: backward security and forward security. Backward secur-
ity is a feature where if the security keys leak after a hand-over, for instance through a
compromised cell tower, all the information encrypted before that hand-over remains
conﬁdential. This feature is easily obtained by transmitting a hash of the security
keys to the next cell tower, so a compromised key will only leak a hash of previous
keys. Forward security is the feature where if the security keys leak before a hand-over,
all the information encrypted after that hand-over is again conﬁdentially protected.
This requires a fresh key generated after a inner-cell tower hand-over, by the MME
and handset. This forward security feature undermines the beneﬁt of not involving
the MME during hand-overs. Therefore 3GPP deﬁnes n-hop forward security, where
any cell tower with knowledge of the current keys is unable to predict the keys used
afternhandovers. These terms of forward and backward security are deﬁned by 3GPP
and are somewhat confusingly namedwith respect to Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
PFS hasmore in commonwith backward security, but is not the same. In fact, the LTE
hand over security is not PFS, even though it is forward and backward secure [183].
The new key diversiﬁcation in LTE adds extra security properties, but does not
offer additional protection against the weaknesses common between GSM an UMTS
described above.
3.6 Conclusions
Passively eavesdropping on GSM remains pretty hard to do using publicly available
hard and software. Theoretically, there are no real constraints in breaking conver-
sation conﬁdentiality in GSM using the A5/1 cipher. However, there are still several
practical issuesmaking aworking implementation of aGSMsniffer using freely avail-
able hardware hard to do.
First of all, some essential software has not been released. Although an explan-
ation on how to perform these steps is available, it is still some work to do this.
Moreover, when all the required software is available, then the attack is still far away
from a catch-all attack, able to eavesdrop on any GSM conversation. This is again due
to several practical limitations, such as reception quality and limited coverage of the
pre-computations tables.
The release of the rainbow tables and the Kraken tool has made the breaking of
the A5/1 encryptionmuch easier. However, this approach does have a few downsides:
besides the hard disk size this method also requires perfect samples – putting ad-
ditional strain on the capturing process – and, as is normal with such tables, they
will never give a 100% chance of ﬁnding the key. Still, the current coverage is work-
able given enough samples. It also turns out that it is currently hard to obtain the
pre-computation tables online, as only very few people seem to share them.
The presented active attacks all have the same problems on the reception level,
but bypass most of the decrypting issues. Their biggest downside is that they are no-
ticeable attacks, as the attacker has to transmit signals, although victims have to be
very observant to notice. These issues with active attacks are only present when try-
ing to create these attackswith easily available software andhardware. Awell-funded
attacker can simply buy practical solutions.
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Of the countermeasures that are often referred to by the GSM industry when
downplaying the news stories, themost effective one is essentially to by-pass GSMall
together and solely use the newer 3GPP protocols UMTS and LTE. However, this could
lead to degraded service, as the coverage is not always as good as with GSM and pro-
viders are keen to keep voice calls on GSM, keeping their UMTS and LTE frequencies
free for high deﬁnition video downloads, or other internet trafﬁc. The adoption of
voice over UMTS has increased in recent years, often as an additional service called
“HD Voice,” but voice over LTE is very rare.
UMTS, the successor of GSM introduced, all the added security needed to mitig-
ate GSM’s biggest weaknesses: weak encryption and lack of mutual authentication.
Regrettably, someminor weaknesses are still present, even in UMTS’s successor LTE.
Most of the security of the mobile phone network is dependant on the provider
settings, such aswhich encryption algorithmsare supported, and the aforementioned
voice over UMTS. These settings differ per location area, per provider. As such, it is
hard to make a general assessment of the conﬁdentiality on the wireless interface.
Finally, when the goal of the attacker is to only capture SMS messages, or imper-
sonate the victim, he could perform amuch simpler attack: SIM card fraud. In this at-
tack the attacker simply requests a new SIM card at the provider of the victim for the
victimsmobile phone number. If the provider does not sufﬁciently verify the victim’s
identity, then this is a simple, but short-lived, impersonation attack, as the victimwill
quickly notice a complete lack of service.
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Chapter 4
Time Memory Trade-Off attacks
The previous chapter discussed conﬁdentiality attacks on the wireless links of mo-
bile telephony networks, by focusing on the protocols and actually capturing signals.
Naturally, the protection for conﬁdentiality is offered by encryption, therefore this
chapter will focus on the cryptography used on the wireless link. In a passive eaves-
dropping attack (and also in some active attacks), an attacker will need to break the
encryption in order to obtain his goals. Therefore, we need to know how hard it is to
break the actual encryption. So, we focus on the, at that time,mostwidely used cipher
in GSM, A5/1. This chapter looks at the Time-Memory Trade-Off (TMTO) attacks pos-
sible against stream ciphers and the speciﬁc TMTO attack successfully used against
GSM’s main cipher. We speciﬁcally focus on the time and memory costs of each dif-
ferent attack, with a, for that time, new analysis.
This chapter is based on the paper A comparison of time-memory trade-off attacks
on stream ciphers, presented at the 6th International Conference on the Theory and
Application of Cryptographic Techniques in Africa, AfricaCrypt 2013 [176]. This pub-
lication referred to the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack as the “Kraken” attack, because at
the time we were not aware of the earlier work [11] proposing this type of attack. This
chapter also contains more information on new publications since our original pub-
lication and looks deeper into the practical comparison of TMTO attacks. Finally, this
chapter includes our attempts at improving the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack, which
did not ﬁt within the page limit of the original publication.
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4.1 Introduction
There aremany scenarios inwhichanattackerwants to reverse a cryptographic func-
tion, such as a hash function or a cipher. An attacker trying to break a cryptographic
function can always try to either brute force the function, or precompute all possible
values beforehand and store them in a large table, so every subsequent attack is a
simple look-up. Most cryptographic functions are protected from these attacks by
having a large enough key size or state size, which makes the time complexity or the
storage requirements of such attacks too large in practice.
In 1980 Hellman caused a breakthrough by suggesting a Time-Memory Trade-Off
attack which is probabilistic and falls somewhere in between a brute force attack and
a precomputation attack. Hellman showed that using his attack he could reverse an
n-bit key cipher, in 22n/3 time complexity, by precomputing 2n values and storing
22n/3 of them [95]. The total amount ofworkdone in this attack ismore than in a single
brute-force attack, but with each subsequent attack the Time-Memory Trade-Off at-
tack is much cheaper. This made ciphers using keys that until then were thought
large enough to prevent a brute-force attack suddenly susceptible to this new Time-
Memory Trade-Off attack.
Later research into TMTO attacks led tomany improvements onHellman’s attack.
First came the Distinguished Pointsmethod, which reduced the number of disk seeks
and is referenced to Rivest [38]. Later Oechslin [136] devised a competingmethodwith
a slight speed-up, called Rainbow Table. The Rainbow Table attack seems to be bet-
ter known, presumably due to its colourful name. Biryukov and Shamir [16] combined
Hellman’s attackwith a speciﬁc data-tradeoff attack against streamciphers [8, 86] res-
ulting in amore efﬁcient TMTO attack for stream ciphers. An attacker canmake gen-
eric TMTO tables for a stream cipher which can bematched against any large enough
sample of keystream, increasing the success chance with every sample. This new
understanding directly led to new proposed attacks against one of the most widely
deployed stream ciphers in the world: GSM’s A5/1 cipher [17, 10].
In 2010 researchers demonstrated a TMTO attack to break the A5/1 cipher of
GSM [134]. This attack used a TMTOmethod which combines two important, but very
differentTMTO improvements; namelyDistinguishedPoints andRainbowTables [130].
This attackwas previously suggested by Barkan et al. in 2006 [11], who called it a Fuzzy
Rainbow Table attack, but which saw very little research attention since its inception.
The tool created for breaking the A5/1 cipher was called Kraken.
It seems rather strange for these researchers to have chosen an, at that time, unre-
searchedapproach for their attack, so the question ariseswhether this FuzzyRainbow
Table attack improves on the already existing attacks. This chapter aims to invest-
igate howmuch, if any, of an improvement Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack brings to the
area of TMTO attacks.
Section 4.2 introduces the general idea of TMTO attacks. Section 4.3 introduces
and analyses the four TMTO attacks: Hellman’s original attack [95] with Biryukov
and Shamir’s improvement for stream ciphers [16], Rivest’s Distinguished Points ap-
proach [38], Oechslin’s Rainbow Tables [136], and the ﬁrst theoretical analysis of the
Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack (Section 4.3.4). Most of these attacks have previously
been analysed by deriving trade-off curves, whichwe feel hide toomuch of the actual
costs of these attacks. This is why we performed a new analysis which we expect
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provide more insight in the actual costs associated with such attacks. We compare
the TMTO attacks in Section 4.4, including an informal analysis on the chances of
chain merges, based on our new analysis. Then we attempt to improve the Fuzzy
Rainbow Table attack in two separate ways in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 gives an over-
view and analysis of the practical implementation of fuzzy rainbow tables for Kraken:
the attack tool against theGSMcipherA5/1. Finally, Section4.7 discusses relatedwork
andsome ideas for future researchare givenandconclusions aredrawn inSection4.8.
4.2 Typical TMTO
Assumeascenario inwhichanattacker tries to breakaknowncryptographic function
f for which he has obtained at least one sample of cipher text y. His goal is to reverse
the function f , i.e. to ﬁnd an input x for which y = f (x). This model covers different
scenarios:
• Finding the pre-image x of a hash function f for the hash value y.
• Finding the key x used to encrypt a known plaintext p to produce y , i.e. a key x
such that y = f (x) = encryptx(p), with encrypt e.g. a DES encryption.
• Finding the internal state used to encrypt a known plaintext p with a stream
cipher. Here x is the internal state of cipher f and y is the corresponding key-
stream. So f (x) = y and y is obtainedbyXORingcipherstreamandknownplain-
text.
This chapter is concerned with the third scenario, ﬁnding the “internal state” x of a
stream cipher and not the key. Note that in many stream ciphers it is possible to
retrieve the key that was used from a given internal state. The essential difference
when reversing a stream cipher or a hash function compared with a block cipher is
that an attacker can construct tableswhich aremore generic, so they can acceptmul-
tiple samples fromdifferent plaintexts as explained in Section 4.3.1. This shows in the
three scenarios above, where you can see that for the block cipher case the computa-
tion of f (x) requires a speciﬁc plaintext p which the other two scenarios do not need.
When trying to break any cryptographic function there are always two approaches
available: exhaustive search and a dictionary attack. In an exhaustive search, an at-
tacker simply attempts all possible values of x to see which f (x)matches the y. In a
dictionary attack, the attacker ﬁrst precomputes a table inwhich he stores all possible
〈x,f (x)〉 pairs (or many likely 〈x,f (x)〉 pairs) and simply looks up the corresponding
x for which f (x) = y during the attack. Both approaches quickly become infeasible
when the search space of possible x’s is too large. For exhaustive search the com-
putation time needed per attack becomes too long, while for a dictionary attack the
computation time, as a one time cost, may be manageable, but the memory costs will
often be too high.
This is where the Time-Memory Trade-Off (TMTO) attacks come in. Trading off
the computational and memory costs may result in an achievable optimum for both.
This usually also involves trading off the chances of a successful attack and possible
other factors.
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A typical TMTO attack consists of two phases: the ﬁrst is the precomputation
phase, often called the offline phase, while the second is referred to as the real-time,
or online phase. In the ofﬂine phase, the attacker precomputes a large table (or sets of
tables) using the function f he is trying to break, while in the online phase the attacker
captures a sample of keystream and checks if this happens to be in his tables. If this
attack is successful the attacker can learn the internal state x for which y = f (x). We
can evaluate these kinds of attacks by looking at different parameters and costs:
• N : the size of the state space.
• T (Attack time): This can be subdivided between the time for the ofﬂine phase,
Tpre , in orders of magnitude, and the time for the online phase, which in turn
can be subdivided into computation time Tc , measured in computation steps of
f and seek time Ts , measured in number of disk seeks.
• M (Memory): memory cost of the attack.
• C (Coverage): the number of points fromN covered by the tables.
• D (Data): number of usable data samples (y ’s) during the online phase.
• P (Chance of success): the chances of a collision between the observed key-
stream and the precomputed tables.
• ρ (Precomputation ratio): the ratio between the number of precomputed points
fromN and the total number of pointsN .
Intuitively, the chance of success P seems equal to the precomputation ratio, ρ =
C/N , i.e. the number of points covered by the tables divided by the number of points
in the search space. However, this is not exactly true for a number of reasons. Firstly,
the tables can contain duplicate values. A certain number of duplicate values is to be
expectedwhen the coverage increases, however duplicateswithin the same table can
lead to so-called chain merges, which cause large parts of table rows to overlap. These
chainmergeswill be discussed inmore detail in the next section, but will for themost
part be ignored in the analysis until Section 4.4, which details why it is hard to give
an estimate on the occurrences of these chain merges. To stress this difference we
introduce C¯ and ρ¯ as variants of the respective variables that do take chain merges
into account.
Secondly, a deﬁnition ofP = ρ assumes that all outputs of the cryptographic func-
tion f are equally likely, so all points in N have the same chance of occurring. This
difference between P and ρ does not matter for our comparisons, where we assume
a perfect cipher, but we will see in the practical example of Section 4.6.2 that this as-
sumption does not always hold in practice, where ciphers can have a bias.
Lastly, if an attacker has multiple samples, as he might have for a stream cipher,
then the chance of success increases by a factorD , the number of samples.
4.3 The TMTO attacks
This section compares the costs of the four attacks: Hellman’s original attack, Distin-
guished Points, RainbowTable, and Fuzzy RainbowTable. For eachwe give a theorem
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that states the cost for the general case with an arbitrary number of tables, followed
by a corollary where we align some of the parameters to allow for an easy compar-
ison. For these corollaries we assume an attacker abides by themt2 = N rule, which
will be introduced in Section 4.3.1, and precomputes enough points so that Dρ = 1.
So, the corollaries normalise the attack costs, for easier comparison.
4.3.1 Hellman’s original TMTO attack on stream ciphers
TMTO attacks were introduced by Hellman for attacking block ciphers [95]. In Hell-
man’s attack the precomputation tables were created using a single piece of known
plaintext. During the online phase an attacker needs to retrieve an encryption of that
exact same piece of known plaintext in order to match it against his precomputed
tables and have a chance on a successful attack. These precomputed tables are use-
less for other known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
In 2000Biryukov andShamir [16] combinedHellman’s attack against block ciphers
with a speciﬁc trade-off attack against stream ciphers, found independently by Bab-
bage in 1995 [8] and Golic in 1997 [86]. This combination showed that TMTO attacks
against stream ciphers have an extra beneﬁt: an attacker can create tables which
are more generic, so any piece of known key stream can be matched to them. These
samples can even be overlapping. If an attacker has created TMTO tables to look for
keystream occurrences of n bits and he obtains e.g. n+6 consecutive bits, this gives
him 7 different keystream samples of length n to match with the results in his tables.
Since every sample of known keystream has its independent chance of matching
with the precomputed values, every sample increases the success chance of the at-
tack. Alternatively, an attacker can make an estimate, D , on the expected number
of samples he will be able to obtain in the real-time phase, this enables him to save
a factor D on precomputation (both time and storage) to achieve the same success
probability as that obtained with an attack on a cipher with D = 1. This effectively
transforms the time-memory trade-off into a time-memory-‘number of data samples’
trade-off.
Hellman’s attack when applied to stream ciphers goes as follows. In order to re-
verse the function f , a table is precomputed in the ofﬂine phase. In order to cover as
much of the N points of the search space as possible, an m × t matrix is computed
starting from random or sequential start points, where the m rows consist of chains
of length t and where each point in the chain is a new iteration of f on the result of
the previous point (see Figure 4.1, where iterations of f are denoted by fi , for reasons
that will soon become apparent). Finally, only the begin point and end point of each
chain are stored (ordered by the endpoints) as the precomputation table. In the rest
of this chapter we will talk about precomputationmatrices and tables, where matrices
denote the temporarym×t precomputation chains and tables refer to the end product,
essentially the compressed storage of the matrices.
During the online phase, the attacker obtains keystream samples (e.g. by snifﬁng
a known plaintext encryption, or because he can perform a chosen-plaintext attack).
He thenmakes another chain of atmost t iterations of applying the function f and for
each iteration checks if the result matches one of the endpoints stored in his table. If
this happens, he recomputes the chain starting from the corresponding begin point
until the pre-image of the ciphertext, thereby reversing function f in an attack time
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x0 → fi(x0) → fi(fi(x0)) → . . .→ f ti (x0)
x1 → fi(x1) → fi(fi(x1)) → . . .→ f ti (x1)
x2 → fi(x2) → fi(fi(x2)) → . . .→ f ti (x2)
...
...
...
. . .
...
xm → fi(xm) → fi(fi(xm)) → . . .→ f ti (xm)
Figure 4.1: A singlem× t matrix of function fi . Only the first and last points of each chain are stored.
of order t in the online phase.
Adding more rows to the matrix computed in the ofﬂine phase will eventually
cause duplicates, two duplicate points in different chains will cause the rest of these
chains to cover the exact same points: the chains merge. Merging chains waste stor-
age and precomputation effort on duplicate points. Hellman shows [95] that the prob-
ability of success is bounded by:
(1/N )
m∑
i=1
t−1∑
j=0
[(N − it)/N )]j+1 ≤ P ≤ (mt/N ). (1)
Hellman proves that this lower bound can be approximated to 3/4 for tables for which
mt2 =N . He argues that increasingm and t beyondmt2 =N is ineffective, since the
chance of overlap only increases as m and t increase. Therefore Hellman continues
his analysis of usingm× tmatrices satisfyingmt2 =N . Most of the subsequent work
on time-memory trade-offs copies this choice, although there is no real reason for
this.
A single m × t matrix satisfying mt2 = N covers only 1/t-th of the search space
N . So, in order to cover a larger part of the search space, Hellman proposed to con-
struct l different m × t matrices each using a variant of the f function, fi . The func-
tion fi is deﬁned as fi(x) = hi(f (x)) where hi is a simple output modiﬁcation that is
different for each table i. In this way, all l tables only have a small chance of duplic-
ate chains (only within a single table). Naturally there are still chances of duplicate
points between different tables, but these will not cause chain merges and are thus
not so costly. This comes at a cost for the online attack time, where a separate chain
needs to be computed per table.
Theorem 4.1 The general costs for Hellman’s attack adapted for stream ciphers are:
M = 2ml entries,
Tc = tlD fi-computations,
Ts = tlD seeks in tables of m entries.
Proof. The memory costs equals the costs of one table, 2m since it only stores the
starting and endpoints, times the number of tables, l. Having l different tables also
carries additional costs in terms of attack time during the online phase, since the
attacker will now have to create l different chains of length t for every sample, so
both Tc and Ts are in the order of tlD fi-computations or seeks, respectively.
In this general case, it might seem that the factorD only has a negative impact on
the costs, however, the value for l , the number of tables, can be reduced with a factor
D when attacking stream ciphers while the success chance remains the same.
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Corollary 4.1 When reversinga streamcipher, usingD samples and them×tmatrices
satisfymt2 =N and precomputing enough points to satisfyDρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D), Tc = t2 fi-computations,
M = 2mt/D entries, Ts = t2 seeks in tables of m entries.
Proof. The attacker makes l tables, each with a different fi . Since each table covers
1/t-th of the search space (mt2 = N ) and the attacker expects D samples, he needs
t/D different tables to cover enough points to satisfy Dρ = 1. So, there are l = t/D
tables each coveringmt points, which means the precomputation time Tpre is in the
order ofN/D , sincemt2 =N (assuming thatD ≤ t). The costs forM , Tc and Ts follow
by simply substituting l with t/D in Theorem 4.1
The memory costsM are measured in entries. We are assuming two entries are
needed per chain, which is an overestimate, since some bits can be spared by clever
storagemethods. The seek timeTs ismeasured in thenumber of disk seeksnecessary
for the attack. In his original analysis Hellman ignores the effect that the size of the
tables might have on the time of an individual disk seek. In order to achieve a more
accurate measure we take the size of the tables into account, but we ignore the way
the tables are organised on disk in our analysis by providing the costs in number of
disk seeks.
Hellman’s attack provides a time-memory trade-off controlled by choice of the
chain length t. The table only stores two points for each chain, the begin and end
point. As Theorem 4.1 shows, increasing t reduces the memory cost, but increases
the time needed in the online phase, asmore time is needed for computing the chain.
Conversely, reducing t reduces the time in the online phase at the expense of higher
memory cost. Note that if we choose t = 1 we have a dictionary attack, while if we
choose t =N we have a part of a brute-force attack.
4.3.2 Distinguished Points
The use of distinguished points was the ﬁrst improvement on Hellman’s approach.
Hellman’s analysis has a practical problem: there is a huge time difference between
computing fi and a disk seek to see if any fi(x) is stored in the precomputation table.
In fact, Hellman’s t2 seeks in the precomputation tables are far more expensive than
the t2 fi-computations [38]. Since Hellman’s analysis counted only the computation
steps (T = t2) the difference between theory and practice became very big.
In 1982, a solution was proposed referenced to Ron Rivest [38, page 100], namely to
identify a subset of special points, called distinguished points. These points should
be easily recognised, usually by a ﬁxed preﬁx, such as the ﬁrst k bits being ‘0’. In the
ofﬂine phase, chains are computed until such a distinguished point is reached, and
that point is then stored as the endpoint. If no distinguished point is reached for a
certain number of maximum computation steps, the entire chain is dropped and a
new one is computed. In the online phase, the attacker starts developing a chain
from captured ciphertext until he reaches a distinguished point, and only then does
he need to perform an expensive disk seek. If no distinguished point is encountered
in the development of this chain after a predetermined number of steps, than this
captured piece of ciphertext is not covered by the tables.
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Rivest’s approach reduces the number of disk seeks, since now only a single disk
seek is needed for every chain that is computed during the online attack, instead of
one disk seek for every link. This leads to matrices with chains of varying length.
However on average the chain length will be t = 2k .
Using distinguished points has one other beneﬁt. When the precomputation
tables are ﬁnished it is possible to remove all chain merges from the tables, simply
by looking for identical end points. After all, if two chains within a table merge, they
will end in the same distinguished point. There is not really an easy way to decide
which chain to drop from the table, although an attacker could record the number of
points in each chain, while precomputing, in order to keep the longest one. Alternat-
ively, keeping both chains will increase the coverage of the search space (assuming
different start points where chosen, then a least a single unique point is added to the
coverage by keepingmerging chains), at the cost of using storage for duplicate points.
Theorem 4.2 The general costs for a Distinguished Points attack are:
M = 2ml entries,
Tc = tlD fi-computations,
Ts = lD seeks in tables of m entries.
Proof. The memory costs remain exactly the same as in the previous theorem. The
computation costs will also remain the same since a distinguished point will on aver-
age be encountered after t steps. The disk-seek cost is now lowered to one disk seek
per chain. Since the attacker needs to make l chains —one for each table— for every
data sample, the seek time is Ts = lD .
Corollary 4.2 For the Distinguished Points attack, where the m × t matrices satisfy
mt2 =N and precomputing enough points to satisfyDρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D), Tc = t2 fi-computations,
M = 2mt/D entries, Ts = t seeks in tables of m entries.
Proof. The attacker again needs to create l = t/D tables, so both the precomputational
work and memory storage remain the same. The costs for Tc and Ts are determined
by substituting t/D for l in the preceding theorem.
This approach can actually save some memory in practice, since k bits of every
endpoint are constant and need not be stored. This makes the entries smaller, but
the number of entries remains 2mt. The time cost in the online phase also remains
t2 evaluations of an fi , but now only t disk seeks are expected, instead of t
2 for Hell-
man’s original attack: a disk seek is only needed when a distinguished point is en-
countered, which happens once for each chain (on average after per t = 2k computa-
tions), whereas inHellman’s original attack it has to be done for all points in the chain.
All this comes at the cost of having variable length chains and probably some extra
pre-computation work for chains that do not end in a distinguished point.
4.3.3 Rainbow Table
A different improvement on Hellman’s approach, called Rainbow Table, was proposed
by Oechslin in 2003 [136], with a factor-2 speed-up in the online phase, for an attack
with single samples. Additionally, it has none of the overhead that Distinguished
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x0 →1 f0(x0) →2 f1(f0(x0)) →3 . . .→t ft(ft−1(. . . f0(x0) . . . ))
x1 →1 f0(x1) →2 f1(f0(x1)) →3 . . .→t ft(ft−1(. . . f0(x1) . . . ))
x2 →1 f0(x2) →2 f1(f0(x2)) →3 . . .→t ft(ft−1(. . . f0(x2) . . . ))
...
...
...
. . .
...
xml →1 f0(xmt) →2 f1(f0(xmt)) →3 . . .→t ft(ft−1(. . . f0(xmt) . . . ))
Figure 4.2: Aml × t rainbow matrix using t different fi functions. Only the first and last points of each
chain are stored.
Points causes with its variable length, sometimes even unending, chains. However,
the Rainbow Table attack is mostly known for its smaller chance of chain merges
when less thanN points are precomputed.
Oechslin suggested to precompute one large matrix (instead of t different ones)
with a different fi for every link in the chain. The name Rainbow Table stems from
the idea of calling each simple output modiﬁcation hi a different colour; each column
has its own colour, so the entire table looks like a rainbow. This prevents some chain
merges when few enough points are pre-computed, since now two chains can only
merge if they reach the same value in the same column (i.e. while applying the same
fi ). Duplicate points can, of course, still occur, but the penalty for these is not as severe
since the chains will not merge if a duplicate happens in a different column.
Theorem 4.3 The general costs for a Rainbow Table attack are:
M = 2m entries,
Tc =
t(t+1)
2 D fi-computations,
Ts = tD seeks in a table ofm entries.
Proof. In a Rainbow Table attack there is a single rainbow table which hasm chains,
of which only the ﬁrst and last point are stored, so 2m entries. The online attack time
becomes t(t+1)2 D instead of tlD , because a different fi is used for every link in the
chain. So instead of computing a single chain (y,f (y), f 2(y), ..) for every data sample
an attacker now needs to evaluate t chains of a length ascending from 1 to t fi calcu-
lations, with a different fi for every link:
y →ft ft(y) ↑
y →ft−1 ft−1(y) →ft ft(ft−1(y)) t
. .
. ...
...
...
y →f0 . . . →ft−1 ft−1(. . .) →ft ft(ft−1(. . . (f0(y) . . .)) ↓
For each of these t chains, the end point needs to be looked up in the table, for each
of theD data samples, which results in tD disk seeks.
The memory costs are deceptively low in this theorem, since Rainbow Table at-
tacks use only a single table. This means the dimensions of this rainbow table are
larger than those of the previous attacks, so m in the above theorem will be larger
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than the values of m for the general costs of the Hellman and Distinguished Points
attacks for any meaningful comparison. In order to compare this attack to the other
approachesweneed the rainbowmatrix to cover an equal number of points as the pre-
vious attacks. The other approaches use t m× t matrices. With a rainbow table there
is only a single table, so this needs to cover mt2 points. Keeping the chain length t,
means the attackerwill needmt entries in his table to covermt2 points. Soweassume
anmt × t matrix, with t different fi ’s, as Figure 4.2 shows.
Corollary 4.3 For the Rainbow Table attack, where theml × t matrices satisfymt2 =
N and precomputing enough points to satisfyDρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D), Tc = t(t+1)2 D fi-computations,
M = 2mt/D entries, Ts = tD seeks in a table withmt/D entries.
Proof. In the Rainbow Table case there is little difference in costs between the gen-
eral case and the case where an attacker chooses m and t to satisfy mt2 = N , since
there is only a single table and only the chain size determines the attack time. For
comparison’s sake, we use a rainbow table of dimensions (mt/D)× t, which covers an
equal number of points as the previous TMTO attacks, and keeps the values for Tpre
and M equal. These mt chains are for comparisons sake, so mt chains of length t
have the same coverage as the t m× tmatrices of other attacks. By substitutingm of
Theorem 4.3 withmt/D , the memory costs are ﬁxed.
SinceD will generally be smaller than t, the number of disk seeks is an improve-
ment when compared to a Hellman style attack, though not as much as the use of
distinguished points. Also keep in mind that every table seek could be more costly
when using a rainbow table, because of its larger size than the l tables used in the
other approaches.
The Rainbow Table attack is most known for a smaller chance of chain merges,
but the table deﬁned in Corollary 4.3 will have a similar chance of chain merges than
the previous attacks forD = 1. Because the same amount of points are precomputed
in every fi (all the points in a single rainbow table column, or all the points covered in
1 Hellman or distinguished point table) and a duplicate between those points causes a
chainmerge. When assumingmore samples, or when precomputing fewer points, i.e.
Dρ < 1, then the Rainbow Table attack will probably have fewer chain merges than
the other TMTO attacks.
The online attack time of the RainbowTable attack is only dependent on the chain
length, ignoring the number of entries in the table, which causes the slight speed up
for attacks whereD = 1.
4.3.4 Fuzzy Rainbow Table
FuzzyRainbowTables combinedifferent time-memory trade-off techniques andwhere
ﬁrst proposed by Barkan et al. in 2006 [11]. In 2009, researchers started a project to
break GSM’s standard encryption cipher A5/1 in practice, using fuzzy rainbow tables.
They proposed the joint creation of a set of TMTO tables to which everyone could
contribute [131]. The idea was to share the intense computing burden of a TMTO’s
precomputation step by having everyone willing to participate perform a part of the
computation on modern GPUs, and share their results over the internet. In the end
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x0 → f0(x0)→ f0(f0(x0))→∗ k||y00 → f1(k||y00)→∗ . . .→ fs(. . . )→ k||y0s
x1 → f0(x1)→ f0(f0(x1))→∗ k||y10 → f1(k||y10)→∗ . . .→ fs(. . . )→ k||y1s
x2 → f0(x2)→ f0(f0(x2))→∗ k||y20 → f1(k||y20)→∗ . . .→ fs(. . . )→ k||y2s
...
...
xm→ f0(xm)→ f0(f0(xm))→∗ k||ym0→ f1(k||ym0)→∗ . . .→ fs(. . . )→ k||yms
Figure 4.3: A Fuzzy Rainbow matrix, where k||y denotes a distinguished point with the first k bits ‘0’.
Only the first and last points of each chain are stored. Note that each chain consists of s Distinguished
Points chains.
however, the project ended up using a set of tables being computed on a single com-
puter. This set was dubbed “The Berlin Set” and its parameters are discussed in detail
later in Section 4.6.2. First we focus on the general approach that was used in this
attack.
In order to ﬁnd the internal state of a generic stream cipher, the Fuzzy Rainbow
Table approach combines both distinguished points and rainbow tables in the table
layout. This is done byﬁrst choosingdistinguishedpoints as bit strings startingwith k
zeros. Then, normal TMTO chains are computed by repeatedly applying fi to random
start points until the output is a distinguished point. The chain is then continued but
nowwith a different fi ; in essence changing the rainbow colour. This is repeated for a
predetermined number, s, of rainbow colours (f0 . . . fs functions), until a distinguished
point is found while using the ﬁnal fs of this chain. This point is the endpoint of a
chain and is stored together with the corresponding start point in the TMTO table.
Figure 4.3 shows such a precomputationmatrix. In order tomatch a sample y against
a table during the online phase, s different chains need to be developed ranging in
size from t to st fi-computations, analogously to the Rainbow Table online attack. On
average this will lead to one distinguished point per fi subchain, assuming that each
possible output of fi is equally likely. While applying fs , the attacker can see if the
resulting distinguished point matches the stored endpoint. The distinguished point
found in the chain while applying fs−1, needs to be developed further by applying fs
until the last distinguished point is found. This continues to the distinguished point
found using the ﬁrst f0, which should require a chain of around st computation steps
to match the ﬁnal distinguished point with the stored endpoint, as Figure 4.4 shows.
This approach can boil down to compressing s different Distinguished Points tables
y →∗fs k||x0s ↑
y →∗fs−1 k||x1s−1 →∗fs k||x1s
sy →∗fs−2 k||x2s−2 →∗fs−1 k||x2s−1 →∗fs k||x2s
. .
. ...
...
...
y →∗f0 . . . →∗fs−2 k||xss−2 →∗fs−1 k||xss−1 →∗fs k||xss ↓
Figure 4.4: The online phase of a Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack. Here k||X denotes a distinguished point
with the first k bits ‘0’. Only the last point of every chain is matched against the precomputation table.
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into one: Each chain basically consists of s subchains, depending on the choice of s
and t. Intuitively, this means that the memory costs will be lowered by a factor s, but
the attack timewill increase bya factor s. This attack shouldkeepall other advantages
of a Distinguished Points attack, such as the easily identiﬁable chain merges. When
compared with a Rainbow Table attack the number of chain merges should rise with
a factor t = τ/s, where τ is the new total chain length, because the same fi is used for
each subchain.
The average length of each subchain, t, can be adjusted by choosing a different
length of k for the k-bit distinguished point. The length of one full chain is equal to
τ = st.
Theorem 4.4 The general costs for the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack are:
M = 2ml entries,
Tc =
s(s+1)
2 tlD fi-computations,
Ts = slD seeks in tables of m entries.
Proof. The costs for memory use and disk seeks remain the same as in the Distin-
guished Points case. The computation costs are still based on the costs for matching
a single sample against a single table multiplied with the number of tables and the
number of samples. The attacker needs to make s chains of sizes increasing from
t to st, so in total s(s+1)2 t fi-computations, to match a single sample against a single
table.
In the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack we are faced with an additional variable s,
which introduces a new Time-Memory Trade-Off within a TMTO attack. It also com-
plicates matters when creating the accompanying corollary by increasing the pos-
sible choices. Here we choose three of the most obvious scenario’s:
• the full chain length of the fuzzy rainbow table tables is as large as in the pre-
vious attacks, which leads to smore tables (Corollary 4.4, more tables),
• the sub chain length of the fuzzy rainbow table tables is equal to the chain
length of the previous attacks, the full chains are s times larger than the pre-
vious attacks (Corollary 4.5, bigger tables),
• one which falls in between these two scenarios, so where the full chain length
is
√
s larger than in the previous attacks, but the sub chain length is smaller
than the chain length in the previous attacks (Corollary 4.6, in between).
Of course these only show three possible choices for s, t and m, of which the ﬁrst
scenario coincides withm(st)2 =N and the second with the familiarmt2 =N .
Corollary 4.4 (more tables) When reversing a stream cipher using Fuzzy Rainbow
Tables, where them×stmatrices satisfym(st)2 =N and precomputing enough points
to satisfyDρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D), Tc = (s+1)2 (st)2 fi-computations,
M = 2mstD entries, Ts = s
2t seeks in a tables ofm entries.
Proof. A single tablewill coverm×st points, or 1/st of the key spaceN (sincem(st)2 =
N ), so st tables are needed to achieve enough coverage for Dρ = 1. Given D expec-
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ted samples during the online phase, an attacker can reduce the number of required
tables to l = stD . This means the memory costs will beM = 2m× stD = 2mstD entries.
The attacker needs a total of s(s+1)2 t fi-computations, to match a single sample
against a single table. Since there are D samples and stD tables, the total attack time
Tc equals:
(s+1)
2 (st)
2. The attackermust create s separate chains for each table. During
the online attack this comesdown to s disk seeks per table, on stD tables andD samples
gives Ts = s2t disk seeks within tables ofm value pairs.
Corollary 4.5 (bigger tables) When reversing a stream cipher using Fuzzy Rainbow
Tables, where them × st matrices satisfymt2 = N and precomputing enough points
to satisfyDρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D), Tc = (s+1)2 t2 fi-computations,
M = 2mtsD entries, Ts = t seeks in a tables ofm entries.
Proof. A single table will cover m × st points, or s/t of the key space N (assuming
s < t), so t/s tables are needed to achieve enough coverage forDρ = 1. GivenD expec-
ted samples during the online phase, an attacker can reduce the number of required
tables to l = tsD . This means the memory costs will beM = 2m× tsD = 2mtsD entries.
The attacker needs a total of s(s+1)2 t fi-computations, to match a single sample
against a single table. Since there areD samples and tsD tables, the total attack timeTc
equals: (s+1)2 t
2. The attacker must create s separate chains for each table. During the
online attack this comes down to s disk seeks per table, on tsD tables and D samples
gives Ts = t disk seeks.
In the original publication on which this chapter is based we only presented
the two scenario’s above. After this publication Professor Jin Hong from Seoul Na-
tional University suggested we add the following scenario where thematrices satisfy
mt2s =N and which falls in between the two scenario’s discussed above.
Corollary 4.6 (in between) When reversing a stream cipher using Fuzzy Rainbow
Tables, where them× stmatrices satisfymt2s =N and precomputing enough points
to satisfyDρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D), Tc = s(s+1)2 t2 fi-computations,
M = 2mtD entries, Ts = st seeks in a tables ofm entries.
Proof. A single table will coverm× st points, or 1/t of the key spaceN , so t tables are
needed to achieve enough coverage for Dρ = 1. Given D expected samples during
the online phase, an attacker can reduce the number of required tables to l = tD . This
means the memory costs will beM = 2m× tD = 2mtD entries.
The attacker needs a total of s(s+1)2 t fi-computations, to match a single sample
against a single table. Since there are D samples and tD tables, the total attack time
Tc equals:
(s+1)
2 t
2. The attacker must create s separate chains for each table. During
the online attack this comesdown to s disk seeks per table, on tD tables andD samples
gives Ts = st disk seeks.
The scenario of Corollary 4.4 (more tables) for Fuzzy Rainbow Tables uses the
same sized matrices as that of Corollary 4.2 for the Distinguished Points. It needs
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Table 4.1: Comparison of the different attacks, forDρ = 1
TMTO technique M Tc Ts
Hellman’s attack 2mt/D t2 t2 inm entries
Distinguished Points 2mt/D t2 t inm entries
Rainbow Table 2mt/D t(t+1)2 D tD inmt/D entries
Fuzzy RT (more tables, t′ = st) 2mt′/D (s+1)2 t′2 st′ inm entries
Fuzzy RT (bigger tables) 2mtsD
(s+1)
2 t
2 t inm entries
Fuzzy RT (in between, t′′ = t
√
s) 2mt
′′√
sD
(s+1)
2 t
′′2 t′′
√
s inm entries
s2 more tables than the scenario of Corollary 4.5 (bigger tables), which is reﬂected in
all the costs. However, keep in mind that the value of t in Corollary 4.4 (more tables)
is s times higher than the value of t in Corollary 4.5 and
√
s higher than the value of
t in Corollary 4.6 (in between). We compensate for these differences during the com-
parison in Section 4.4.
The costs in Corollary 4.5 (bigger tables) conﬁrm our intuition of Fuzzy Rainbow
Tables using s compresseddistinguishedpoints tables. So it can reducememory costs
a factor s at theprice of increasing the computation cost in the online phase by a factor
s+1
2 in comparisonwithDistinguishedPoints approach, which is better thanour initial
intuition.
4.4 Comparison
Themain idea behind Fuzzy Rainbow Table is to combine the beneﬁts of both Distin-
guished Points (i.e. low number of disk seeks) and Rainbow Tables (i.e. fewer duplic-
ates). The question iswhether this really turns out beneﬁcial. The cost of the different
attacks are compared in Table 4.1, which lists the costs given in Corollaries 4.1 to 4.6.
The three possible Fuzzy Rainbow Table approaches are shown, but Corollary 4.4 has
st substituted for t′ and Corollary 4.6 has t
√
s substituted for t′ , so their t′ and t′′ re-
spectively are comparable to the value of t for the other attacks.
The three classic attacks
Hellman’s attack (adapted for streamciphers) is added in this table as a baseline, since
the other attacks all improve on almost all costs. Between Distinguished Points and
Rainbow Table it seems that a Rainbow Table is the best choice for D = 1, with only
the disk seeks being more expensive due to the larger table. This makes Rainbow
Tables the best choice for attacking block ciphers.
However, when attacking stream ciphers with multiple samples, D > 1, the com-
parison is not so simple. The online attack time and the number of disk seeks for
Rainbow Table, Tc and Ts , both increase beyond those of the Distinguished Points at-
tack. Of course increasingD also decreases the size of the rainbow table used,making
each table search cheaper, but generally seek timewill be in the order of the logarithm
of the table size, so this beneﬁt is smaller than the increase in the number of disk
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seeks. Based on these calculations, the more samples are expected during the online
attack, the more attractive the Distinguished Points approach becomes, compared to
Rainbow Tables.
The Fuzzy Rainbow Table attacks
Our initial intuition that the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach is comparable to s Distin-
guished Points tables stored as one, seems validated when looking at the respective
costs of both Fuzzy Rainbow Table attacks and the Distinguished Points attack. If we
take s = 1, then the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approaches are the same as Distinguished
Points, and their costs are identical. Another way to look at the Fuzzy Rainbow Table
approach is as a “bloated” rainbow table, with every rainbow colour expanded from
one column to t columns (on average). Looking at the costs for the online attack time
for the Fuzzy RainbowTable approach, if we choose t = 1 and s = τ (essentially a rain-
bow table), it almost compares to the online attack costs of a Rainbow Table attack,
where the difference can be explained by a RainbowTable attack having a single table
instead of the stD ,
t
sD or t tables of the respective Fuzzy Rainbow Table attacks.
It is clear from this comparison that having fuzzy rainbow tables of the more-
tables variant is not the best choice. It has more disk seeks than the bigger-tables
approach and the Distinguished Points attack, without the beneﬁt of smaller memory
costs. Having fuzzy rainbow tables of the “in between” variant are already better with
a factor
√
s less storage and less disk seeks than the more tables variant. The fuzzy
rainbow tables of the bigger tables, are in this comparison the clear winner, with an-
other factor
√
s less storage and less disk seeks opposed to the in between variant.
The online costs remain constant over all three variants, since in the end the attacker
either computes shorter chains over more tables, or longer chains over fewer tables.
Fuzzy Rainbow Tables vs the classics
The Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack can be tuned further by changing the s parameter.
Basically, the Fuzzy RainbowTable attackmoves in between the Distinguished Points
and Rainbow Table attacks, guided by the value of s, where a higher choice of s will
save memory costs, but increase the online attack costs.
From the three Fuzzy Rainbow Table approaches shown in the comparison table,
the bigger-tables approach is the most competitive in this analysis. If the memory
costs are the single limiting factor for using theDistinguishedPoints orRainbowTable
attack, then this Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack seems a good choice.
However, with the continuous drop in the prices ofmemory such a scenario seems
unlikely, so depending on the number of expected samples a Rainbow Table or a Dis-
tinguished Points attack is probably the better choice.
Comparing chain merges
The comparison above is based on all attacks satisfying Dρ = 1, in other words the
costs are compared when all attacks precompute the same amount of points. How-
ever, due to duplicates and chain merges not all precomputed points will be unique.
It would be more fair if we compared the costs of the attacks when they all satisfy
Dρ¯ = 1, so the number of precomputed unique values would be in the order ofN/D .
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However, it is hard to estimate the chances on chain merges in a general case for
the different approaches. In essence this problem boils down to the expected overlap
between two paths (of length t for most approaches) within a digraph consisting of
the N points of the search space as nodes and the current fi as the edges between
these nodes. This digraph is a directed pseudo forest, so every node has out-degree 1,
meaning there can exist source nodes, but no sinks and from every node there exists
a path leading to a cycle. An analysis of the number of expected duplicates, or analog-
ously the number of unique values for a certain TMTO attack seems hard [98, 78, 74, 11]
and to our knowledge this is in fact an open problem for most TMTO attacks.
We can however make some assumptions over the chain merges for the different
approaches, when they all precompute the same amount of points. We ignore single
duplicate points and only look at chain merges, so only duplicates under the same
fi . Then by looking at the number of precomputed points per different fi function,
although ignoringmany of the subtle differences between the TMTO attacks, can give
an indication on the chances of chain merges.
Whenwe assume that the distinguished points fromaDistinguishedPoints attack
are uniformly spread over the iterative function graph, then in general the number of
duplicates in the Distinguished Points tables will be about the same as those in the
Hellman attack. The number of duplicates in the Rainbow Table attack will in general
be smaller than for the Hellman and the Distinguished Points attack, as long as the
number of records in a rainbow table is smaller than them× t points in a Hellman or
distinguished point table.
When we look at the three presented approaches for the Fuzzy Rainbow Table at-
tack, then they are most easily compared to a Distinguished Points attack. The ﬁrst
Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach (m(st)2 =N , Corollary 4.4) uses s different colours in-
side an almost standard Distinguished Points matrix. So, only 1/s th of the points in
a single table have the chance of leading to a chain merge, and we would therefore
expect s less chain merges in this Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach than in a Distin-
guished Points approach. The second Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach (mt2 = N , Co-
rollary 4.5) compresses s different Distinguished Points tables into one, but because
the end point of one of those Distinguished Points tables is the start point for the
next, chain merges in one of these subchains will carry through the rest of the chain.
Therefore, we can roughly estimate that this Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack has around
s/2more duplicates due to chain merges than a Distinguished Points attack. The ﬁ-
nal Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach (mt2s = N , Corollary 4.6) has a full chain length
which is
√
s larger than standard Distinguished Points tables. This means the sub
chains are a factor
√
s smaller than the Distinguished Points chain length, leading to
an expected
√
s less chain merges than the Distinguished Points approach.
When we keep chain merges in mind, the comparison from Table 4.1 becomes
more subtle, since it seems that the factor s extra costs in memory and disk seeks of
the ﬁrst Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach compared to the second, is somewhat mitig-
ated by having less duplicates, and thusmore unique points in its tables and a higher
success chance. The ﬁnal Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach might offer a nice balance
in this case. However, since we have no hard way of quantifying the number of chain
merges in these attacks, this analysis remains very tentative.
Both Distinguished Points and Fuzzy Rainbow Table have one extra beneﬁt when
comparing chain merges. Both approaches have identiﬁable chain merges, which
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means that every chain merge will automatically end in the same end point. So by
simply comparing end points all chain merges can be identiﬁed. With extra precom-
putation effort both approaches are able to replace one chain of every merging chain
pair, with a new one, thereby increasing their coverage C¯. Naturally, both the increase
in coverage and the amount of extra precomputationwork are dependent on thenum-
ber of chain merges.
4.5 Twopossible improvements for FuzzyRainbowTables
Given the analysis above it seems that if the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach is the
best choice for a TMTO attack, than it is only marginally so. The analysis also ar-
gues that the Fuzzy Rainbow Table suffers from more chain merges than the Distin-
guished Points or Rainbow Table approach. However, it seems possible to improve
the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach. The Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach stems from
the idea to combine two beneﬁts: the reduced disk seek time that comes from Distin-
guished Points and the reduced chances of chainmerges by applying rainbow tables.
However, it appears the reduced chances of chainmerges of rainbow tables where in-
creased again by combining Rainbow Table with the Distinguished Points approach.
We therefore look into two possible improvements to the Fuzzy Rainbow Table
approach, by combining the Rainbow Table and Distinguished Points approaches in a
slightly different manner. The two newly suggested approaches contain similarities
to the Rainbow Table variants proposed by Barkan et al. [11] and are therefore analog-
ously named thick Fuzzy Rainbow Table and thin Fuzzy Rainbow Table.
4.5.1 Thick Fuzzy Rainbow Table
The beneﬁt of using the Distinguished Points approach only helps while applying the
ﬁnal colour, since only those values are matched with the pre-computation table. So
we propose an improved Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach where distinguished points
are only used while applying the ﬁnal colour of a pre-computationmatrix and simple
Hellman chains are used while applying all other colours, as shown in Figure 4.5.
x0 →t f t0 (x0) →t f t1 (f t0 (x0)) →∗ . . . f ∗s (f ts−1(..(f t0 (x0))..)) → k||y0
x1 →t f t0 (x1) →t f t1 (f t0 (x1)) →∗ . . . f ∗s (f ts−1(..(f t0 (x1))..)) → k||y1
...
...
...
. . .
...
xm →t f t0 (xm) →t f t1 (f t0 (xm)) →∗ . . . f ∗s (f ts−1(..(f t0 (xm))..)) → k||ym
Figure 4.5: An thick Fuzzy Rainbow Table matrix, where k||y denotes a distinguished point with the
first k bits ‘0’. It features pre-computation chains of s − 1 times t fi -computations and a final round of
fi -computations until a distinguished point is reached. Only the first and last points of each chain are
stored.
The improvement this new approach offers is that the expected cost of chain
merges is lowered w.r.t. the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach, since chain merges that
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occur in sub chains will not propagate through the entire chain unless the duplic-
ates occur in the exact same position. Chain merges will therefore be more loc-
alised within a single fi segment. This means that with the same amount of pre-
computation costs this thick Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach will likely cover more
unique points than the standard Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach.
It does however have some major drawbacks when compared to the standard
Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack. The ﬁrst is that partly merging chains no longer end
in the same endpoint, and so it is no longer possible to remove all chain merges from
the tables by removing any one of two chains that result in the same end point.
The second drawback of this approach lies in the added costs:
Theorem 4.5 The general costs for Thick Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack are:
M = 2ml entries
Tc =
(s+1)(st+2)t
2 lD fi-computations
Ts = ((s − 1)t +1)lD seeks in a tables ofm entries
Proof. The costs for memory use remain the same as with the Fuzzy Rainbow Table
attack. The computation costs are still based on the costs for matching a single
sample against a single table multiplied with the number of tables and the number
of samples. For every sample the attacker needs to iterate the fs function, until a dis-
tinguished point is reached. These, on average t, steps need to be performed for every
possible subchain within the pre-computation matrix, as Figure 4.6 shows.
y →∗fs k||x0s
y →fs−1 →∗fs k||x1s
y →fs−1 →fs−1 →∗fs k||x1s
...
...
...
y →fs−2 →tfs−1 →∗fs k||x2s
...
...
...
y →tf1 . . . →tfs−2 →tfs−1 →∗fs k||xss
Figure 4.6: The online attack phase of a thick Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack, where a single sample y is
compared with a single matrix. Here k||X denotes a distinguished point with the first k bits ‘0’. Only the
last point of every chain is matched against the pre-computation table.
So, on average, the attacker needs tomake (s−1)t+1 chains, and accordingly, also
(s−1)t+1 seeks per sample per table. The costs for the computation time then come
down to
∑s
j=0 t(1+jt) =
(s+1)(st+2)
2 t fi-computations, tomatch a single sample against
a single table.
Corollary 4.7 When reversing a stream cipher using thick Fuzzy Rainbow Tables,
where them×stmatrices satisfymt2 =N andpre-computing enoughpoints to satisfy
Dρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D) Tc = (s+1)(st+2)t
2
2s fi-computations
M = 2mtsD entries Ts =
(s−1)t2+t
s seeks in a tables ofm entries
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Proof. As in the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach, this attack requires l = tsD tables,
for comparison’s sake. The costs are determined by substituting l accordingly in the
previous theorem.
So the online attack is a factor t+2/sworse than the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack,
with a factor (st − t +1)/smore disk seeks.
4.5.2 Thin Fuzzy Rainbow Table
The beneﬁt of the thick Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach comes from preventing chain
merges happening in the same fi subchain (but not on the exact same position) from
propagating through the rest of the chain. In the thin Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach
we want to keep the identiﬁable chain merges that result from the Distinguished
Points approach and standard Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach, by choosing s fi func-
tions for a pre-computation matrix, and applying those one after another repeatedly,
until a distinguished point is reached:
x0→ f0f1f2 . . . fs−1f0f1f2 . . . fs−1f0 . . .→DP
If an attacker chooses the distinguished point such that on average it will take t times
the s functions to reach one, the tables will cover around the same amount of points
as the original Fuzzy Rainbow Table tables.
This approach keeps the identiﬁable chain merges, from the original Fuzzy Rain-
bow Table approach, but at some costs. Chain merges happening while applying the
same fi (while not in the same column) will again propagate through the rest of the
chain, so the same amount of chain merges as the original Fuzzy Rainbow Table had
are to be expected and the online attack time is slightly worse.
Theorem 4.6 The general costs for Thin Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack are:
M = 2ml entries
Tc = s2tlD fi-computations
Ts = slD seeks in a tables ofm entries
Proof. The costs for memory use remain the same as with the Fuzzy Rainbow Table
attack. The computation costs are still based on the costs for matching a single
sample against a single table multiplied with the number of tables and the number
of samples. For every sample the attacker needs to make s different attack chains of
average size st, each starting with one of the s different fi functions:
y → f0f1f2 . . . fs−1f0f1f2 . . . fs−1f0 . . .→DP
y → f1f2 . . . fs−1f0f1f2 . . . fs−1f0 . . .→DP
...
y → fs−1f0f1f2 . . . fs−1f0f1f2 . . . fs−1f0 . . .→DP
So the online attack time becomes s2t to match a single sample against a single
table, with s disk seeks.
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Corollary 4.8 When reversing a stream cipher using thin Fuzzy Rainbow Tables,
where them× st matrices satisfymt2 = N and pre-computing enough points to sat-
isfyDρ = 1, the costs are:
Tpre = O(N/D) Tc = st2 fi-computations
M = 2mtsD entries Ts = s seeks in a tables ofm entries
Proof. The total attack time for t/sD tables andD samples becomes: Tc = st2
fi-computations and the seek time becomes Ts = s × tsD ×D = t disk seeks.
Intuitively we felt improvements on the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach where
possible. Regrettably, both of our suggestions offer no improvement on the original
Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack. Our attempt to reduce the number of chain merges
within fuzzy rainbow tables (thick FuzzyRainbowTables) caused a big increase in on-
line computation time, while our attempt to keep the identiﬁable chain merges (thin
Fuzzy Rainbow Tables) caused only a slight increase in online computation time, but
offered no improvements in return.
4.6 A Fuzzy Rainbow Table Case study: Kraken
Thecomparisonof Section4.4 remainsunfair, due to our inability to quantify thenum-
ber of chain merges. Therefore, this section will look at the only practical situation
where the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach was used. Naturally, this only provides an
insight in the number of chain merges for the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach with
speciﬁc parameters on a single practical case. However, this can at least provide us
with an insight into the signiﬁcance of the chain merger problem in practice.
4.6.1 A5/1
Themost commonly used cipher within GSM (Global System for Mobile communica-
tion) is A5/1. It is a stream cipher that encrypts the communication between amobile
phone and the local cell tower.
The design of A5/1 contains three Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) which
contain 64 bits in total, as Figure 4.7 shows. The internal states of these registers
are instantiated with two variables; a 64-bit session key and the 22-bit current frame
number. The session key is a temporary private key that both SIM card and mobile
phone network can compute from a shared secret. The frame number is a publicly
known value that functions as a counter.
These registers are clocked irregularly through a majority clocking function over
the three clock bits (bit 8 of R1 and bit 10 of R2 and R3). So at each step two or all three
of the registers will clock, and each register will clock with a chance of 34 .
Communication on the GSM-air interface is sent in bursts of 114 bits. For each
burst, A5/1 generates 328 bits of keystream. The ﬁrst 100 of these are discarded. Of
the remaining 228 bits, the ﬁrst half are used for the encryption of a burst on the up-
link (mobile phone to cell tower) and the second half is used for encryption on the
downlink (cell tower to mobile phone).
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Figure 4.7: Diagram of the internal design of the A5/1 stream cipher.
In a standard TMTOattack onA5/1, an attackerwill try to retrieve the internal state
of the cipher using keystream samples from captured bursts containing known plain
text. In an ideal scenario, an attacker can collect 228 bits of consecutive keystream,
generated from a single internal state, though it is unlikely that an attacker could pre-
dict the required amount of knownplain text on both the up and down links. However,
since all the communication in one session uses the same session key,1 the attacker
can collect several keystream samples from different bursts, to increase chances of a
successful attack. From the internal state the attacker can deduce the possible ses-
sion key that was used for this encryption, which on average is one per internal state,
and thus decrypt an entire session.
The natural assumption here is that the state space has size 264, but careful exam-
ination of the clocking function shows that a large part of the possible internal states
are unreachable from any valid state. Several studies have measured the decline of
possible states in the A5/1 cipher[86, 130], and all of these ﬁnd that only around 15% of
all possible states are still viable after the initial 100 clockings. Thismeans in practice
that an attacker only needs to cover around 15% of the state space: N ≈ 261.26.
Note that the initial key generation algorithm provided in GSM generated keys
with ten bits set to ‘0’ as was discussed in Section 3.2.2. Together with the state space
collapse, this would lead to a state space of only: N ≈ 251.26.
4.6.2 The Berlin Set
The Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach, discussed in Section 4.3.4, is used by researchers
to perform an attack on the stream cipher A5/1. In this setup the fi(x) is setting x in
the internal state of A5/1, clocking it a 100 steps forward and then producing 64 bits
of keystream, combined with some trivial output modiﬁcation (the rainbow colours).
These 64 output bits are then used to set as the new internal state for the next round.
Note that these fi functions step through the same state space as A5/1, but not in the
same sequence.
In the pre-computation phase 40 independent tables (l ≈ 25.3) where created,
dubbed the Berlin set. As distinguished points where chosen those points starting
1In practice the same session key is often re-used over multiple sessions.
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with 12 zeros (k = 12). Eight rainbow colours where used per table (s = 8) and they
differ for each table, so in total there are 320 different colours.
Every chain consists of eight subchains of average length t. Assuming each pos-
sible outcome of an fi is equally likely: t = 212. So τ = 8× 212 = 215.
Initially, every table was computed with 8662000000, approximately 233, rows
(m = 233). Afterwards, one of every two chains with duplicate end points was re-
moved and the current set contains around 6000000000 entries per table.
Thismeans the researchers pre-computed around 215×233×25.3 = 253.3 points of
N. Their current set ended up covering around 215×232.5×25.3 = 252.8 distinct points,
with a set of tables that take up around 1.6 TB. So over 29% of the chains produced in
this Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack on A5/1 ended up merging with a previous chain.
WithN ≈ 261.26, the Berlin set has its parameters around themt2s ≈N option.
4.6.3 Comparison
Table 4.2: Comparison of the different TMTO attacks
TMTO technique M Tc Ts
Fuzzy RT (s = 8, t = 212,m = 233, l = 40) 239.3 222.5D 28.3D
Hellman’s attack (t = 212,m = 233, l = 320) 242.3 220.3D 220.3D
Distinguished Points (t = 212,m = 233, l = 320) 242.3 220.3D 28.3D
Rainbow Table (t = 212,m = 241.3) 242.3 223D 212D
Thick Fuzzy RT (s = 8, t = 212,m = 233, l = 40) 239.3 234.5D 28.3D
Thin Fuzzy RT (s = 8, t = 212,m = 233, l = 40) 239.3 223.3D 28.3D
Table 4.2 shows a more practical comparison of the different TMTO approaches,
by simply substituting the chain length, table size and number of tableswith concrete
values. The Fuzzy Rainbow Table data show the costs for the exact parameters that
were used in the Berlin set. The other approaches have suggested parameters, so that
they achieve the same coverage, ignoring duplicates, as the Berlin set. Note that the
presented values do not satisfy the mt2 = N equation and are likely not the most
efﬁcient parameters for the techniques.
This comparison clearly shows that the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack has a beneﬁt
in the lowest memory costs of all presented attacks, while having a higher online
attack time than the Distinguished Points and Hellman attacks.
The Distinguished Points seems the most favourable attack in this comparison,
with only itsmemory costs higher than the FuzzyRainbowTable attack. The compar-
ison is not favourable for the RainbowTable attack, which ismostly due to its greatest
strength, a lower chance of chain merges, not being reﬂected in these numbers.
Based on these possible parameters for the different attacks each attack pre-
computes the same number of points, but again it remains unclear what the num-
ber of unique points is. The Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack had approximately 2 billion
chainmerges per table, or 29% of the total number of chains. By the informal analysis
from Section 4.4 it can be surmised that the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack probably has
a lot more duplicates due to these chain merges than the Distinguished Points and
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Hellman attack, with these parameters. The Rainbow Table attack probably has the
least duplicates of all.
4.7 Related work
Some of the discussed TMTO methods have previously been compared with each
other. Most of these publications compare the trade-off curves for these attacks [16,
45], which give the rate at which extra memory can be traded in for a reduced attack
time. Such asM2T = N2 for both the Hellman and Distinguished Point attack, with
M the memory cost, T the time cost of the online phase, andN the size of the search
space. Our comparisons are not based on trade-off curves, because we feel that these
curves hide toomuch of the real costs such attacks have, such as the seek times in the
online attack, or the precomputation effort. Biryukov and Shamir compare Hellman’s
attackwith Distinguished Points [16] and Erguler et al. compare Hellman’s attackwith
Rainbow Tables in [45]. Barkan et al. [11] make a comparison within a new theoretic
framework and ﬁnd the Distinguished Points attack better than the Rainbow Table at-
tack, mainly based on the possibility to shorten the stored values of a Distinguished
Points attack. In a more elaborate study Hong et al. ﬁnd the Rainbow Table attack to
outperform the Distinguished Points attack by a small margin for single sample at-
tacks [100]. These comparisons seem to contradict each other, though Hong provides
an argumentation why the earlier result by Barkan et al. is faulty. Still, the question
on which TMTO attack has the lowest costs, in terms of time and memory seems to
still be open to debate.
In 2008 Hong et al. [99] already combined Distinguished Points with Rainbow
Tables, but in a different way than with Fuzzy Rainbow Tables. Their combination
does not improve on just Distinguished Points or Rainbow Table attacks.
We were unaware of any earlier analysis of the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack at the
time of our original publication that this chapter is based on. The attack had been
considered in work by Krhovjak et al. [112], where they use it as a practical example
for an attack against A5/1, but they provide no analysis andmake no comparisonwith
the earlier attacks. Shortly after our publication Hong et al. published an in-depth
analysis of the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack [110] based on an earlier eprint publica-
tion [109], where they compare the non-perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack with both
the perfect and non-perfect Rainbow Table attack. They ﬁnd that a Fuzzy Rainbow
Table is better than a Rainbow Table on almost all fronts for low success rates. For
higher success rates the difference is smaller, but remains in favour of Fuzzy Rain-
bow Tables, though the Rainbow Table manages to achieve a higher maximum suc-
cess rate than is possible with Fuzzy Rainbow Tables.
Though we share the conclusion of [110] that Fuzzy Rainbow Table are better than
Rainbow Tables, we ﬁnd the Distinguished Points attack to be better than both. This
difference of ﬁndings can be partly explained by the somewhat arbitrary parameter
choices for the comparison, such as the required chance of success, and our differ-
ence in focus; we focused on worst-case multi-sample attacks, while Hong et al. fo-
cused on average case single-sample attacks. Still, this would not seem to explain
all differences and certainly the comparison by Hong et al. is more extensive than
ours, incorporating for instance false alarm costs and storage beneﬁts of the differ-
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ent approaches. However, manymore factors remain unresearched, such as possible
parallelism beneﬁts for the different approaches, and the differences remain small
enough that the particularities of speciﬁc attack situation could sway the choice in
favour of any of the algorithms.
4.8 Conclusions
We have presented our analysis of the cost of the Fuzzy Rainbow Table TMTO attack.
This attack is used to break GSM’s A5/1 cipher. We have also given a comparison of
the costs of Fuzzy Rainbow Table and three older TMTO attacks: Hellman’s original
attack, Distinguished Points, and Rainbow Tables.
Our comparison is more detailed than earlier work comparing these three older
forms of attack. Most earlier work compared the trade-off curves of these well known
attacks [16, 45]. This tells us the rate at which extra memory can be traded in for a
reduced time, but completely ignores some important costs, namely the precompu-
tation time, seek times, and the number of unique points covered by an attack. We
do consider these costs in our comparison: for each attack we give the memory and
time costs, split into precomputation time, online computation time, and number of
disk seeks.
In our comparison in Section 4.4 the new Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack performed
ﬁne, with the lowest memory cost of all attacks and the ability to identify chain
merges as itsmajor beneﬁts. Only Distinguished Points seems a better choice in com-
parison, having a higher memory cost, but the lowest online attack costs. The more
well-knownRainbowTables are only interesting for attackswere only a single sample
of plaintext-ciphertext is available, as it is outperformed by Distinguished Points for
multiple samples.
Another limitation of comparisons of trade-off curves for the different approaches
is that these curves are invariablymade under the assumption that the table sizes are
always chosen so thatmt2 =N . We see no convincing reason to constrain the choice
in parameters in this way. Hellman used the constraint mt2 = N to compute a nice
bound for the chance of success of his attack, but other choices for m and t that do
not satisfy this constraint might perform better in concrete instances.
Since the publication of our research in 2013 [176], a more detailed analysis of
TMTO attacks has been published by Hong et al. [110], which shows the Fuzzy Rain-
bow Table attack to be the best choice for single sample attacks in the average case.
Still, the difference between attacks remain marginal and there remain enough un-
researched factors, such as possible parallelism beneﬁts, to keep the question on the
best TMTO attack open.
We still abstract away from certain practical costs in our analysis. We count 2
words for each chain entry, while in practice an attacker can store less than this. Also,
we count the number of disk seeks as single costs steps, which again in practice can
be quite different due to caches. All of these abstractions would be interesting to con-
sider in future work.
One factor that we still have not been able to quantify precisely in our comparison
is the chance of duplicates during the precomputation of the tables. We conjecture
that the effectiveness of the Fuzzy Rainbow Table attack is in fact lower than our
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current results suggest when this number of duplicates values is taken into account.
The informal analysis of the expected number of chain merges in Section 4.4 shows
that Fuzzy RainbowTable has a higher chance of chainmerges than the other attacks
when the number of rainbow colours in the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach is chosen
to achieve lower memory cost.
To compensate for this we attempted twoways to improve Fuzzy Rainbow Tables,
which we dubbed thick Fuzzy Rainbow Tables and thin Fuzzy Rainbow Tables. How-
ever, both our attempts did not improve on the Fuzzy Rainbow Table approach, in fact
our attempts proved to only make matters worse.
Estimating the chance of duplicates during precomputation is the most difﬁcult
aspect in achieving a fair comparison. Over 29% of all chains created in the Fuzzy
Rainbow Table tables used to break A5/1 ended up merging with existing chains,
showing that chainmerges can indeed be a signiﬁcant factor when comparing TMTO
attacks. We know no way to compute the expected number of chain merges for the
general case, or indeed for any non-trivial practical cipher. Since theoretical analysis
of the chance of duplicates seems very difﬁcult, we think that further research which
collects empirical data of practical experiments in constructing TMTO tables may be
the best way to shed light on this.
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Chapter 5
Femtocell security
The previous two chapters looked into attacks on the wireless part of mobile tele-
phony networks. Because of the nature of wireless broadcasts, it is usually easier (or
at least less risky) to perform an attack on the wireless connection than attempting
to compromise network equipment, which is usually securely stored in hard to reach
places, e.g. on top of highmasts or buildings. The scenario of attackingnetwork equip-
ment has become much more realistic with the introduction of femtocells. Femto-
cells are low-powered cellular base stations for mobile telephone networks, meant
for home use, but still managed by the provider. They are an increasingly popular
solution, with the number of femtocells steadily rising to a market value of $1 billion
USD in 2016 [155].
However, femtocells also introduce a number of security concerns. Several earlier
femtocells have been hacked to varying degree and analysed. Naturally, the industry
has responded and tries to create more secure femtocells.
Femtocells introduce a new attack vector into the mobile networks; one that is
easier to exploit than traditional cell towers, but also provides slightly different priv-
ileges to attackers. They are the most likely source of an attack, by our non-network
attacker (Section 1.1.2) and as such warrant a thorough security analysis.
This chapter looks at what the theoretical security implications are when a pos-
sibly compromised femtocell is introduced in a mobile telephony network. Further-
more, this chapter details a practical experiment to assess the security measures
modern femtocells take against attacks.
This chapter is based on the paper Femtocell Security in Theory and Practice, presen-
ted at the 18Th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, NordSec 2013 [178]. Besides
some small changes to better embed the article within the rest of this thesis, the pub-
lication has been included as this chapter practically verbatim.
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5.1 Introduction
In mobile telephony networks such as GSM, UMTS and EV-DO (an American coun-
terpart to UMTS), service is provided through many antennae that each cover a geo-
graphic area. These areas are called cells and can range in size based on the transmis-
sion power of the signal and the available bandwidth. Within each cell the coverage is
inﬂuenced differently by local propagation conditions which can result in blind spots
where signal reception is so poor that no service is available. To solve this small cells
can be created within these blind spots, with a low power antenna that operate on a
different frequency from its containing cell.
Small cells can have different sizes, which are usually subdivided into microcell,
nanocell and femtocell, from small to smallest. The normal, much larger, cell size
is referred to as macrocell. The distinction between the types of small cells is not
ofﬁcially deﬁned, but typically a microcell covers an area the size of a shopping mall
or a transportation hub, a nanocell covers a small business or an ofﬁce ﬂoor, and the
femtocell a small house or several rooms [155].
Besides the coverage size there is a more important distinction between the
femtocell and other small cells. Themicrocells and nanocells are installed andmain-
tained by the provider and connect directly to the provider’s core network, while the
femtocell is a consumer-installed (and owned) device and connects to the core net-
work of the provider through the consumer’s broadband connection. Naturally this
introduces several new security risks for both provider and consumer, since a low-
cost device is now placed at the consumer’s home, which has the ability to act as
an authentic cell tower and to connect to the provider’s back end over an untrusted
channel.
A femtocell device is a small boxwith a power and Ethernet connector and at least
one antenna. Some of the femtocells have GPS unbar, to verify their geographical loc-
ation. All of them can listen to neighbouring cells, in order to run on a non-interfering
frequency. Usually femtocells contain a dedicated chip that is speciﬁcally made for
femtocell devices. These chips consist of a base band processor1, some cryptographic
processor and a general purpose processor. All of the femtocells analysed so far run
some lightweight form of the Linux operating system.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview
of femtocells within a cellular network. Section 5.3 gives an overview of the femto-
cell security model we assume and the most likely attack vectors. In Section 5.4 we
discuss possible attacks offered by a compromised femtocell against the 3GPP secur-
ity goals for UMTS and LTE. A practical security analysis is presented in Section 5.5
where we successfully compromise a modern femtocell (the Vodafone SignaalPlus
Plug & Play). Finally, we discuss our conclusions and some ideas for future work.
Related work
3GPP, the standardisation body for the GSM, UMTS and LTE systems, has speciﬁed the
use of femtocells within mobile telephony networks. Of these speciﬁcations 25-467
[64] and 33-320 [63] are the most interesting, and respectively detail the architecture
of and the security architecture of the femtocell (called a Home NodeB or HNB).
1A dedicated processor for signal processing and real-time transmission operations.
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Several books have been written on femtocells. “Femtocell Primer” [28] is a very
superﬁcial introduction into femtocells, and focuses more on the economic aspects
of introducing femtocells. Two other books, “Femtocells: Technologies and Deploy-
ment” [192] and “Femtocells: Design and Application” [106] cover femtocells more ex-
tensively. They highlight all the technical difﬁculties in realising femtocells from an
engineering standpoint. Both books contain a small section on security, with only a
broad overview of the subject.
Some publications analyse possible security problems that arise when femtocells
are introduced in the network [145, 94]. Both are theoretical analyses. Tyler et. al [152]
show the economic incentives of possible attackers to use a compromised femtocell
to DDoS a telecommunications network.
There have also been practical analyses of a physical femtocell device. Indeed
several off-the-shelf femtocells have been hacked with varying consequences. In
2010, a research group that calls itself THC (The Hackers Choice) managed to gain
root access to the Vodafone Sure Signal femtocell [163]. This proved a very severe se-
curity break, based on an easy to guess root password, which allowed interception
of phone calls and allowed attackers to request the current session keys from any
handset, from the Vodafone back end. A Samsung Femtocell was rooted by a group of
researchers from Trustwave’s SpiderLabs in 2011 [169, 72]. We could not ﬁnd any pub-
lications showing the attack capabilities they gained with getting root access to this
femtocell.
Researchers from the Technical University of Berlin [23] analysed the security of a
femtocell by Ubiquisys. Theymanaged to break its security and run arbitrary code on
the femtocell, which also included the functionality to request session keys for con-
nected phones. They conclude with a rather brief list of possible attacks against the
femtocell and the core network with their compromised femtocell. A second public-
ation by the same group [84] presents the method used to break this femtocell and
shows that this break compromises all security requirements.
Theoretical andpractical research are combined in a publication from researchers
in Birmingham together with the group from TU Berlin [4]. In this work they formally
veriﬁed the authentication in the UMTS and LTE systems using ProVerif, discovered
an attack on location privacy, and proved the feasibility of this attack by reprogram-
ming a femtocell.
5.2 Femtocell overview
The femtocell idea can be applied to many different cellular communication net-
works, such as UMTS, LTE and EV-DO. Since each of these has its own terminology
for network entities, each network also has their own names for the femtocell and
the extra network components required for femtocells. For instance, in UMTS the cell
towers are called NodeB, so the femtocell is called HNB (Home NodeB). In LTE, on the
other hand, femtocells are called HeNB (Home eNodeB). All these different acronyms
can make the different speciﬁcations difﬁcult to read. Figure 5.1 shows a femtocell
inside a UMTS network. This representation of a UMTS network is amore detailed in-
stantiation of the genericmodel presented in Section 2.2. Here a UE (User Equipment,
the handset) contains a SIM card and connects to the RAN (Radio Access Network)
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Figure 5.1: Diagram of a UMTS network that incorporates a femtocell
either via a cell tower, or through a femtocell called a HNB. For a user who connects to
the femtocell, the experience should be indiscernible from connecting to regular cell
towers. So a running session should be seamlessly handed-over between the HNB
and the NodeBs, dependent on signal strength. From the RAN a connection is made
to the Core Network of a provider. The SeGW (Security Gateway) is the entity in the
provider’s core network where the encrypted connection from the HNB over the un-
trusted internet connection terminates. The HNB-GW (HNB Gateway) then routes the
decrypted trafﬁc inside the provider’s core network. The HNB-GW can be combined
with the SeGW in a single entity. Communication can be routed to the HSS (Home
Subscriber Server), which primarily handles the authentication of SIM2 cards. There
is also a HNBManagement Server (HMS), whichmanages practicalities such as ﬁrm-
ware updates and the operational frequencies. The SGSN is also shownas a part of the
core network in Figure 5.1, but this is merely there for completeness sake, as the cell
tower’s equivalent of the femtocell’s gateway and not important for any of the further
discussion.
Again different terminology is used by the Small Cell Forum, a consortium of in-
dustry players that advocate the use of femtocells — they actually started out under
thenameFemtocell Forum. This terminology is alsoused inmost books on femtocells
and is meant as a communication network independent generalisation of the femto-
cell idea. They mostly describe the same network entities under a different name.
Here a FAP (Femto Access Point) is used to designate the actual femtocell radio unit.
The Femtocell gateway is often combined with the security gateway and called the
FGW. The HMS is now called a FMS (Femto Management Server) and the HSS is re-
placed by amore generic AAA (Authentication, Authorisation andAccounting) server.
In the rest of this chapter we will attempt to avoid any speciﬁc terminology, in-
stead we refer simply to femtocell and handset. However in cases where a speciﬁc
term is needed we will use the 3GPP terminology.
2In GSM terminology, SIM card can mean either the physical smart card or the application which runs
on it. For UMTS the physical smart card is called a UICC and the application is called USIM. For simplicity
we only speak of SIM cards here.
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Figure 5.2: Tunnelled communication between handset and core network over a femtocell
5.3 The security model
In earlier cellular systems, such asGSM, thehandsets didnot authenticate cell towers.
This allowed attackers to impersonate these cell towers. Modern cellular networks
protect against this attack through mutual authentication between handset and net-
work. The network creates a fresh authentication token based on a sequence number
and a shared symmetric key (stored in the provider’s core network and inside the sub-
scriber’s SIM) for each authentication. Handsets will only connect to cell towers that
transmit the correct authentication token. So the provider’s core network is authen-
ticated and the handset can assume the cell tower is genuine since it was able to
obtain this token. The handset then also responds to a challenge sent by the network,
so it to can be authenticated by the network.
A femtocell has a wireless connection to a handset and even before the initial
authentication some communication is needed. A femtocell is a device that is sup-
posed to function as a small cell tower and is therefore able to relay the authentication
tokens from the core network. Both the connection into the provider’s core network
and the connection a femtocell makes to handsets can be interesting attack vectors
thatmight threaten the cellular network’s securitymodel. Therefore there are several
security features advised for femtocells in several speciﬁcations [64, 63, 55].
This section gives an overview on the security model of a femtocell.
5.3.1 The femtocell security model
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 give an overview of the femtocell inside a cellular network. The
communication between the femtocell and the core network of the provider needs
to be Tunnelled through an authenticated and encrypted connection. The speciﬁca-
tions advice the use of an IPSEC connection between the femtocell and the SeGW, for
instance by using IKEv2, which provides authentication based on PKI certiﬁcates and
integrity and conﬁdentiality on an IP level.
IKEv2 has been formally analysed and shown to be a secure protocol [57] provided
both entities keep their secret key hidden. Naturally the keys inside the femtocell
need to be stored securely, for example by placing them on a smart card or inside a
TPM (Trusted Platform Module).
Figure 5.1 shows that the femtocell can contact the management server directly
or through the secure tunnel. Both scenarios are presented in the speciﬁcations, al-
though the preferred approach is to use the SeGW. For this chapter we assume net-
work designs where the management server is placed behind the SeGW and all com-
munication between the management server and the femtocell is thus protected by
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the IPSEC tunnel. This design seems to make more sense and is also the only beha-
viour we have encountered in the modern femtocells we have investigated.
All the communication between a femtocell and the core network are routed
through the IPSEC tunnel. This communication consists of signalling information
and user data. Most of these are again inside their own secure tunnel between hand-
set and the core network.
A femtocell has to pass on the authentication messages from both the handset
and the core network unaltered for the handset to connect to the femtocell. In this
process the session keys between handset and core network are established, which
are used to create the secure tunnel between handset and core network (the inner
tunnel in Figure 5.2). These session keys can not be computed or retrieved by the
femtocell.
It is possible to design a femtocell in such away that it also stores the session keys
for the secure wireless tunnel. This would seem like a needlessly insecure option, but
it does provide some usability beneﬁts, since internet trafﬁc can then immediately be
routed onto the internet from the user’s router, instead of via the provider’s back end.
This feature is referred to as local break-out. We will use the term “local break-out” to
refer to a femtocell that was designed with the possibility to store or request the user
session keys for the secure wireless tunnel, regardless of the implementation of the
local break-out feature. Our practical experiments were on a femtocell model that did
not use local break-out, sowe assume amodel inwhich femtocells do not support this
feature.
Femtocells can be run in two different modes: open and closed. These modes
refer to the femtocell’s behaviour with respect to handsets that do not belong to the
consumer. In open mode, the femtocell allows any handset (usually only from sub-
scribers to the same provider) to camp on it. Inmost cases the subscriber who bought
the femtocell can manage the femtocells operating mode and its CSG (Closed Sub-
scribers Group). The 3GPP speciﬁcations allow for two types of femtocells, a CSG
femtocell and a non-CSG femtocell [64]. The difference between these femtocells is
whether the femtocell or the core network checks if a handset is a member of the
CSG. A CSG femtocell maintains the Access Control List of identities (IMSIs) allowed
within the CSG, while a non-CSG femtocell is oblivious to the existence of a CSG, all
the CSG management is then handled in the core network of the provider.
5.3.2 Attack vectors
Assuming an attacker has no access to the core network of the provider, the addition
of a femtocell into a telco network introduces three new entry points for an attack:
the wireless interface, a direct attack on the femtocell device, and an attack on the
internet back haul connection.
The ﬁrst, the wireless interface, is the same as the standard wireless cellular in-
terface, and so femtocells introduce no new threats compared to the normal wireless
interface of the telco network.
The last, the untrusted internet back haul, delivers a serious threat to the overall
security of a telco network. This is mitigated by using a secure IPSEC tunnel, which
provides authenticity, integrity and conﬁdentiality.
This makes a direct attack on the femtocell the most viable entry point for an
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attack, especially since the femtocell also stores the secrets that are needed to set up
the IPSEC tunnel.
5.4 Theoretical security analysis of femtocells without
local break-out
This section looks at possible attacks with a compromised femtocell against the se-
curitymodel of UMTS and LTE. So theweaknesses of GSMand fallback attacks to GSM
are not considered. With a compromised femtocell we mean a femtocell on which a
hacker can execute arbitrary code. This scenario seems likely, since a femtocell is a
reasonably low-cost device that is placed in the care of consumers for an extended
period of time and which includes a lot of software on a standard execution platform,
running Linux. The hacker might not be able to learn the securely stored secrets, e.g.
those on a smart card or in a TPM, but he can access the functionality these provide,
like signing or encrypting.
We assume a femtocell design that does not receive any user session keys from
the provider’s core network. So we assume a femtocell without local break-out, which
means the attacker is able to listen to, and inﬂuence, messages inside the IPSEC tun-
nel, but not to messages inside the secure wireless tunnel, nor is he able to inﬂuence
any decisions made in the provider’s core network. This is the main difference with
most other analyses [145, 84, 23, 163]. We believe it ismore realistic to assume a femto-
cell without local break-out, since the femtocell we investigated does not support it
and it seems themost sensible design choice, security wise. Though certainly femto-
cells with local break-out exist [163, 84], which are therefore more interesting targets
for attackers, it does not seem unreasonable to assume these devices will be phased
out in the future.
The 3GPP standardisation organisation has speciﬁed several security goals for the
UMTS and LTE cellular systems [55, 68] which expand the security goals that were
stated for GSM [53]. We will now see what the impact of a compromised femtocell is
on all the goals that could conceivably be inﬂuenced by femtocells. In some cases this
will add new attacks that were previously impossible. In other cases an already exist-
ing attack that is currently hard to performdue to the cost of implementingUMTS/LTE
signal processing, could bemade easier to implement with a compromised femtocell,
because it already handles all the signal processing out of the box. This effectively
means the introductions of femtocells can lower the costs of an attack.
User data conﬁdentiality and integrity
These two security goals concern the conﬁdentiality and integrity of user data against
eavesdroppers and active attackers. Lawful interception is an exception on user data
conﬁdentiality.
None of them are weakened by a compromised femtocell, when we assume that
no local break-out is implemented in the femtocell, as there is a secure tunnel from
the handset to the provider’s core network, which is authenticated and provides both
conﬁdentiality and integrity. It is infeasible for a compromised femtocell to decrypt
or compromise this trafﬁc (assuming strong enough encryption and MACs are used,
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such as the KASUMI cipher in UMTS). It is also impossible to inﬂuence the encryption
choice of the network.
Network authentication
This security goal was speciﬁcally added for UMTS security to mitigate an import-
ant weakness of GSM. It aims to protect subscribers from fake cell towers through
authentication of the network and is unbroken by a compromised femtocell.
This authentication is done by the so-called UMTS-AKA protocol. The network
provides a handset with cryptographic proof of knowledge of a shared secret key and
a sequence number to prevent retransmission attacks. The UMTS-AKA protocol was
formally analysed using enhanced BAN logic and shown to provide both authentica-
tion and conﬁdentiality [57]. It is discussed in more detail in Sections 2.1.2 and 3.5.
The femtocell never learns the secret key shared between handset (more spe-
ciﬁcally SIM card) and network and is as such unable to fake a connection to the
real network. Retransmission of an authentication token is infeasible because of
the sequence number. When a correct UMTS-AKA run ﬁnishes, handset and network
communicate through a secure tunnel. This makes it impossible for a compromised
femtocell to hijack the session without local break-out.
Subscriber identity authentication
Subscriber identity authentication is meant to protect the network against unauthor-
ised use by ensuring that the subscriber identity transmitted to the provider is the one
claimed.
This security goal is ensured through the mutual authentication of handset and
core network. This mutual authentication uses the UMTS-AKA protocol, as men-
tioned above. The authentication itself does not happen on the femtocell, but inside
the provider’s core network, so insider attacks, such as swapping the authentication
tokens inside the network [170], are not feasible from a femtocell without local break-
out.
So attacks need to circumvent the UMTS-AKA protocol. A possibility is to place
an emergency call at a femtocell and immediately place another call afterwards. An
emergency call creates an unauthenticated radiolink, and this link is kept open for
the second call. This results in theft of service with a possibly spoofed subscriber
identity. However, this threat is detectable by the core network and as such this risk
is accepted in the speciﬁcations [63]. This attack does not require a compromised
femtocell, but could be more easily realised with a compromised femtocell. Due to
the detectability the impact is probably small.
Subscriber identity conﬁdentiality
Subscriber identity conﬁdentiality comes down to the secrecy of the IMSI number
from eavesdroppers and active attackers. This secrecy is already problematic in cur-
rent networks due to an identity request procedure, which causes the handset to re-
spond with its IMSI in plaintext. So, this attack — often referred to as an IMSI catcher
attack— isnot introducedbyacompromised femtocell, thoughacompromised femto-
cell does make the execution of an IMSI-catcher attack a lot easier [84].
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The speciﬁcationsalso explicitly state that there shouldnot be any relationbetween
the IMSI number and the subscriber’s phone number, other than in a database in the
provider’s back-end. The check whether a handset (or, more accurately, a SIM card)
belongs to the CSG — the Closed Subscribers Group, discussed in Section 5.3.1 — can
bemade inside the femtocell or within the provider’s core network. In the former case
a compromised femtocell can uncover the IMSI-phone number relation by adding
phone numbers to the CSG, which is standard functionality available to the femto-
cell owner. The phone numbers need to be translated to IMSIs by the core network
and subsequently stored in a CSG femtocell, where they can be uncovered by an at-
tacker. This attack against the subscriber identity conﬁdentiality is more effective
than IMSI-catcher attacks, because victims do not need to be connected to, or even
near, the attacker. As far as we can tell, this IMSI-harvest attack is a new attack, with
a higher impact than other attacks against subscriber identity conﬁdentiality.
Signalling conﬁdentiality
The signalling messages between handset and network should remain conﬁdential.
Sincewe assume a femtocell without local break-out, only the signalling that is trans-
mitted outside of the user session tunnel is subject to conﬁdentiality breaches. Since
this concerns all unencryptedmessages on the wireless link, no newweaknesses are
introduced by a compromised femtocell, although some attacks are easier to imple-
ment with one.
The most prominent attack here is IMSI catching, which is detailed under the se-
curity goal Subscriber identity confidentiality. Another attack vector lies in the paging
channel. Handsets listen to this channel to see if they have incoming transmissions,
by looking for occurrences of their IMSI or, more frequently, their TMSI (a temporary
pseudonym for their IMSI). This could lead to a trafﬁc analysis where all incoming
transmissions for subscribers connected to a compromised femtocell can be revealed.
Signalling integrity
An attacker should not be able to alter signallingmessages between handset and net-
work. A compromised femtocell introduces the attack that makes it possible to alter
unencrypted signalling messages.
The user session tunnel guarantees integrity of messages, so any attacks against
signalling integrity, have to be made on untunnelled signalling. Attacks against sig-
nalling integrity can lead to DoS attacks, which are discussed in the section on Avail-
ability shown below. Other possible attacks are to fake paging messages to handsets
— which cause a handset to indicate incoming transmissions, when there are none
— or abuse of the broadcast messages — such as fake alert messages of the Public
Warning System (PWS) [90].
Subscriber location privacy and untraceability
The current or earlier location of a subscriber should not be derivable from transmis-
sions on the air interface.
A recently found location privacy attack [4] unveiled aweakness in the UMTS pro-
tocol that can be used to break subscriber location privacy. In short, cell towers send
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an authentication request message to a mobile phone. This message contains both
a proof that the network knows the SIM card’s secret key and a sequence number
needed for freshness. The mobile phone responds with an error message if the proof
of knowledge of the secret key is incorrect, or with a different error message if the
sequence number is incorrect. So by replaying any, earlier recorded, correct authentic-
ation requestmessage for a speciﬁc phone, an attacker can see if the target phone is in
his current cell. This attack is very similar to a traceability attack against e-passports
by Chothia and Smirnov [31], where they also use responses of replayed messages to
determine whether an RFID passport is in the vicinity.
The location privacy attack in UMTS was implemented on a femtocell as a proof-
of-concept. The implementation showed this attack is indeed viable from any 3G cell
tower ranging from femtocell to macrocell.
This attack is also viable from a compromised femtocell without local break-out,
since the correct authentication requestmessages are sent plain text from theprovider’s
core network, as no session key is yet established, and can always be replayedwithout
access to the session secrets.
Availability
Attacks against availability, commonly known as DoS, are considered in the UMTS
and LTE speciﬁcations [56], but availability is not ofﬁcially stated as security goal [55,
68]. DoS attacks performed from a femtocell can be subdivided into two categories:
DoS attacks towards the subscriber and DoS attacks towards the provider.
DoS attacks towards the subscriber are trivially possible by blocking any incoming
or outgoing data transmissions on a subscriber camping on a compromised femtocell.
Another method to perform a DoS attack is to sendmalformed packages to the hand-
sets, which attempt to compromise their base-band stack. This could be done at very
low layers of the protocol (for example by changing something in the waveforms),
below the layer with the integrity checks of the secure tunnel, or by attacking all the
layers in the untunnelled signallingmessages, such as the broadcast andpagingmes-
sages. This process of creatingmalformed packets is called fuzzing. To our knowledge
this attack has not been attempted onUMTS base band stacks. However, several fuzz-
ing attacks against GSMhave shown that older (GSM) base band stacks are vulnerable
to this. Chapter 6 will give a detailed overview of fuzzing attacks against GSM base-
band stacks.
Another DoS attack that was possible with earlier femtocells [128, 84], is no longer
possible on a femtocell without local break-out. In this attack the IMSI detach mes-
sage of a camped handset is faked. This will cause the network to assume a phone
has been switched off and therefore hold all inbound transmissions to this handset.
However, this attack only works as long as a handset is connected to the comprom-
ised femtocell, and the femtocell needs local break-out to perform it.
DoS attacks towards the provider’s core network also seem possible. The most
obvious point would be to attack the SeGW, since this entity sets up the IPSEC con-
nections, and therefore needs to do many calculations in order to send and verify
received cryptographic messages. If many attacking machines attempt to set up an
IPSEC connection with the SeGW it will get overloaded and the connections between
the SeGW and genuine femtocells will suffer. An attacker would not need to com-
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Table 5.1: Overview of successful attacks on femtocells; the last entry is the femtocell we attack in this
chapter
Vendor Type Weakness reference
1 Sagemcom Vodafone SureSignal Guessable root password [163]
2 Samsung Verizon SCS-24UC4
& SCS-2U01
& Sprint Airave
Adjustable boot loader [72, 169]
3 Ubiquisys SFR Home 3G Insecure update proced-
ure
[23, 84, 4]
4 Sagemcom Vodafone SignaalPlus
Plug&Play
Insecure recovery mode
promise a femtocell for this, though access to the secrets needed to set up the IPSEC
tunnel can make this attack more effective, by causing more computations in the
SeGW.Whether it is possible to DoS other entities in the provider’s core network, such
as the AAA/HSS, is hard to predict. As we discussed, there have been several suc-
cessful fuzzing attacks against handsets. So it would seem logical to assume that the
base band stack on network equipment is also vulnerable when handling packets just
outside of the speciﬁcations. Some attacks against the core network were found by
a private security company [141], which seems to support this assumption, but it re-
mains impossible to test without access to a test network or by possibly harming the
real network.
5.5 Practical security analysis of theVodafonePlug&Play
femtocell
The femtocell itself needs to be a hardened device, since it contains credentials to
authenticate to the provider’s core network and is placed at the subscriber’s home,
but it should still be under the management and control of the provider. For a prac-
tical security analysis on a modern femtocell we looked at the Vodafone SignaalPlus
Plug&Play, the ﬁrst commercially available femtocell in TheNetherlands, available for
80 euros. We ﬁrst give a high level overview of our attack and discuss its nett effect.
We then provide the details for the interested reader.
Overview of the attack
We were able to read out the unencrypted memory of the femtocell, which provided
all the secrets needed for our attack. It proved possible to reboot the femtocell in an
insecure recovery state, by sending a command over the ethernet connection on a
TCP port. The ﬁrewall that runs on the femtocell only opens up this port after a secret
port-knocking sequence is completed. Once in recovery mode the femtocell has SSH
enabled and attempts to retrieve a ﬁle via a tftp session to a local network address,
which it then executes. We provided the femtocell with a ﬁle that gave us a root login
on its SSH prompt.
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Figure 5.3: The Vodafone SignaalPlus Plug&Play femtocell.
The recoverymode of the femtocell runs a different Linux version than the normal
mode. From the recovery kernel we canmount all the other partitions, but we cannot
get the femtocell into operation, since most programs will not run from the recovery
kernel version. So getting the femtocell in operation would require rewriting most of
the binaries for this speciﬁc kernel version. Also, this implementation would invari-
ably need to be tested, which could result in some non standard behaviour that might
be observable inside the Vodafone back end.
However, we were able to compile programs that run on the femtocell in recovery
mode. Thismeanswe can run arbitrary code on this femtocell, in essence this breaks
the security model as detailed in Section 5.4.
The details
We ﬁrst attempted attacks that were successful on older femtocell models (summar-
ised in Table 5.1):
1. There was no SSH running on our femtocell, so easy guessable root passwords
were out.
2. Researchers from Trustwave’s SpiderLabs looked for the differences between
the source codemade available by Samsung3, to which theywere obliged under
GPL, and the stock open source versions. They found a key that allowed them
to enter the boot loader’s menu via the serial port. In our case the femtocell
also uses GPL code, but the code placed online by Vodafone was not the same
as the code that runs on the device (which we could uncover by dumping the
memory chip). Although this is a clear violation of the GPL license, it did hinder
our efforts.
3. Holding the reset button does not prompt our femtocell to connect to an insec-
ure update server, like the Ubiquisys did.
So, all previous attacks failed. The Vodafone SignaalPlus Plug&Play, shown in Figure
5.3, is manufactured by Sagemcom. Inside the casing (which can be removedwithout
any physical counter measures) there are two connected PCBs, with a Percello 6000
3The source code was made available via the webpage http://www.samsung.com/global/business/
telecommunication-systems/resource/opensource/femtocell.html
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chip and a ﬂashmemory chip. The JTAG connectors are logically disabled4, but there
are active UART connectors that show a console log during the boot sequence.
The Percello 6000 chip has a built-in TPM that presumably contains the secrets
needed to set up the IPSEC tunnel. The boot logs also show that the integrity of the
code which runs on the femtocell is veriﬁed: the hashes of some ﬁles are compared
with signed hashes from the TPM.
The data on the ﬂash memory chip is unencrypted and stored in an UBI format
and is divided in several volumes that we were able to dump through direct access
to the memory chip. Nearly every volume needed for normal operation has an exact
duplicate labelled either with an A or B post-ﬁx, which seems built-in redundancy (for
instance in case an update fails and corrupts the ﬁle system). The other partitions
also have an exact duplicate, but nowwith a _BKP postﬁx. Only the recovery partition
has no duplicate.
The femtocell runs a ﬁrewall that blocks most ports. However, a port-knocking
daemon also runs from the RFS_A partition. We set up the femtocell on an internal
network, without outgoing internet connection. On this internal network we ran our
own DHCP server and DNS gateway. After sending packages to the femtocell in the
order of the porting-knocking sequence, the ﬁnal port opened in the ﬁrewall for a TCP
connection. Reverse engineering the binary that listens to this newly opened port
revealed two commands: “reboot recovery” and “switch bank”. After the command
“switch bank” was sent to the newly opened port, the femtocell boots from the B par-
titions (or back from the A partitions). More interestingly the “reboot recovery” com-
mand causes the femtocell to boot into a recovery mode.
A trace from the WireShark network protocol analyser showed that in recovery
mode the femtocell attempts establish a tftp session to the ﬁxed IP address 192.168.1.1
and requests a ﬁle called femto3xx/originalsin. The LINUX_R volume contains the
recovery kernel, which is booted in recovery mode, and a compressed recovery ﬁle
system. This ﬁlesystem contains a ﬁle adam that is called immediately after the boot
procedure. This ﬁle proved to be a simple script in the execline syntax that tries to
tftp the ﬁle femto3xx/originalsin into a temporary ﬁle eve. This eve ﬁle then has the
executable bit set and is executed. Since adam runs with root privileges, the attack ﬁle
that we offer for the tftp session can put our public key in the SSH authorised_keys
ﬁle of the root account. This gives us root access through SSH on the recovery mode
of the femtocell.
We were able to replicate the attack on multiple femtocell devices of the same
version. Through the shadow ﬁles we found that the root password is the same for
every device we gained access to. Running John the Ripper on the root password
hash yielded no results.
Using a MIPS compiler we can compile programs that run onto the femtocell, and
this gives us arbitrary code execution on the femtocell.
4JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) is an industry standard for debugging access to embedded processors
and printed circuit boards.
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5.6 Future Work
Acompromised femtocell without local break-out offers some attack possibilities dis-
cussed in Section 5.4, which should be examined further. Most prominently these are
the integrity attacks against the untunnelled signalling messages that could offer up
new attacks. Also, a compromised femtocell can make fuzzing attacks over UMTS
protocols against handsets possible, which to our knowledge have not been attemp-
ted before.
We also see some ways to improve our attack against the Vodafone SignaalPlus
Plug&Play femtocell. It might be possible to reactivate the JTAG connectors. This
would allow a degree of control on the processor that our current attack does not
provide.
Our attack could also be extended in using the TPM as an oracle, in order to ana-
lyse the data sent through the IPSEC tunnel which are not part of the 3G trafﬁc, so all
the management data. We are able to execute arbitrary code on the femtocell, which
makes this approach possible, but due to a lack of time we were unable to perform
this attack.
5.7 Conclusions
We have provided the ﬁrst comprehensive security analysis of a femtocell without
local break-out in Section 5.4. We have shown that a compromised femtocell enables
attacks that directly impact several security goals:
• Subscriber identity conﬁdentiality
• Signalling integrity
• Availability
Several attacks already exist without a compromised femtocell, but we argue that
some of these are much easier to exploit with the use of a compromised femtocell.
This resulted in easier implementation of attacks against several security goals:
• Subscriber identity authentication
• Subscriber identity conﬁdentiality
• Signalling conﬁdentiality
• Availability
Several attacks using older model femtocells with local break-out, are not possible in
our model of a femtocell without local break-out. Of these, the eavesdrop attack on
subscriber data probably has the most impact. So, the security of a cellular network
with femtocells is improved when the femtocells do not support local break-out; in
essence the provider places less trust in a femtocell.
Our analysis resulted in two new attacks, which to our knowledge were not pub-
lished earlier: (i) the IMSI-harvest attack discussed in the section on Subscriber iden-
tity conﬁdentiality (page 82) and (ii) fake PublicWarning Systemmessages, discussed
in the section on Signalling integrity (page 83).
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We also show a practical attack on a modern femtocell without local break-out. A
dumpof the code of the femtocell enabled us to learn the port-knocking sequence that
allows the femtocell to go into an insecure recovery mode, which retrieves a ﬁle and
executes it. With a couple of days of effort, we were able to gain root access to this
device and were able to execute arbitrary code on it. We gained fewer capabilities
than previous hacks of older femtocells (which did implement local break-out). Our
femtocell was also secured against earlier known attacks.
We made some interesting observations while examining the femtocell. First of
all, in accordance with GPL, Vodafone provides a link to source code. However, the
provided source code is not the code that actually runs on the femtocell. It appears to
be code meant for an older version of different hardware by Alcatel-Lucent, instead
of the current version by Sagemcom. This is clearly a violation of GPL and it forced
us to dump the contents of the memory chip for analysis.
Secondly, it seems strange to disable SSH access, but to allow access to the femto-
cell through the secrecy of a port-knocking sequence, which is poor security, since the
secret sequence cannot be stored securely. However, the beneﬁt of the port-knocking
defence is that this will only work locally, since most devices will be placed in a NAT
environment in a subscriber’s home, so the router would already block most ports.
SSH on the other hand might be accessible over the internet. This would have been
especially worrying, since we found that all devices of this type we bought had the
same (hashed) root password.
Both our theoretical and practical analysis suggest the security of femtocells is
improving. None of the weaknesses from earlier models were present in the new
femtocell. Though the main improvement is that the providers place less trust in the
femtocell devices, because the femtocells do not provide local-breakout. One should
always assume that a femtocell will eventually fall under control of an attacker, so the
less trust that is placed in the femtocell, the better. Femtocellswithout local break-out
are a deﬁnite improvement, as are femtocells that do not check themembership of the
closed subscribers group themselves.
However, femtocells with local break-out are still available on the market and as
long as these can connect to the core network, femtocells without local break-out add
little security. Even with these femtocells without local break-out some attacks re-
main possible when a femtocell gets compromised, though these attacks typically
have a lower impact.
Responsible Disclosure
We informed Vodafone Netherlands of our ﬁndings. They informed us that recent
models of their femto cell do not expose the recovery mode. We could conﬁrm that
our attack indeed no longer works on these models.
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Chapter 6
Fuzz testing GSM implementations
The previous chapters in this thesis have mainly focused on the protocol speciﬁca-
tions and cryptography layer of mobile telephony. Finding weaknesses in the spe-
ciﬁcations can have major impact, because all the equipment has to follow the spe-
ciﬁcations quite narrowly to allow cooperation between different vendors. However,
looking at the implementations of these vendors can reveal completely new vulner-
abilities. Even though the speciﬁcations are to be followed, these are also notoriously
complex, with very many options, of which a large part is hardly ever used. Also spe-
ciﬁcations tend to only provide the scenarios for correct input, leaving the incorrect
cases up to individual programmers to handle.
There are not as many vendors of so-called baseband stacks, the software layers
running the wireless part of mobile telephony networks, as you might expect. There
are only around 5major vendors for baseband stacks running onmobile phones, at the
time of writing. These are Qualcomm, Broadcomm, MediaTek, NVIDIA and Intel. So,
ﬁnding a vulnerability in one of their products could potentially threaten many con-
sumer phones. Unfortunately, all these stacks are closed-source, makingmeaningful
security research much harder.
This chapter focuses on our research efforts in fuzz testing the implementations
of themobile telephony protocols. This research showed that basic forms of fuzz test-
ing – effectively random, automated testing – can quickly reveal many bugs in the
software implementing the GSM stack in mobile phones. Fuzzing could reveal most
of the security vulnerabilities present in this software in an efﬁcient way.
This chapter is based on the article Security Testing of GSM Implementations, presen-
ted at the International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems,
ESSoS 2014 [175]. Besides some changes in the introduction for a better integration
with the rest of the thesis, andmoving some information to chapter 2, the background
chapter, nothing changed with regards to the original publication.
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6.1 Introduction
With current, off-the-shelf, hardware and open-source software it is possible to run
your own GSM cell tower to which real phones will connect, since in GSM the net-
work does not authenticate itself to the phones. This opens up the possibility to verify
the implementations of the GSM stack of phones by the technique known as fuzzing.
Fuzzing has been used a lot to ﬁnd security holes on internet equipment. Thanks to
low level access offered byEthernet cards itwas easy to simply try out all kinds of pos-
siblemessages, mostly those just outside of the speciﬁcations, and see what happens
when these are received by network equipment. Fuzzing mobile phones has mostly
happened in the hackers scene of security research, with few academic publications.
Naturally, there are many interfaces in mobile phones which can be fuzzed. Just
think of every type of input that a phone can receive, such as WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC,
installed apps or the SIM interface. All of these inputs can be interesting input vectors
for fuzz testing. We focused on fuzzing theGSMbaseband stack. This is the part of the
phone which handles all the GSM trafﬁc. It is available in every phone, implements
a hugely complicated standard and is remotely accessible over the air, which could
easily lead to dangerous attacks.
The GSM system comprises many entities, such as the mobile phones and cell
towers, but also many more back-end components. Our fuzzing research only fo-
cuses on mobile phones. Naturally, fuzzing the network components of a GSM net-
work can have amuch larger impact. However, availability of commercially used net-
work components that are not currently running inside an operational GSM network
is very limited. Thus we limited ourselves to the readily available mobile phones. In
this chapterwe discuss our efforts and results in fuzzing two speciﬁc parts of theGSM
speciﬁcation: SMS messages and CBS messages.
The well-known Short Message Service (SMS) was added shortly after the initial
release of GSM and the ﬁrst SMS message was sent in 1992 [89]. The ﬁrst version of
SMS allowed the exchange of short text messages between GSM users, but SMS has
gone a long way since then. Not only can SMS be used to exchange text messages,
but nowadays also pictures, sounds andmany other types of data can be sent over the
SMS. The current SMS standards also allow segmentation of messages that are too
long to ﬁt into a single message, enabling users to transmit much longer messages.
The current SMS speciﬁcation is found in [61, 67].
The lesser-known Public Warning System (PWS) actually started out as the Cell
Broadcast Service (CBS), which was developed in parallel to the SMS service as a re-
sponse of mobile developers to the competing paging services being offered in 1990.
It allows providers to broadcast messages to all phones currently connected to a cer-
tain cell, i.e. all phones connected to a single transceiver on a cell tower. The original
business case was to provide news, weather and trafﬁc information to mobile users,
though this never found any wide spread popularity. This lead to both mobile net-
work operators and mobile developers neglecting the implementation of the service
in their equipment. However, this service has been gaining importance in the last
years, because it can be an ideal method for governments to broadcast information
in the event of an emergency to all phones in the vicinity. Several countries deﬁne
and implement their own warning system that rely on the CBS to deliver emergency
information. Due to the diversity of technical speciﬁcations of each warning system,
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ETSI with the aid of the 3GPP consortium developed a standardised system known
as the Public Warning System (PWS). The initial goal of the PWS was to introduce a
standard emergency and warning communication infrastructure, as well as speciﬁc
technical requirements formobile phoneswithin theEuropeanUnion to receive these
emergency messages. Due to its standardised nature this system and its accompa-
nying protocols can now be implemented worldwide. This allows roaming users to
receive broadcast messages no matter what their location is, as long as they are in a
GSM coverage area.
In Section 6.2 we discuss the basics of the GSM air interface and provide an in-
troduction into the SMS and CBS protocols. We then discuss fuzzing in general and
the speciﬁcs of fuzzing mobile phones in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes our own
fuzzing research, together with the practical details and results. It is here that we also
discuss the related work, for comparison and to attempt to provide an overview of the
fuzzing research into GSM up to this point. Finally, Section 6.5 presents the conclu-
sions and ideas for future work.
6.2 GSM
The GSM baseband stack is usually described in three layers, where the third layer is
again subdivided, as is shown in Figure 6.1. The bottom two layers of the GSM stack
show similarities with the OSI model. The ﬁrst layer, the physical layer, creates a
set of logical channels through time division on already divided frequencies. These
channels can be used by higher layer functions for many different tasks, as uplink
(mobile phone to cell tower), downlink (cell tower to mobile phone) or broadcast (cell
tower to all connected phones) communication. These channels can either be a trafﬁc
channel, or one of a multitude of control channels. Most control data is transmitted
in 184 bit frames which are split up into 4 bursts. These bursts are modulated and
transmitted by radio waves.
The signalling protocol used on the second layer, the data link layer, is called
LAPDm. The data link layer (and higher layers) is only deﬁned for the signalling chan-
nels, not for the speech channels. This is because speech bursts contain no further
headers or other meta information, only speech data; during a phone conversation,
the trafﬁc on the dedicated speech channels needs no meta information in order to
be reconstructed correctly at the receiving end. The LAPDmprotocol can provide pos-
itive acknowledgement, error protection through retransmission, and ﬂow control.
The third layer is where the match with the OSI model stops. The third layer is
subdivided into three layers, of which the last (highest) one is again subdivided into
several protocols:
1. RadioResourcemanagement (RR); this concerns the conﬁguration of the logical
and physical channels on the air-interface;
2. Mobility Management (MM); for subscriber authentication andmaintaining the
geographical location of subscribers;
3. Connection management (CM); consists of several sublayers itself, such as:
(a) Supplementary Services (SS); managing all kinds of extra services that are
not connected to the core functionality of GSM;
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(b) Short Message Service (SMS); the handling of the SMSmessages;
(c) Call Control (CC); creating and ending telephone calls;
(d) Locations Services (LCS); location based services for both the user and the
provider;
Layer 3 frames consist of a 2 byte header followed by 0 ormore Information Elements
(IEs). These IEs can be of several different types: T, V, TV, LV and TLV, where the letters
T, L andV denote the presence of a Type, Length andValue ﬁeld respectively. The type
ﬁeld is always present in non-mandatory IEs. Interesting from a fuzzing perspective
are those IEs that contain a length ﬁeld, LV and TLV, even though they are speciﬁed
as having a standard length, because these are typical places where a programmer
might make a mistake in handling data of non-standard length.
Figure 6.1: The layers of GSM
We only fuzz on the third layer of the protocol stack, since this is more likely to
trigger observable bugs than fuzzing on the ﬁrst two layers. That is not to say that the
lower layers of the protocol will likely contain less, or less nasty bugs, they are simply
harder to observe.
SMS
Before messages can be sent on the SMS sublayer the cell tower needs to notify the
mobile phone of an incoming message and set up the channel (Standalone Dedic-
ated Control Channel or SDCCH) with themobile phone. The delivery of an SMSmes-
sage then requires four messages exchanged on the SMS sublayer using the SDCCH,
as shown in Figure 6.2. The ﬁrst message is the SMS-DELIVER message sent from
the network to the phone. This message contains the actual content (user data) with
Service Centre Mobile Station
SDCCH
1. SMS-DELIVER
2. CP-ACK
3. RP-ACK
4. CP-ACK
Figure 6.2: Message sequence chart of delivering an SMS to a mobile phone
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an optional User Data Header (UDH) andmandatory Transfer Protocol (TP), Relay Pro-
tocol (RP) and Connection Protocol (CP) headers. The phone ﬁrst parses the CP header
and veriﬁes it. If it is valid the phone (Mobile Station or MS) returns a CP-ACK mes-
sage, otherwise it returns a CP-ERROR message and releases the connection. If the
CP header was correct the MS continues by verifying the RP header and checking if
the phone has enough memory to store the message. If either of those checks fails
it returns an RP-ERROR and releases the connection. If both checks succeed the MS
returns an RP-ACK with a CP header. The ﬁnal message is sent by the network when
the RP-ACK passes the checks for the CP header.
A schematic overview of a correct SMS-DELIVER message can be found in Fig-
ure 6.3, where Figure 6.3(b) shows the ﬁelds we fuzzed of the SMS-DELIVERmessage.
Of the RP-ACKmessage we fuzzed practically all header ﬁelds.
Public Warning System
For CBS messages no speciﬁc trafﬁc channels need to be set up for mobile phones
to receive the transmission. The messages are transmitted on the broadcast chan-
nel, a speciﬁc channel to which all phones always listen to see if they are still in the
same cell. So even if a cell is overloaded with regular voice or data trafﬁc, broadcast
messages can still be sent tomobile phones. This very feature iswhatmakes them in-
teresting for emergencymessages in the ﬁrst place. Japan’s tsunamiwarning system
and the European emergency broadcast (EU-Alert) are examples of implementations
of the PWS.
A CBS message is ﬁrst announced on a broadcast channel and then transmitted
in four frames. A schematic representation of a CBS message is shown in Figure 6.4
where all the ﬁelds we fuzzed are shown in grey.
6.3 Fuzzing
Fuzzing is the process of transmitting automatically generated, uncommon inputs to
a target with the purpose of triggering unexpected behaviour. This unexpected beha-
viour is typically something like program crashes or failing built-in code assertions.
In contrast to human testing, fuzzing can be largely automated and as a result can ﬁnd
(security) errors that likely will not be triggered during normal use or testing. Fuzzing
is already a relatively old testing technique, dating from the end of the 70s and start
of the 80s [129]. Fuzzing has evolved over the years into several variants:
1. plain fuzzing,
2. protocol fuzzing, and
3. state-based fuzzing.
Plain fuzzing is the original idea behind fuzzing: simply generating lots of test cases,
oftenwith randomdata, and feed this to the programyou are testing. These test cases
are usually made by mutating correct inputs and is used to test the error-handling
routines. It is a highly portable way of fuzzing, but also provides very little assurance
on code coverage.
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In protocol fuzzing the test cases are generated based on the speciﬁcations, espe-
cially on speciﬁcations of packet formats. Here the fuzzer will try to choose speciﬁc
test cases which are likely to provide the largest code coverage based on its know-
ledge of the speciﬁcations. Typically, fuzzers will look at each ﬁeldwhich can contain
more values than are allowed by the speciﬁcations and generate test cases with val-
ues on the corner cases, values just over the corner cases and some values way out
of the range of what is allowed. This is also called “partition fuzz testing”, since the
possible inputs for a ﬁeld are partitioned (e.g. a half byte which represents an ID and
allows for the values 1-12, would give three partitions: 0, 1 to 12 and 13 to 15). These
are often not partitions in the mathematical sense, as they need not be disjoint, but
the union of all partitions usually do span the entire input space. Note that although
these fuzzers are named “protocol fuzzers” and are in fact mostly used to test proto-
cols, they can also be used to test non-protocol implementations, as long as the input
has a format to which it should conform.
The ﬁrst two fuzz variants discussed here try to ﬁnd errors by changing the con-
tent of individual messages. But there is another part that can often be fuzzed: the
statemachine. Most protocols have some sort of set sequence inwhichmessages are
exchanged andwhichmessages are expected at any one time is tracked in a statema-
chine. When the wrong message is sent at some point in time and still accepted by
the implementation it shows a problem with its state machine. The impact of this
is hard to estimate, because it depends on what states can be skipped, but for some
protocols it might allow one to bypass authentication steps, posing a serious secur-
ity risk. State-based fuzzers not only change the content, but also the sequence of
messages.
Whichever fuzzing approach is used, fuzzing will usually follow three distinct
phases:
1. generating the test cases,
2. transmitting the test cases, and
3. observing the behaviour.
The fuzzing approaches discussed above concern the ﬁrst phase. On traditional com-
puter networks the second phase is trivial. Also, observing the effects after transmit-
ting the fuzz tests is usually easier on traditional computers than on GSM phones,
because there is often the possibility of running a debugger, or simply looking for fa-
miliar error messages. Fuzzing GSM implementations on baseband chips has many
of the same problems as the fuzzing of embedded systems; one cannot easily observe
the effect of fuzzed inputs [113].
6.3.1 Fuzzing GSM phones
There are many different GSM-enabled mobile phones. Mobile phones started out
with just the ability to make and receive voice calls, but nowadays phones are avail-
able that have a wide range of features and possible connections. It is important to
realise that the current market contains a wide variety of GSM-enabled devices, not
only of different make and model, but also internally: GSM phones can consist of a
single processor, which runs the GSM protocol stack and a very limited OS for the
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user interface, these are typically cheaper or older GSM phonemodels. The chip run-
ning the GSMprotocol stack is referred to as the baseband chip [191]. More complicated
phones run their OS on a separate general purpose processor, named the application
processor. Both processors can communicate through a variety of protocols, where
the application processor uses the baseband processor like a modem. Most modern
phones combine the application and baseband processor in a single SoC (System on
a Chip).
Fuzzing mobile phones is challenging compared to e.g. fuzzing network cards,
mainly because it is hard to observe undeﬁned behaviour. Most phones are closed
devices without any debugging tools, so it is impossible to, for instance, look at the
memory during operation. Alsomost phones run closed source software. Thismakes
it harder to predict where errors will occur. Even Android phones use closed software
libraries for low level communication with the baseband chip and if the baseband
chip has its own memory a debugger on a rooted Android phone will provide little
extra help. Phones usually have limited interaction possibilities, whichmakes obser-
vation a time consuming effort. Generally there are few alternatives to simply using
the phone after a fuzz message and observing whether it shows any undeﬁned beha-
viour, which can lead to false positives. Thismeans internal errors that do not directly
lead to observable undeﬁned behaviour, may go unnoticed.
The fuzzed messages need to be introduced to the target phones. This can either
be done by transmitting them as actual GSM messages to the phones, or by directly
inserting them in the phones, for instance by inserting them on the wire between
the baseband and application chip. The latter option is cumbersome to use on many
different phones and much harder on modern phones with a single SoC, but this was
the only available option when open source GSM networks were not available [126].
For transmitting the messages over actual networks there are several options:
1. you could use a running GSM network, either because you happen to have ac-
cess to commercial GSM network equipment, or by transmitting fuzzed mes-
sages from a modiﬁed phone to a target phone over the normal network.
2. Amore feasible solution is to change existing GSM equipment, such as a femto-
cell for transmitting fuzz messages, though the success of this method will
depend on the success in breaking the femtocell security. See the previous
chapter for more details.
3. Finally there are several open-source projects that allow you to set-up your own
GSM network.
Using the existing network (option 1) severely limits the ﬁelds you can fuzz and the
network operator could change or ﬁlter our messages. Adapting a femtocell to do
the fuzzing (option 2) could prove unsuccessful, so we chose the third option. The
most important of the open-source projects areOpenBTS [26] andOpenBSC [189]. Both
systems run on most ordinary PCs and require extra hardware for transceiving GSM
signals.
OpenBTS is based on the GNU Radio project [82] and is designed to work with
the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral), a generic and programmable hard-
ware radio component. The USRP can bemodiﬁed through the use of daughterboards
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for speciﬁc applications and frequencies. Several versions of the USRP are currently
available and a typical setup for a local GSM network costs around $1500,- [49].
OpenBSC runs a basestation controller and therefore interfaces with an actual
basestation in order to work. OpenBSC started out as a controller for the Siemens
BS11, an actual commercial cell tower of which a small batch became available on
eBay, and the nanoBTS from ip.access, a corporate solutionminiature cell tower. Both
cell towers are hard to obtain, so OpenBSC will now also work with a new project, Os-
moBTS [190], which in turn implements a cell tower on several devices such as the
custommade sysmoBTS and even, experimentally, two modiﬁed mobile phones.
The OsmoBTS project was not yet available when we started our research, which
led us to choose the OpenBTS option, for full control of the GSM air link.
6.4 Our fuzzing
For GSM all the speciﬁcations are openly available, but implementations of the base-
band stacks are not. Examining the speciﬁcations led to the conclusion that although
GSM is a very complicated protocol, there are actually very few state changes in the
baseband stacks. This is why we mostly resorted to protocol fuzzing, as will be de-
scribed in Section 6.4.1 and 6.4.2. We attempted some state-based fuzzing on the SMS
sublayer by both sending a correct message when it was not expected by the phone
and sending a correctmessagewhen a differentmessagewas expected by the phone.
This only showed unexpected results for one phone, the Sony-Ericsson T630, which
accepted conﬁrmations of unsent SMS messages, but which did not lead to any ex-
ploitable results.
There are several open-source protocol fuzzing frameworks available [121]. How-
ever, these frameworks are notmade to be usedwith cell phones. Especially the target
monitoring aspects generallywork onnetwork interfaces andvirtualmachines, while
wehave separatedevices connectedover a (custom) radio interface. Thismakesauto-
matic target monitoring with one of these tools impossible. We did end up using one
fuzzer, Sulley [138], as the basis for our fuzzer.
6.4.1 How do we fuzz?
For this research we made our own fuzzer GSMFuzz, for the generation of the fuzz
messages. It is a fuzzer, with features designed speciﬁcally for GSM, but which non-
etheless can be used for other protocols as well. The fuzzer is written in Python (ver-
sion 2.6) and loosely based on Sulley[138], an open-source fuzzing framework. It has
the following features added:
• Fuzzing of bit positions within a byte;
• Partition fuzz testing of special ﬁelds (type, length), resulting in few cases with
maximum impact;
• Innate support for the eight different GSM Layer 3 IEs;
• Length ﬁelds can count octets, septets or half-octets (often used in GSM);
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(a) Overview of the ﬁelds fuzzed in the
SMS-DELIVER message by related re-
search.
(b) Overview of the ﬁelds we fuzzed in
the SMS-DELIVER message.
fuzzed in [44] fuzzed in [184]
fuzzed in [124] fuzzed in [126, 125]
Figure 6.3: Overview of the fields fuzzed in the SMS-DELIVER message.
• Hexadecimal output of fuzz cases to a ﬁle, which can be used directly in our
extended version of OpenBTS.
GSMfuzz itself is just over 900 lines of code (excluding white space). Besides the
source code of the program itself we created 34 ﬁles with input to mutate valid mes-
sages. The input ﬁles are 3601 lines in total (excluding white space and comments).
The source code for GSMFuzz is available upon request.
Figure 6.3(b) shows the ﬁelds we fuzzed in the SMS-DELIVER message and Fig-
ure 6.4 shows the ﬁelds we fuzzed in the CBS message.
For the transmission of the fuzzed messages we used the open-source OpenBTS
software together with a USRP-1 (where the internal clock was replaced with the
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Figure 6.4: CBS message fuzzing candidates
more precise Fairwaves ClockTamer-1.2) and a collection of (aWBX and two RFX1800)
daughterboards. Combining this with two Ettus LP0926 900MHz to 2.6 GHz antennas
yielded a setup of around 1500e.
We tuned the software to only allow a speciﬁc set of SIM cards to connect, but this
did not prevent several phones in the surroundings to still connect to our cell. This
already shows errors in how phones handle connecting to cell towers. Since we did
not want to unintentionally harm the phones of our colleagues, we made a Faraday
cage around the whole setup, using chicken wire. With a maze size of 12.5mm, which
is smaller than ten times the wavelength of GSM signals on 1800MHz, wemanaged to
keep our GSM broadcasts contained.1 This setup is shown in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: A photo showing our fuzzing setup
The OpenBTS software does not support emergency broadcasts2, so for these
broadcasts we installed a speciﬁc branch of an older OpenBTS version (OpenBTS 2.5.4
- SMS-CB), where this service was already implemented.
Having the ability to generate and transmit fuzzed messages, leaves the third
stage: the observation. In our SMS fuzzing case, we alternated each fuzzed SMSmes-
sagewith a correct SMSmessage to see if the phone still responded by acknowledging
the correct message. Then after transmitting a batch of alternating fuzzed and nor-
mal SMSmessages we quickly triedmost functions of the phones.3 For our CBS fuzz-
1There was some leakage through the power cord, but not enough to get phones outside of the cage to
connect.
2It is likely that this will be included in a newer release [26].
3At this stage we also used the phones to empty the SMSmemory, which is limited in the older models
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Table 6.1: Overview of cell phones tested in this research and the most noticeable results. Legend: I:
irremovable icons, D: DoS message, M: memory bug, N: no notification, R: Reboot S: message handling
in violation of specification.
fuzzed
Brand Type Firmware/OS SMS CBS Result
Apple iPhone 4 iOS 4.3.3 yes no I,D
Blackberry 9700 BB OS 5.0.0.743 yes yes I,S
HTC Legend Android 2.2 yes no I,D
Nokia 1100 6.64 yes no I
Nokia 1600 RH-64 v6.90 no yes S
Nokia 2600 4.42 yes no I,M,R
Nokia 3310 5.57 yes yes I,S
Nokia 3410 5.06 yes no I
Nokia 6610 4.18 yes no I,N,R
Nokia 6610 4.74 yes no I,N,R
Nokia 7650 4.36 yes no I,R
Nokia E70-1 3.0633.09.04 yes no I
Nokia E71-1 110.07.127 yes no I
Samsung SGH-A800 A80XAVK3 yes no I,N,R
Samsung SGH-D500 D500CEED2 yes no I,M,R
Samsung Galaxy S Android 2.2.1 yes no I
Samsung Galaxy Note Android 4.1.2 no yes S
Sony Ericsson T630 R7A011 yes no I,N
ing we simply used most functions of the tested phones after a batch of fuzzed mes-
sages, since there is no acknowledgement of received CBS messages.
Table 6.1 shows the make and models of the phones we used during the fuzzing
research. During the research it turned out thatmany phones did not support the CBS
features, so the test set for CBS fuzzing was small.
6.4.2 Fuzzing results
We now give an overview of some of themost interesting results we found during our
fuzzing research, which are also summarised in Table 6.1. For a complete overview of
the exact fuzzing performed and the obtained results we refer to the Master’s theses
on fuzzing SMS [97] and CBS [27] on which this chapter is based.
SMS Fuzzing
All tested phones accepted some rarely used SMS variants, such as Fax-over-SMS,
which causes strange icons to appear to notify the user of a newmessage (e.g. a new
fax). These SMS variants are so obscure that often the GUI of these mobile phones
offered no way for the user to remove these icons, only a message from the network
could remove them.
More serious issues were that for ﬁve out of sixteen phones we found SMS mes-
sages that are received and stored by the phones without any notiﬁcation to the user.
101
6 Fuzz testing GSM implementations
Figure 6.6: These two pictures show the strange behaviour when the same SMS is opened twice in a
row. Note that the words in the left image are the names of games available on the device.
This enables attacks of ﬁlling up the SMSmemory remotely, which causes phones to
silently reject new incoming messages with an error message to the network, but all
phones notify the user of a full SMS memory. In addition, seven out of the sixteen
tested phones could be forced into a reboot with a single SMS message, though each
through a different SMS message.
TheNokia 2600 showed strange behaviourwhere a particular SMSmessagewould
display random parts of the phone memory when opened, instead of the SMS mes-
sage. This behaviour is shown in Figure 6.6.
Both the iPhone 4 and the HTC Legend could be forced in a DoS state were they si-
lently received amessage and afterwards could no longer receive any SMSmessages,
without any notiﬁcation to the user. Rebooting these phones or roaming to a different
network would stop the DoS.
Strangely enough we found no real correlation between speciﬁc harmful mes-
sages and phone brands. So, a message triggering a reboot in a speciﬁc Nokia phone,
would have no effect on all other Nokia phones. This is likely due to the large variety
in phones as explained in Section 6.3.1
CBS Fuzzing
Our CBS fuzzing research did not reveal any obvious errors such as spontaneous
phone reboots. One of the main problems here is that we had no way to tell whether
an ignored CBS message was not received by the baseband stack, or that the phone
OS did not know how to display it.
The GalaxyNote displayed a fuzzed CBSmessagewhich according to the speciﬁc-
ations should have been ignored. According to the GSM speciﬁcation, mobile phones
should only receive CBS messages containing Message Identiﬁers registered in their
memory or SIM card. In our initial tests we used theMessage Identiﬁer value of 0 and
did not register this topic number in the mobile phones. All mobile phones except
for the Blackberry received the CBS message. In addition, once we changed the Mes-
sage Identiﬁer to a value different from 0, all mobile stations did not receive the CBS
messages even though this time we did register the topic in the mobile phones.
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So we observed that most phones have a lot of trouble to show even correct CBS
messages. Since several countries are clearly pushing to get the CBS messages re-
supported by phone manufacturers, CBS fuzzing tests should deﬁnitely be repeated
when wider support is provided.
6.4.3 Related work
One of the most well-known bugs found in SMS implementations is the “Curse of Si-
lence” found by Thomas Engel, though it is not directly clear if he used any systematic
way, such as fuzzing, to ﬁnd the vulnerability. With this bug certain Nokia phones
stopped receiving SMS messages after receiving an email as SMS message4 with a
sender’s email address longer than 32 characters [44].
Themost proliﬁc academic researcher in the fuzzing of GSMphones is CollinMul-
liner [127, 126, 125, 124]. In 2006 he fuzzed the Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS)
feature of GSM [127]. MMS is an extension to SMS for the exchange ofmultimedia con-
tent. When an MMS message is sent the recipient receives an SMS message with a
UniformResource Identiﬁer (URI) to a server where theMMS content can be retrieved
using the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP). Of the three delivery methods dis-
cussed opPage 97Mulliner et al. used the ﬁrstmethod by building a virtual (malicious)
MMS server using open source software and retrieving content from it on different
cell phones. They found several weaknesses in various implementations, including
buffer overﬂows in the SynchronisedMultimedia Integration Language (SMIL) parser,
the part that takes care of the presentation of the content on the cell phone to the user.
Some of these buffer overﬂows could be used for arbitrary code execution. Mulliner
togetherwithCharlieMiller fuzzedSMSmessages on smart phones [126, 125] using the
second method of transmission. The three smart phones available for this research
were an iPhone, an Android Phone and a Windows Phone. An application was de-
veloped for each of the three platforms, which makes it possible to directly generate
and inject SMSmessages into the phones’ modems. Through this application, the re-
searcherswere able tomake the device believe that an SMSwas just received from the
GSMnetwork. Finally, Mulliner and Golde fuzzed the SMS implementation on feature
phones [124]. This time they used a rogue cell tower based on OpenBSC, so they used
the third method of message transmission. Furthermore they used a J2ME3 applica-
tion formonitoring on the cell phones. Despite the spectacular title of this publication
(“SMS of Death”) there was no hard evidence that a fuzzed message caused the death
of a phone, since this test was not repeated. The researchers did ﬁnd DoS attacks for
six different popular feature phone brands. They formed SMSmessages that can even
be sent over commercial (real) networks and will cause the phones to reboot, tempor-
arily losing network connectivity. After consultation with the phone manufacturers
Mulliner and Golde did not publish the actual messages that cause the DoS.
The companyCodenomicon released awhite paper detailing a product that fuzzes
SMS messages in order to test the whole network chain for delivery of fuzzed SMS
messages [184]. This is targeted towards providers as a tool that can be connected
inside the core GSM network.
4Simply this option of receiving email over SMS is a good illustration of how baroque the SMS standard
is!
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It is oftenhard to ﬁnd out exactlywhich ﬁeldswere fuzzed in the studies discussed
so far. We have attempted to provide an overview of the ﬁelds that have been fuzzed
in the SMS-DELIVERmessage, as far aswe can tell from these publications and some-
times throughpersonal communicationwith the authors. This overviewcan be found
in Figure 6.3(a). We chose to limit this overview to the one message we also fuzz in
our research.
Naturally, fuzzing is not the only way to reveal (security) bugs in the GSM base-
band stack. Weinmann et al. decompiled baseband ﬁrmware updates from two pop-
ular baseband chips and performed a manual code inspection which led to several
bugs, amongst which one which led to remote code execution [187, 186].
Few researchers have access to the GSM core network. One private security com-
pany specialises in fuzz testing GSM core networks and they apparently have a data-
base of possible attacks [141], though the nature of the found vulnerabilities is not pub-
lic knowledge.
6.5 Conclusions
We have demonstrated that fuzzing is a simpel technique that quickly ﬁnds a large
variety of bugs in the implementation of GSM stacks on mobile phones. This seems
to indicate that manufacturers did not incorporate fuzz testing in their development
cycle.5
The attacks we found can easily be initiated by an attacker. Some could even be
transmitted over the genuine mobile network, as the weaknesses where inside the
payload of SMSmessages. Providers could, and should, scan for these attacks, and at
least some do [184, 141]. We never attempted to transmit these messages over a live
network, somaybe our attacks would already be intercepted by the network. Another
way to initiate these attacks is by impersonating a fake base station. Setting up a fake
base station and sending out malicious messages is, at least for GSM, not that hard
nor expensive anymore and the potential damage could be enormous.
The wide diversity of phones makes it harder to ﬁnd a single bug affecting many
different mobile phones. Nevertheless, our fuzzing research in GSM has shown sev-
eral issues withmobile phones. Themost important attacks here led to various types
of DoS messages which can usually be solved through a reboot of the phone. Some
results show clear buffer overﬂow errors, such as the SMS message which will show
random parts of the phone’s memory when read on the Nokia 2600. Although it is
not immediately clear how to abuse such an error for remote code execution, it is
possible that such an attack will be constructed in the future for a popular brand of
mobile phones. Unfortunately, the CBS service seems to be too poorly supported at
the moment to achieve any meaningful fuzzing results, or to use it as an emergency
broadcast service for that matter.
Thehardest part of fuzzingmobile phone implementations is observing thephone’s
behaviour, which is hard to automate. There are not a lot of other options, other than
human testing, for security analysis of the closed source baseband stacks on mobile
phones. Then again, with direct access to the baseband stacks fuzz testing these im-
5About a year after this research, it became clear that Qualcomm, one of the leading manufacturers of
mobile protocol chips, had only recently started incorporating fuzz testing [188].
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plementationswould bemuch easier. Themanufacturers of the baseband stacks or of
the SoC have this access and employing strong security tests on their products could
greatly increase the security of their product, which among baseband stacks would
be a novel selling point. For future research it would be interesting to focus on fuzz-
ing rooted Android devices, where it may be possible to run debuggers in thememory
to better observe strange behaviour.
For now almost all fuzzing research into GSM has focused on fuzzing mobile
phones, and then mostly on fuzzing SMS messages, which still leaves many areas
open to explore, such as all the other broadcast messages, but also the network side
of a GSM network. It seems logical to assume that the baseband stack on network
equipment will contain as many bugs as the stacks on mobile phones, and attacks
against the GSM network itself would probably have a much larger impact.
Since the 3G and 4G protocols all have mutual authentication, it is not possible to
simply deploy a fake base station in order to fuzz the 3G and 4G baseband stacks. A
way around this obstacle would be to use self controlled SIM cards, so you can have
your cell tower authenticate to the mobile phone. However, as far as we know there
is no open source 3G or 4G cell tower software available yet, so this would require a
large amount of work to implement.
Most of our effort came from getting the open source GSM base station up and
running. After that implementing the fuzzers was only a few weeks of work. The
initial effort to set up a base station and incorporate a fuzzer was substantial, but this
solution can now be used to fuzz test any GSM phone on SMS or CBS weaknesses in
one and a half hour. This makes fuzzing a cost-effective and feasible technique for
making implementations of mobile phone stacks more robust and safe.
Responsible Disclosure
We informed the phone manufacturers of the vulnerabilities we found. While most
vulnerabilities are likely caused by the baseband chips it was not always possible to
ﬁnd out who the respective baseband manufacturer was.
We did not disclose the found vulnerabilities, as it is highly unlikely that the
devices will be patched against these vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 7
Mobile phones as second factor in
authentication
Until now we only looked at the security of the mobile phone networks themselves.
However, there are also many applications running on top of these networks. For
instance, a lot of machine-to-machine communication takes place over mobile net-
works, such as in certain trafﬁc lights, or smart meters. There are also many user
applications using themobile telephony network to communicate. Especially follow-
ing the success of smart phones, these applications can offer lots of functionality to
users.
Now that users can be assumed to have amobile internet connection all the time,
more and more services are offered over the internet. This necessitates the use of
strong authentication of users over a distance for security sensitive services; another
thing in which mobile phones see a lot of use. An attacker might not be interested
in attacks on the mobile networks per se, but rather in attacking this extended use
of the mobile phone. This chapter explores the ways in which mobile phones can be
used for remote authentication and the, sometimes very security sensitive, applica-
tions deployed on top of themobile telephony network. We ﬁrst look atmobile phones
used as an additional factor inmulti-factor authentication and then look at a particu-
lar service offering server-based signatures, which also uses the mobile phone as an
additional factor during authentication.
This chapter is based on the article Digitale handtekeningen: nieuwe technologie en
nieuwe wet- en regelgeving which was published in February 2014 in the Dutch journal
Privacy & Informatie [177]. The original publication was more focused on legislation
and regulations considering electronic signatures. The current chapter is an English
version of the publication which takes a broader perspective, including an analysis
of multi-factor authentication techniques using mobile phones. Section 7.2 has been
added to the original publication. The security assessment of SMS in Section 7.2.2 is
based on joint work between the Digital security group of the Radboud University and
Price Waterhouse Coopers on a risk assessment for using SMS authentication to se-
cure access to onlinemedical records [144]. This risk assessment was commissioned
by the Ministry of Health and led to the cancelling of this online access feature.
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7.1 Introduction
More and more services are being offered over the internet. With this transition the
need to authenticate users remotely is also growing. With consumer services one
popular solution is the use of mobile phones as, at least, an additional factor in re-
mote authentication to the common username and password combination. However,
use of these services is no longer limited to traditional PCs, but is moving to mobile
devices. When the mobile device itself is used to access a service, it can no longer
be an additional factor in authentication. Services offered over the internet can be
very security sensitive, such as in mobile banking applications, making strong re-
mote authentication important. In 2013 the European Central Bank (ECB) published
a set of recommendations for online payments, strongly focusing on authentication
[50]. Similar recommendations are being prepared for mobile payments [51].
Firstwewill take a closer look at the remote authentication problem in Section 7.2.
In this section we also discuss the current recommendations of the European Cent-
ral Bank (ECB) concerning strong authentication, as well as look at several popular
approaches for using the mobile phones as an additional factor for authentication.
Section 7.3 presents a background section into digital signatures and also covers the
legal framework for electronic signatures. Signatures themselves of course require
authentication, but this section serves mostly as background information for a case-
study presented in Section 7.4 where we discuss a server-based signature service. In
this service a user’s private key is stored in the cloud and the user’s mobile phone
is used as an additional factor in authentication. We will then draw conclusions in
Section 7.6.
7.2 On (remote) authentication
Authentication is a fundamental issue in computer security. Often it is solvedwith the
use of passwords. Authentication can be a local process where a user authenticates
himself to (a programona) computer hehasphysical access to. With internet services
users have to be able to authenticate themselves from their ownPC to a remote server:
remote authentication.
Remote authentication is more vulnerable to attacks than traditional authentic-
ation, not just because authentication parameters are exchanged over an untrusted
connection (usually remedied by a secure pipe over the connection), but also because
the attacker does not need to be in physical proximity of the authenticating party,
making attacks easier to perform. Furthermore, remote authentication may be vul-
nerable toMan-in-the-Middle attacks, especially since these attacks can be employed
at the user end point of a secured connection (e.g. in the case of aMan-in-the-Browser
attack [91]).
Authentication is usually meant to deﬁne a process of proving or verifying one’s
identity. But apart from this notion of user authentication, we also consider the notion
of transaction authentication, where we not only authenticate a user, but also check that
user’s intent in agreeing to some transaction, e.g. an online bank transfer. Transaction
authentication is a form of non-repudiation, and typically subsumes a form of user
authentication.
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In remote multi-factor authentication, the user will usually have a device as an
additional factor. In order to restrict the use of this device to a speciﬁc user, such a
device will often authenticate the user, before performing the authentication calcu-
lations as the additional factor in remote authentication. This separate user authen-
tication step is in itself an (assumed) part of the remote authentication. To prevent
confusion, we will refer to this authentication step as local authentication. Also, we use
the term “authentication,” to refer to both user and transaction authentication.
7.2.1 ECB’s notion of strong authentication
In January of 2013 the European Central Bank (ECB) published its’ recommendations
for the security of internet payments [50]. These recommendations are the ﬁrst res-
ult of the European Forum on the Security of Retail Payments (SecuRe Pay), a volun-
tary cooperation initiative includingmost European central banking authorities. The
members of SecuRe Pay have committed to supporting the implementation of the re-
commendations in their respective jurisdictions and will integrate them in existing
supervisory/oversight frameworks. The recommendations should be implemented
by payment service providers (PSPs) and Governance Authorities (GAs) of payment
schemes by 1 February 2015.
The recommendations provide interesting key considerations and best practises
for online authentication. In particular, it deﬁnes a notion of strong user authentication,
which is deﬁned as: “a procedure based on the use of two or more of the following
elements:”
1. knowledge, something the user knows, such as a PIN;
2. ownership, something the user has, such as a smart card;
3. inherence, something the user is, e.g. biometric characteristics, such as a ﬁnger
print.
This deﬁnition seems a pretty straight forward deﬁnition of multi-factor authentic-
ation, but it adds additional demands: “the elements selected must be mutually in-
dependent, i.e. the breach of one does not compromise the other(s). At least one of
the elements should be non-reusable and non-replicable (except for inherence), and
not capable of being surreptitiously stolen via the internet. The strong authentica-
tion procedure should be designed in such a way as to protect the conﬁdentiality of
the authentication data.”
This notion of strong authentication is only deﬁned for online banking and has
no legal status (yet). It does provide a starting point for strong authentication that we
can use for other authentication problems besides online banking.
Regrettably, the ECB’s notion of strong user authentication only concerns authen-
tication of the user, not authentication of transactions carried out by that user. A no-
tion of transaction authentication is only considered inBest Practice 7.3 in theECB re-
commendations as anoptional extra: “Stronguser authentication could[our emphasis]
include elements linking the authentication to a speciﬁc amount or payee.”
There is also somehaziness in the ECB’s deﬁnitionwhere it states that at least one
element should not be capable of being surreptitiously stolen via the internet. Exactly
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which attacks should be protected against by this remark? Simple eavesdropping of
HTTP trafﬁc? Or also attacks that use fake bank-sites or even Man-in-the-Browser
attacks?
7.2.2 Multi-factor authentication using mobile phones
Multi-factor authentication is an often used technique to add security to authentic-
ation. Often “Something the user has” is used as a second factor in authentication,
particularly for remote authentication. This “something” the user has can be a hard-
ware token, such as a smart card, an RSA token, or a passport. Especially with con-
sumer services, the mobile phone is a popular device to use for this. Naturally, this
assumes the user does not already use the phone itself to access the service hewants
to authenticate to, since then it would no longer count as a second factor.
Mobile phones are a convenient choice for an additional authentication factor
since practically all users carry a phone anyway. This both saves the costs of creat-
ing dedicated tokens and saves users fromhaving to take care of an additional device.
Furthermore, because of themany uses amobile phone offers, users (or at least smart
phone users) typically check their phones 150 times a day [119], which results in users
noticing the absence of their phones (e.g. through loss or theft)much faster than other
hardware tokens. Also, phones have their own connections to the mobile network or
the internet. So when using a computer for remote authentication, using a mobile
phone as an additional factor automatically provides a separate path to the user. If,
for instance, the computer is infected with malware, than this separate path to the
user would remain uninﬂuenced by the malware.
Let’s take a closer look at some solutions formulti-factor authentication usingmo-
bile phones: SMS mTAN, Google Authenticator, the Twitter app, Mobile PKI, tiqr and
Cronto. In this discussion we assume that a user logs in to a server using a computer
and uses the provided authentication methods on a phone as an additional authen-
tication step.
SMS mTAN / OTP
A TAN, Transaction Authentication Number, is a code used to authenticate a transac-
tion. Originally, some banks gave lists of TANs to customers which could be used as
one-time passwords, to authenticate themselves or to authorise transactions. Sev-
eral banks now use TAN codes transmitted to the user’s mobile phone via SMS for
authenticating online banking transactions. These codes are often referred to as “mo-
bile TAN” (SMS mTAN), or as SMS One-Time Password (SMS-OTP) [123]. Note that
these two names allude to the two different forms of authentication we distinguish,
namely transactionauthentication for TANanduser authentication forOTP.WithSMS
mTAN/OTP the user receives a code via SMSmessage and enters this code unaltered
into his computer (the challenge and response are equal).
SMSmTAN is usable on practically everymobile phone since it only needs awork-
ing subscription for the mobile network to receive SMS messages. This option does
not store secrets on the phone and themessage size offered by SMS provides the pos-
sibility to give the user additional information besides the mTAN, such as the receiv-
ing account number and amount of money in a banking transaction. This allows a
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user to validate the transaction he is authenticating through an independent chan-
nel, which is also called out-of-band veriﬁcation.
A downside to SMSmTANare the costs involved; every SMS / authentication costs
money. Also, this approach is vulnerable to any attack which intercepts the SMS.
There are several attacks to intercept SMS messages:
1. Eavesdropping the wireless link (as detailed in Chapter 3),
2. Malware on the phone which intercepts the message and forwards it to the at-
tacker [73, 151], and:
3. SIM-fraud, where an attacker manages to obtain a new SIM card belonging to
the phone number of the victim.
In each of these attacks an attacker obtains the TAN code and could use this to au-
thenticate to the service assuming the attacker can already circumvent the other
factors involved in authentication [123, 144]. In the ﬁrst attack, eavesdropping, the
victim will also receive the SMS message, which should alarm him if he did not re-
quest the message. Alternatively, an attacker could use an active Man-in-the-Middle
attack between the cell tower and the victim’s mobile phone and simply not trans-
mitting the mTAN on to the victim (Section 3.2.2). In the other two attacks the SMS
messages can remain hidden from the user, but in the third attack all telco services to
the victimwill be discontinuedwhen the newSIMcard is activated, which alsomakes
this attack detectable. The malware attack is the attack which scales the best when
performed on many targets, since the eavesdropping attack requires the attacker to
be in the vicinity of the victim when performing the attack and the SIM-fraud attack
requires the attacker to obtain a new SIM card from the victim’s provider.1
Finally, this authentication method is also vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle at-
tack, where the user thinks he is performing a correct authentication, but the attacker
modiﬁes or redirects the authentication messages in order to authenticate on behalf
of the victim. All the phone-based additional-factor authentication techniques dis-
cussed here are vulnerable to such an attack, though some, like the SMS TAN version,
still have a beneﬁt because of the out-of-band veriﬁcation information that can be ad-
ded in the SMS message. A user can use this information to verify he is performing
the expected transaction [144].
Google Authenticator
Google offers a two-factor authentication scheme for its services [87]. First a user au-
thenticates using a user name and password combination, then the users provides
an OTP generated on a smart phone app. This smart phone app, called the Google
authenticator, is a personalised app containing a secret shared with the Google back-
end. The app generates a new code every 30 seconds (each code remains valid for one
minute), so the challenge consists of the current time and is never transmitted. This
1From personal experience we found that some banks have started protecting against this attack
through an agreement with the providers. The providers alert the bank when a new SIM card gets ac-
tivated for a mobile number used for remote authentication to the bank. The bank then simply disallows
any transaction from that phone number for a certain period, such as 48 hours.
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is also called Time-based One-time Passwords (TOTP) [35]. The response is supplied
by the user via the computer.
This time-based authenticator app runs on most smart phones and does not cost
any money per authentication. It stores a secret within the app memory, which is
not considered very secure. This secret is stored during the personalisation phase, by
having the phone scan a QR code which contains the secret.
This additional authentication scheme is vulnerable tophone-sidemalwarewhich
either retrieves the stored secret or forwards authentication codes. If the stored secret
ever gets retrieved by an attacker, while the victim remains owner of the phone, then
the attacker can defeat the additional authentication stepwithout the victimnoticing
this. As opposed to SMSmTAN, the Google Authenticator offers no out-of-band chan-
nel through which a user can verify the transaction details he authenticates. This
makes this authentication method extra vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle attack
on the victim’s computer.
Twitter app
The Twitter app recently added a two-factor authentication option for users signing
in via a PC [156]. The Twitter app itself also gives access to a user’s account, in which
case it no longer counts as a second factor, but here we are interested in the use case
of a user using the app solely as a second factor, while authenticating over a PC.
When a user enrols for this two-factor authentication, his app generates an RSA
key pair en sends its public key to the Twitter server. Now, when a user tries to log-in
to Twitter, the Twitter server will transmit log-in details (time, location and browser
information) along with a random challenge to the Twitter app on the user’s phone.
The app will notify the user of a log-in attempt, who can then approve or deny the
action. Upon approving, the app will sign the challenge with its private key and send
this back to the Twitter server as a response. After verifying the response the Twitter
server allows the user’s PC to log-in.
Thismulti-factor authenticator runsonmost smart phones, butwill needanactive
data connection at the time of authentication. This authentication could cost the user
money to transmit over a data network, especially when roaming abroad, though the
amount of data transmitted is very small.
The app also provides the possibility to generate back-up codes for when the
phone does not have a data connection. This is based on the S/KEY password sys-
tem [93], which in turn is a concrete implementation of Lamport’s One-Time Pass-
word scheme [114], where the app generates a secret and hashes this n times (in case
of the Twitter app n starts out at 10000) and sends this to the Twitter server during
enrolment. Back-up codes are generated by hashing the secret n − 1 times and dis-
playing this to the user. The user can then type this code in his browser during au-
thentication. The Twitter server then hashes the code once and veriﬁes that it equals
the value it stored during enrolment. Subsequently the server stores the n − 1 times
hashed value and the appwill generate an n−2 times hashed value the next time, and
so on. Effectively, this provides an OTP.
Both solutions were designedwith the additional goal of the back-end server only
being able to verify the authentication responses coming from the Twitter app, but
not being able to generate said authentication responses itself. So, in the event of
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a breach of the back-end server (or at least the database containing the user log-in
parameters) an attacker would still not be able to generate valid log-in responses on
behalf of users [156]. Although this is an interesting feature, it does raise the ques-
tion whether an attacker gaining access to the back-end of Twitter would not be able
to then impersonate a user by other means, e.g. by changing the stored user log-in
parameters to his own?
Both these solutions do have a secret stored in the app memory, which is con-
sidered vulnerable. However, the beneﬁt compared to the Google authenticator is that
the Twitter server does not store the secret. Both of these Twitter app solutions are
vulnerable to mobile malware, which can either retrieve the secrets or forward au-
thentication codes. Again, malware on the PC is also a vulnerability, although the
standard public key method of the Twitter app provides the user with out-of-band in-
formation which he can use to verify he is logging in to the correct site.
Mobile PKI
Mobile PKI is an interesting variant where secrets are stored on the SIM2 card [137].
It alsomakes an explicit separation between user authentication and transaction au-
thentication. As the name suggests, this method relies on public key cryptography,
where the SIM stores the user’s private key.
Mobile PKI uses the so-called SIM toolkit, an optional application on SIM cards
with extensive additional functionality compared to normal SIM card applications.
When supported by the mobile phone, the SIM Toolkit can perform actions such as
sending SMS messages, or modify numbers called by the user. SIM Toolkit also al-
lows for direct communication between provider and SIM card through service SMS
messages, which are regular SMSmessages with additional options set in the header
indicating that the payload of these SMS messages are to be delivered directly to the
SIM card, without notifying the user of the reception. These service messages are
used in mobile PKI, where a message contains two data ﬁelds, one containing the
data to be signed and one containing data to be displayed to the user. After reviewing
the data displayed, the user can instruct the SIM card to proceed with signing. This
will require an additional local authentication to the SIM card using a PIN code. When
successful, the SIM card will sign the appropriate data and send it back to the server
using service SMS messages.
Mobile PKI is the most costly of the techniques discussed in this section, since it
both requires SIM cards that support Mobile PKI, which are not commonly provided
to users, and requires SMS messages (both transmitting and receiving) per authen-
tication. The use of the SIM card also involves an organisational hurdle, since the
SIM card is under the sole control of a provider. This means that you both need the
permission and cooperation of the provider, as well as have the required trust in the
provider.
While it is possible to eavesdrop on the wireless transmission of the service SMS,
this does not matter for the Mobile PKI solution. Not only can the contents of this
message have extra encryption, the contents of these messages are useless to an at-
tacker without access to the secrets stored in the SIM. After all, under the assumption
2We use the term SIM card, as this is the more commonly used term, though most modern phones ac-
tually have a UICC with a (U)SIM application.
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that challenges are not re-used, simply snifﬁng the challenge sent to the SIM card
does not help an attacker and snifﬁng the responsemeans the user already agreed to
the authentication. The storage of secrets in the SIM is a huge security beneﬁt com-
pared to the other approaches since SIMs offer protected storage, which is not (yet)
available in the phone memory.3
This approach is susceptible to malware attacks on the phone. Although the spe-
ciﬁcations of SIM Toolkit require a phone to give sole control over the keyboard and
screen to the SIM card, when input/output is exchanged between user and SIMToolkit
[54], this requirement is most likely no longer supported in modern smart phones,
where the OS is needed to provide the user with a keyboard.
This authentication method is vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle attack on the
victim’s computer, although like in the SMSmTAN case, the added transaction details
that can be shown to the user, could mitigate these vulnerabilities.
tiqr
Tiqr is an authentication method developed by SurfNet [180]. Again, it involves an
app running on a smart phone, which performs a challenge/response protocol. In
this case the challenge arrives via the PC; it is presented in the form of a QR code on
the computer screen, which the user needs to scan using the tiqr app and his smart
phone’s camera. The user is then presented with the domain name of the website
of the log-in attempt, and an option to continue with the authentication. When the
user chooses to continue, the response is computed using a shared secret and then
transmitted over a wireless data connection of the phone when available. If no data
connection is available, the tiqr app will show a response on the screen, which the
user can type into the PC.
This approach requires a smart phone with a camera. The response could cost
the usermoney to transmit over a data network, though the amount of data transmit-
ted is very small. Otherwise, this approach does not cost any additional money per
authentication and is considered relatively user-friendly, as the online case does not
require the user to copy either the challenge or response by manual typing.
Tiqr, like the Google authenticator, stores a secret in the phone memory, making
this approach vulnerable to attacks that retrieve the secret from the phone’s memory.
Tiqr is also vulnerable to phone-sidemalware which generates and forwards authen-
tication codes.
This authentication method is also vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle attack on
the victim’s computer, though again the showndetails (domain name) offer some pro-
tection.
Cronto
Cronto is a smart phone app by Vasco, speciﬁcally intended for banks [182]. Cronto
also uses scanning of a QR code4 as a means of getting the challenge into the phone
application. The difference with standard tiqr is that the Cronto app generates a TAN
code displayed to the user, who can then enter this code onhis computer. So, Cronto is
3Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) might provide secure storage on mobile phones [181].
4In this case a coloured QR code in stead of the standard black-and-white QR code.
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very similar to tiqrwithout a data connection, butwith oneother important difference:
Cronto also shows transaction details to the user.
The Cronto solution does not use any additional channel afforded by the mobile
phone.5 Again, as with all the previous smartphone app approaches, the Cronto app
stores a secret in the phonememory, making this approach vulnerable to attacks that
retrieve the secret from the phone’s memory.
This authentication method can be vulnerable to a Man-in-the-Middle attack on
the victim’s computer, although the added transaction details couldmitigate this vul-
nerability.
Comparison
Comparing the discussed alternatives, we see that they all use different channels for
receiving the challenge and/or transmitting the response and where or if they store a
secret. Figure 7.1 summarises these differences by showing the different information
ﬂows after a user started the authentication procedure, e.g. by providing username
and password.
Three of these approaches use the separate channel offered by the use of amobile
phone for receiving the challenge. In the case of the Google authenticator the chal-
lenge is public knowledge (time) and tiqr receives its challenge over the PC used for
the authentication. Tiqr uses the separate channel for transmitting the response, just
as Mobile PKI and the on-line Twitter app, while the other two remaining approaches
use the PC connection for transmitting the response. The separate channel helps to
assure not all communication can be inﬂuenced from the PC.
Mobile PKI stores its secret in the most secure way. SMS mTAN does not involve
a secret, but this results in a severe weakness, since this means the challenge and
response are the same and thus the challenge needs to remain conﬁdential. This is
something the SMS channel cannot provide strong guarantees for.
Interestingly, the mobile PKI and SMS mTAN/OTP both explicitly recognise user
authentication and transaction authentication, while Google Authenticator, the Twit-
ter app and tiqr seem mainly focused on user authentication and Cronto speciﬁcally
targets transaction authentication.
Of these approaches Mobile PKI is by far the most secure, though the costs and
necessary involvement of the provider can be a huge downside. The online version
of Twitter authentication offers essentially the same scheme asMobile PKI, only with
the secrets stored in the phone memory instead of in the SIM. This removes most of
the downsides with Mobile PKI, but also its greatest strength, since the secrets are no
longer stored in trusted hardware. SMSmTANseems theweakest solution as it has an
extraweakness the other approaches do not share: interception of the SMS challenge.
This problem could be mitigated by storing a secret on the phone, so the incoming
SMS challenge can be used for a true challenge response protocol, but then again the
storage of the secret would introduce weaknesses. We discussed intercepting SMS
messages on the air interface in Chapter 3. Additionally, SMSmessages can be inter-
cepted on the phone itself usingmalware, butmost other authenticationmethods are
also vulnerable to phone malware.
5A variant of the Cronto mobile phone app involves a special hardware token, with a camera and a dis-
play and two buttons, which functions exactly as the Cronto app, but on dedicated hardware.
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All approaches are still vulnerable to malware on the PC that fools a user into au-
thenticating for something else than what he thinks. However, several of these ap-
proaches use the possibility to add extra (out-of-band) data showing the user authen-
tication details pertaining to the actual authentication being performed. The online
Twitter app and tiqr (both, online and ofﬂine) both show additional user authentica-
tion information, while Cronto shows additional transaction authentication informa-
tion. SMSmTAN andMobile PKI can provide both details in case of user and transac-
tion authentication, while Google Authenticator and the Twitter app in ofﬂine mode
provide neither. This feature can be very powerful in preventing MitM attacks, and is
arguably more important when approving transactions than during log-in attempts.
Bank transfers are a good example of a scenario where it is relatively easy to give
transaction details to the user. However, as we will see in the case-study presented
in Section 7.4, for more complicated transactions, such as the signing of documents,
this is not so easy.
According to the ECB deﬁnition
We can see how the different second factor authentication solutions hold up against
the ECB deﬁnition of strong authentication. We still assume users authenticate over a
PC, using user name and password as the primary authentication factor. This means
the mobile phone solution is the second factor and is mutually independent of the
primary factor. Furthermore, we assume the challenge transmitted to the mobile
phone is never re-used. So, in order to comply with the ECB’s notion of strong se-
curity, the second factor techniques need to (I) not be able to be surreptitiously stolen
via the internet and (II) should protect the conﬁdentiality of the authentication data.
We already discussed how the requirement of “not being able to be surreptitiously
stolen via the internet” is problematically vague. However, we can also argue that
the requirement of “conﬁdentiality of the authentication data” already subsumes this
vague requirement.
For most techniques, this requirement is highly dependant on the implementa-
tion of the authentication process on the primary channel, in our case a PC. Only the
Mobile PKI solution offers the possibility of conﬁdentiality of its authentication data,
within its own solution. The Google Authenticator uses the current time, and as such
part of the authentication data can not be considered conﬁdential.
All techniques where the response is transmitted via the user’s PC are vulner-
able to Man-in-the-Browser attacks, whereby the authentication response can leak.
SMS mTAN/OTP has an additional problem since the transaction data could also be
stolen from the SMS transfer. Because with SMS mTAN the challenge and response
are equal, any conﬁdentiality leak of the challenge immediately presents a critical
vulnerability. This also shows an additional problem with the ECB recommendation,
as the channel of which the factor gets surreptitiously stolen presumably does not
matter when evaluating strong authentication.
7.3 Digital signatures
This section will look into the practice of digital signatures and the legal framework
around the electronic signatures. This serves mostly as a background for the inter-
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Figure 7.1: Schematic representation of information flows and stored secrets with different 2nd factor
authentication solutions. Challenges are denoted with dotted arrows and responses are denoted with a
straight arrow. Keys of the same colour represent symmetric keys and keys of different colours represent
asymmetric keys.
ested reader, introducing the particularities concerning electronic signatures before
looking into a server-based service for digital signatures in Section 7.4. Most of the
information in this section became outdated on July 1, 2016, when the eIDAS regula-
tion went into effect. A short section (7.3.3) was added here to to describe the biggest
change, with respect to this chapter, introduced by the eIDAS regulation. Since the
rest of this chapter mostly considers the situation prior to July 1, 2016, the informa-
tion here is left as-is.
For centuries now handwritten signatures on a document provide both a prove of
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identity and a proof of intent from the signer. So, we see a signature combining both
user authentication and transaction authentication. Although the actual security of
a handwritten signature is debatable, most countries give strong legal status to sig-
natures, and signatures are often required for legal documents, such as contracts and
ofﬁcial written statements. Also, legal systems usually have procedures in place in
case of a contested signature.
In thedigitalworldwealsohavedigital signatures. Most digital signature schemes
are built on a public-private key pair, where the signer makes a hash of the message
to sign, encrypts it with his private key, and attaches the result to the message. The
validity of the digital signature can than be veriﬁed using the public key, which is
usually bound to the identity of the signer via a public key infrastructure (PKI).
‘Digital signature’ is a somewhat confusing name, as there are several important
differences between hand-written signatures and their digital homonym, besides the
obvious difference in mediums on which they are used.
A difference is that digital signatures are amorewidely used concept in the digital
world, than hand-written signatures are in the physical world. Completely automated
messages in a protocol, for instance, are regularly signed, messages without a natural
or legal entity as the signer, in contrast to signed documents in the physical world.
There is a related difference in the extended functionality offered by digital sig-
natures, compared to hand-written signatures. Digital signatures provide integrity of
the document, which hand-written signatures do not.
A ﬁnal difference betweenhandwritten and digital signatures is thatwe only need
a pen and ink for placing a handwritten signature. For digital signatures though, we
need some kind of computing device to generate a signature and a computing device
to verify a digital signature, as this involves mathematics that most people can not
perform by themselves. Also a device is required that stores the private key, this can
be the same device that generates the signature or a separate device. This device will
need to provide some local (user) authentication to control access to the signing func-
tionality it provides. Depending on the strength of the local authentication, the loss of
this device could completely invalidate the security offered by the digital signatures.
In this sense a digital signature is more the digital equivalent of a seal (placed on a
see-through envelope holding a document), since a seal also protects integrity and is
made with a device instead of by the signer.
So, whereas hand-written signatures are always used to prove intent of the signer,
digital signatures are mostly used to achieve integrity protection and sender authen-
tication. For the speciﬁc form of digital signatures that are meant to fulﬁl the same
function as hand-written signatures the legal term is electronic signatures.
7.3.1 Electronic signatures – Legal framework up to July 2016
Many countries now recognise electronic signatures. The European Directive on a
Community framework for Electronic Signatures, Directive 99/93/EG [165] was passed
through the European Council and Parliament and went in effect on the 13th of
December 1999. This European directive handles the legal status of electronic sig-
natures in commerce and on legal documents and proceedings. It can be said to dis-
tinguish three types of signatures. These are, in order of reliability:
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1. electronic signatures
2. advanced electronic signatures
3. qualiﬁed electronic signatures
Electronic signatures are deﬁned in article 1 of the European directive as: “data in
electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with other electronic
data and which serve as a method of authentication”. So, an electronic signature can
be anything from a digital signature to a scan of a handwritten signature or even a
typed name on a digital document, and the reliability of an electronic signature can
be very poor.
For an electronic signature to be considered as an advanced electronic signature it
has to meet the requirements listed in article 2 of the European directive:
1. it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
2. it is capable of identifying the signatory;
3. it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole con-
trol6; and
4. it is linked to the data to which it relates in such amanner that any subsequent
change of the data is detectable;
Where a signatory is “a person who holds a signature-creation device and acts either
on his own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or entity he represents”.
Basically, advanced electronic signatures aremore trustworthy versions of electronic
signatures. Digital signatures, such as PGP signed e-mail, can be advanced electronic
signatures when they are created by means under the sole control of the signer (re-
quirement 3).
Qualified electronic signatures are not explicitly named in the European directive
(the name stems fromETSI standard TS 101 456), but it is the name commonly given to
advanced electronic signatures that also meet the two additional demands of article
5.1 of the European directive: “electronic signatures which are based on a qualiﬁed
certiﬁcate and which are created by a secure-signature-creation device”. These are
the highest level of electronic signatures and are considered to have the same legal
power as hand-written signatures do. In fact, the Directive states that these qualiﬁed
electronic signatures “(a) satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to
data in electronic form in the samemanner as a handwritten signature satisﬁes those
requirements in relation to paper-based data; and (b) are admissible as evidence in
legal proceedings.” The next two subsections will look into the demands set on the
qualiﬁed certiﬁcates and secure signature-creation devices required for generating
qualiﬁed signatures.
This European directive had to be implemented in the local law of the European
member states by the 28th of December 2009. In the Netherlands this happened in
6The upcoming eIDAS standard [167] actually relaxes this requirement so a user can entrust a third party
with his means to create a signature, as long as the user keeps “sole control over the use of his electronic
signature creation data”
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May of 2003 with the “Wet Elektronische Handtekening (WEH)”, the law on electronic
signatures, which incorporates several modiﬁcations of existing laws. The Dutch law
does not name the different signatures (i.e. electronic, advanced and qualiﬁed), but
states that any electronic signature made through amethod that is considered “sufﬁ-
ciently reliable” is considered to have the same legal status as a hand-written signa-
ture. It then follows this by listing six demands, which when met, yield a signature
which is assumed to be sufﬁciently reliable.7 These six demands are the same six
demands for qualiﬁed signatures in the European directive.
It is important to realise that these laws and directives do not mean that qualiﬁed
electronic signatures are the only way a legally binding electronic signature can be
made. There is a lot of leeway to accept other forms of electronic signatures, but in
those cases it is necessary to make a risk analysis for the speciﬁc context, to see if
the signature method provides enough guarantees on the identity of the signer and
on the integrity of the document for the speciﬁc case. The main difference is that for
a qualiﬁed electronic signature this assessment is not needed, as such a signature is
considered sufﬁciently reliable by default and has to be accepted as a valid signature.
7.3.2 Qualiﬁed certiﬁcates
Digital certiﬁcates are essential for digital signatures, since they provide the link
betweena signature and the signer. Asnoted in the previous section, in order to create
qualiﬁed signatures the signer needs a qualiﬁed certiﬁcate. Annex I of the European
directive supplies demands on the contents of these qualiﬁed certiﬁcates, such as
an indication that the certiﬁcate is issued as a qualiﬁed certiﬁcate and the name or
pseudonym of the signer.
Qualiﬁed certiﬁcates are issued by Certiﬁcation Service Providers (CSPs). In order
for a CSP to be allowed to issue qualiﬁed certiﬁcates, the CSP should conform to re-
quirements stated in Annex II of the European directive. These requirements come
down to the CSP using techniques and procedures that satisfy the current standards
for security and reliability and employing competent personnel. CSPs issuing qual-
iﬁed certiﬁcates are also liable for damages suffered by entities or natural or legal
persons who reasonably relied on that certiﬁcate, unless the CSP can prove that he
has not acted negligently.
All member states of the European Union have to have a supervisory body for su-
pervision of CSPs established on its territory issuing qualiﬁed certiﬁcates. Further-
more, member states may introduce a voluntary accreditation scheme by which CSP
can get accredited. Although this accreditation is voluntary, it seems the easiest way
to show conformation to the requirements and once accredited in a member state,
issued qualiﬁed signatures have to be accepted in all member states. These accred-
itation scheme’s will usually seek compliance with the requirements for CSPs stated
in ETSI TS 101 456 and with CWA 14167-1 and CWA 14167-2, as these are the standards
for electronic signature products recognised by the European Commission in Com-
mission Decision 2003/511/EC [166].
Matters get evenmore complex, as the organisations performing the CSP accred-
itation require periodic accreditation themselves (they should conform to the require-
ments stated in NEN EN 45011 and EN 45012).
7Article 3:15a, Clauses 1 and 2 of the Dutch Civil Code.
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7.3.3 Secure signature-creation devices
Qualiﬁed electronic signatures are created using a Secure Signature Creation Device
(SSCD). SSCDs need to conﬁrm to requirements (Annex III of the European directive) :
1. Secure signature-creation devices must, by appropriate technical and proced-
ural means, ensure at the least that:
(a) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can practically
occur only once, and that their secrecy is reasonably assured;
(b) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation cannot, with
reasonable assurance, be derived and the signature is protected against
forgery using currently available technology;
(c) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can be reliably
protected by the legitimate signatory against the use of others.
2. Secure signature-creation devices must not alter the data to be signed or pre-
vent such data from being presented to the signatory prior to the signature pro-
cess.
These requirements are hard to fulﬁl in practice. Although software solutions as
SSCDs are not explicitly excluded in the Directive, it seems impossible for software
solutions to conform to these requirements with the current state of PC security.
The most well-known SSCDs are probably smart cards. They are used, for in-
stance, in the Belgian and German e-ID cards, allowing citizens to sign communica-
tion with the government using the smart card in their ID document. Other solutions
include USB-tokens and Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). All these solutions are
dedicated hardware solutions with protected memory. They all have the same prob-
lems in that they need additional hardware in order to communicate to users. In the
case of smart cards this can be an independent terminal with a screen and keypad,
but also a terminal connected to a computer which in turn provides the screen and
keyboard to the user. Naturally, the latter option is less secure than the former, due
to possible malware corrupting the data ﬂows. USB-tokens almost always require a
computer for communication to the user. HSMs communicate over a network con-
nection and are placed within a server domain and manage things like crypto keys,
authentications and signing of automated messages, such as in DNS SEC. They are
not generally used for signing personal digital signatures, though Section 7.4 dis-
cusses a setup wherein this is exactly their use.
Just as the certiﬁcate service providers, the SSCDs can also achieve accredita-
tion. When an SSCD Conforms to the demands set in CEN Workshop Agreement
14169 (CWA 14169) it is assumed to fulﬁl the demands of the European directive stated
above [166]. CWA 14169 deﬁnes a Protection Proﬁle for a Common Criteria evaluation
of SSCDs. Interestingly, CWA 14169 allows for the end user’s computer to be placed
out-of-scope of the evaluation, as evaluating every user’s computer would clearly be
infeasible. However, this also means the local authentication of the user to the SSCD
is effectively removed from the scope of the evaluation on the assumption the local
authentication is carried out over a trusted path, even though the use of the user’s
computer is clearly the weak spot for most SSCDs.
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Electronic signatures – current legal framework
TheneweIDAS (electronic identiﬁcation and trust services for electronic transactions
in the internal market) standard [167] repeals the European Directive, and went into
effect on July 1, 2016. This loosens the sole control demand, by allowing a user to
“entrust qualiﬁed electronic signature creation devices to the care of a third party,
provided that appropriate mechanisms and procedures are implemented to ensure
that the signatory has sole control over the use of his electronic signature creation
data”. This was speciﬁcally changed in the new regulation to allow for server-based
signatures.
The eIDAS regulation remains vague on how electronic signature creation data can
remain under the sole control of a user, when his SSCD is placed on a server. The
organisation offering server-based signature services is expected to “apply speciﬁc
management and administrative security procedures and use trustworthy systems
and products, including secure electronic communication channels, in order to guar-
antee that the electronic signature creation environment is reliable and is used under
the sole control of the signatory.” Which is not helpingmuch. In fact, the eIDAS seems
to acknowledge that this is currently hard to achieve and thus hard to get accredited,
stating: “However, innovative solutions and services suchasmobile signing andcloud
signing rely on technical and organisational solutions for qualiﬁed electronic signa-
ture creation devices for which security standardsmay not yet be available”. In those
cases alternative processes for evaluation should be used, which have a security level
equivalent to standard security evaluations.
7.4 The Digidentity setup
Digidentity eSigning offers a subscription service for creating server-based electronic
signatures. These are digital signatures where the user’s private key is stored in the
cloud. Documents are uploaded to this service in order to be signed. The idea of using
a server in support of digital signing is known in the literature as a “delegated server”
approach [143]. The more speciﬁc idea of having the server signing documents on
behave of users is known as “server-based signatures” [6]. Both approaches require a
deep conﬁdence in the servermaintainers. Naturally in a service such as this, remote
authentication is paramount.
Digidentity offers four levels of these signatures, where levels one and two con-
form to ‘regular’ electronic signatures, level three conforms to advanced electronic
signatures and level four to qualiﬁed electronic signatures. It is this fourth level that
has our interest, since signatures made with it automatically have the same legal
status as handwritten signatures.
7.4.1 Enrolment
Signing up for the Digidentity service is possible via the Digidentity website. A user
chooses a user name and password and provides personal information, such as a
bank account, postal address, email address, mobile phone number and the docu-
ment number of an identity document. Much of this personal data is then veriﬁed:
the bank account through the transfer of 1 euro cent, the email address through email,
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the mobile phone number through an SMS OTP and the identity document through a
face-to-face check. The user gets a letter containing a PUK code which needs to be
entered during a phone call originating from the supplied mobile phone to an auto-
mated phone service. During this phone call the user chooses a PIN code.
After these checks the user can log on to the Digidentity website and can there
generate two certiﬁcates, one for logging on to the Digidentity account from now on
and one for digital signatures. Generating these certiﬁcates requires the user to sup-
ply his PIN code and a SMSmTAN.
7.4.2 Signing
Digidentity offers an iPad app for signing PDF documents: the SignPad app [39]. Cur-
rently, Digidentity does not offer the possibility to upload documents using the web-
site. After installation of the app it needs to be personalised. The user supplies his
user name and password for his Digidentity account, as well as an SMS mTAN sent
to his mobile phone. The user then has to choose a password for accessing the iPad
app. This password exists out of 4 letters between A and J, presented on a wheel that
rotates for every password attempt. This prevents leaking of the password through
ﬁngerprints on the iPad screen.
The SignPad app has a built-in PDF viewer and documents can be added to the
app directly from the iPad’s mail client or browser or via DropBox.8 The thus added
ﬁles can now be viewed and signed. Additionally, the signature of signed documents
can be veriﬁed. The SignPad app shows some strange behaviour when signing PDF
forms. The built-in PDF viewer is incapable of displaying these documents, but the
document itself can still be signed!
When a user indicates the wish to sign a document, he can decide on a location
within the document to place the signature and provide his location and a signing
reason. The document is then uploaded to the Digidentity back-end through an SSL
connection, where the user’s private key is stored in a HSM [40]. The creation of the
signature then needs to be conﬁrmed by the user, by supplying his PIN code and a
fresh SMSmTAN. If both are correct, the signature is computed and transmitted back
to the iPad, where it is added to the document.
7.4.3 Analysis
The Digidentity setup is an interesting case, since it takes a traditional problem of
local authentication (the user towards the SSCD) and changes it into a remote au-
thentication problem by placing the SSCD in the cloud. To illustrate this Figure 7.2
shows the traditional approach of using a smart card as SSCD, while Figure 7.3 shows
the Digidentity approach with a cloud-based SSCD. The numbering of steps in both
ﬁgures has been kept the same as much as possible. It is important to note that we
have no information on the setup of the back end of Digidentity, so we present a pos-
sible scenario in Figure 7.3 where the SSL tunnel terminates within the HSM and also
the authentication challenges are generated and the responses are veriﬁedwithin the
HSM. We feel this presents the setup most secured against insider attacks. However,
these attacks cannot be ruled out. For a simple example of this remember that the
8DropBox is a free, cloud-based, storage service: www.dropbox.com
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Figure 7.2: Schematic representation of traditional qualified electronic signatures using a smart card
as SSCD, e.g. in the case of the Belgian and German e-ID card.
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Figure 7.3: Schematic representation of qualified electronic signatures with the Digidentity approach,
i.e. a HSM as SSCD placed in the cloud.
PIN code chosen by the user is provided to Digidentity via a phone call, requiring an
extra process to place the PIN code inside the HSM.
Digidentity is accredited as a CSP able to issue qualiﬁed certiﬁcates and the e-
Signing level 4 method is accredited as a means of generating qualiﬁed signatures.9
It is unclear which parts of the system fell within the scope of this evaluation, as the
evaluation report has not been made public. Digidentity stated in a meeting that the
authentication step of the user towards the SSCD has been included in this evalu-
ation, but is not clear what this exactly entails. The remote authentication messages
are sent over an SSL tunnel, although this does not protect the endpoints of the tunnel
(especially the iPad app).
9Both accreditation certiﬁcates can be found on the Digidentity website: https://www.digidentity.
eu/static/nl/privacy-veiligheid/privacy.html
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The authentication
When evaluating an authentication scheme, we could use the deﬁnition provided by
the ECB for strong authentication, presented in Section 7.2.1. The remote authentica-
tion when signing a document using the Digidentity service uses two factors:
1. knowledge, namely the user’s PIN and
2. ownership, namely the user’s iPad and phone (ownership of the iPad is proven
because the iPad app is personalised and ownership of the phone is proven us-
ing an SMSmTAN).
The ownership of the iPad, however, is not mutually independent with the other
factors, since the iPad is the end point of the connection with the Digidentity back-
end, so if the iPad gets compromised, then the whole authentication is defeated. This
leaves the user’s PIN and SMS mTAN. Although we refer to SMS mTAN several times
when discussing Digidentity’s authentication, their mTAN’s are actually sent over an
SMS variant, which in the 3GPP standards is referred to as ‘class 0’ or ‘ﬂash’ SMS.
In essence this is simply a normal SMS with a header option enabled which causes
the SMS to be displayed immediately on the phone’s screen and not be stored in the
SMS database, unless the used desires it. The important part for this discussion is
that thesemessages can still be intercepted through one of themethods discussed in
Section 7.2.2.
Continuing with the ECB deﬁnition, both the mTAN and the PIN code are mutu-
ally independent and the mTAN is non-reusable. Whether the mTAN can be surrepti-
tiously stolen via the internet depends again on the security of the iPad, but aswe dis-
cussed in Section 7.2.2, SMS mTAN does not conform to the ECB deﬁnition of strong
authentication.
In Section 7.2.2 we concluded that using SMS has a beneﬁt when used for transac-
tion authentication, namely that there is a separate channel through which not only
the mTAN is transmitted, but possibly also some transaction details. In the Digiden-
tity case the mTAN is accompanied by a 64 character string, probably showing the
SHA256 hash of the document ready to be signed. This transaction detail has little ad-
ded value asmost userswill not be able to calculate and verify this hash. The SignPad
app shows the same transaction detail when signing, however in our tests comparing
all 64 hexadecimal characters between app andSMS took too long and the transaction
expired. This might have been because of delays caused by the GSM network.
Given the presented weaknesses and conﬂicts with the deﬁnition of strong au-
thentication, we claim that SMS mTAN, even using the ﬂash SMS, is too weak a path
to use in remote authentication for something as important as qualiﬁed electronic
signatures. In particular, thismeans that the accreditation scheme allowing qualiﬁed
signature accreditation for such a system is not strict enough. In October of 2016 Di-
gidentity announced that it will move away from SMS mTAN to its own app. At the
time of writing, this app was not yet available for review.
We can than wonder whether any of the other methods for two factor authentic-
ation using mobile phones discussed in Section 7.2.2 would offer adequately strong
authentication. Most of the discussed methods offer only slightly better security by
protecting against eavesdropping thewireless transmission, which is one of themain
weaknesses here.
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The strongest guarantees are offered through the Mobile PKI solution, which was
the only presented method that could possibly adhere to the ECB deﬁnition of strong
authentication. Interestingly, Mobile PKI comes very close to a smart card based
method, with the SIM functioning as a smart card and the phone functioning as a PC
and card reader in one. The biggest difference between the Mobile PKI solution and
the classical smart card solution is that with Mobile PKI the SIM card is continuously
present in the phone, while in smart card solutions the smart card will normally not
be present in the card reader when the user is not using it. This introduces an extra
weakness, by giving attackers (e.g. via malware) a much longer time frame in which
to perform an attack. As a mobile phone solution, the Mobile PKI method does offer
the beneﬁt of users noting the disappearance of the mobile phone much faster than
of a smart card.
So, of the discussed methods for two-factor authentication using mobile phones,
the Mobile PKI method would seem most acceptable for authenticating to a signing
service.
Server-based signatures in general
Ifwe assume for amoment that the remote authentication of a server-based signature
scheme adheres to the ECB deﬁnition of strong authentication, thenwe can still won-
der if a server-based signature solution is acceptable in general, when looking at the
European directive on electronic signatures discussed in Section 7.3.1. The demands
1, 2 and 4 for advanced electronic signatures seem to bemet, as are the additional de-
mands for qualiﬁed electronic signatures, since the Digidentity solution could get the
required accreditation.The problem seems to be with demand 3, requiring the signer
to have sole control over the means creating the signature. In general, there seems
to be no technical means through which a signer can keep sole control over his SSCD
when this is placed in the cloud. This can be amended by strict procedures, but it
would be hard to argue that a user still has the sole control in these situations, as the
SSCD is kept under control by a company who use it on the user’s behalf.10
In 2005 the Forum of European Supervisory Authorities for Electronic Signatures
(FESA) concluded that server-based signatures could, in principle, be able tomeet the
demands for qualiﬁed signatures set by the European directive, although they deem
this rather unlikely [79]. Furthermore, they conclude that the usual accreditation for
SSCDs would be extremely complex for a signing service and that such signatures
would be unusable in Germany, where sole control implies physical control. This
opens up a legal issue on the acceptability of server-based signatures accepted and
generated in other EU countries being used in Germany.
Server-based signature schemesoffer anexplicit advantageover traditional smart
card-based systems in that they allow for additional security through monitoring of
transactions. Such transaction monitoring proved very successful in preventing on-
line banking fraud. However, this will be very dependent on the type of transactions:
online banking transactions can be proﬁled to scan for abnormal transactions, but for
generic signatures this could be a lot harder or even impossible. Additionally, trans-
action monitoring could also introduce privacy or conﬁdentiality issues.
10As discussed in Section 7.3.3 the current legal framework was speciﬁcally changed to allow server-
based signing.
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The fundamental problem with the classical, smart card-based solutions, is the
lack of a trusted display: the user sees the document on his computer and has to
trust that this will be the exact document signed by the smart card. An attacker in
control of an infected computer, could replace the document with any document he
wants to have signed by the user. For accredited smart card solutions this problem is
apparently acceptable.
If the user also uses the computer to input his PIN code to the smart card, then
the attacker can even sign multiple documents, for as long as the smart card stays
connected to the computer. This risk can be avoided by entering the PIN code on a
numeric keypad on a smart card reader, as is for instance required in the German
e-ID solution. An attacker in control of the user’s computer is then only capable of
changing the documents signed by the user and not add newdocuments to be signed.
Server-based signature schemes also do not have a trusted display, unless speciﬁc
hardware is rolled out. However, there is the option of adding an out-of-band channel
to the user, whichnot only adds an additional factor to the authentication, but can also
offer the option of displaying transactiondetails to the user onwhat he is signing [185].
Thisworkswell for small transactions suchas online banking transactions, where the
transaction details can contain the account numbers and amounts involved in all the
transactions. For electronic signatures though it is not so clear what to add as trans-
action details; A typical document to sign will often contain too much information to
be simply summarised in these transaction details. The Digidentity solution presen-
ted above uses a hash of the document as transaction details, but this requires the
user to compute the hash of the document he wishes to sign on a different device
than the iPad he currently uses to sign a document. A user not willing or unable11 to
perform this check runs the same risk of the document swap as users of smart card
based solutions.
If an attacker also wants to control this out-of-band channel then that will ne-
cessitate an additional attack on the second hardware platform. In the Digidentity
example an attacker then has to also infect the user’s mobile phone as well as the
iPad, to achieve this. This is an extra step for the attacker, but it will also increase
his capabilities. In a server-based signature solution the SSCD is always online, so
an attacker controlling all authentication channels can sign an unlimited number of
documents. This shows the fundamental necessity of having trusted hardware in the
hands of the user. In the case of Digidentity this trusted hardware for the user ismiss-
ing and the whole user side security is realised in software on generic and complex
operating systems.
A solution for server-based signatures could be to provide users with smart cards
and card readers as trusted hardware, but this would defeat the major beneﬁt of
server-based signatures, namely that users do not require an additional card reader.
7.5 Related work
Therehavebeenmanyproposals fornewauthentication schemesusingmobile phones
as additional factors [118, 3]. Some of these treat the mobile phone as a trusted device
11Auser canalso simply be ignorant, as in the currentDigidentity implementation there is no explanation
of what the transaction details represent, or how a user could reproduce them.
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[118], an assumption we are not ready to make in this chapter. Others provide, in es-
sence, a combination of two methods that were discussed above, such as a combina-
tion of SMS mTAN and the Google Authenticator app [3].
Van Rijswijk and Van Dijk presented the tiqr approach (also discussed above) in a
paper where they also compare other two factor approaches such as hardware tokens
and mobile phone solutions [180]. Their comparison is broader, not only in what they
compare, but also where they compare on; e.g. ease-of-use, security and costs, than
the comparison above, which focuses solely on security.
Mulliner et al. [123] reviewed the security of SMS-OTP (discussed in Section 7.2.2)
in-depth and proposed a solution to improve SMS-OTP securityw.r.t.malware, by hav-
ing the OTP SMS-es being delivered directly to a speciﬁc app. This solution hinges on
the reliability of the mobile OS to be able to deliver the SMS directly to the speciﬁed
app, without malware being able to intervene. Additional encryption could then also
be applied on the SMSmessages, removingmost of theweaknesses caused by the use
of the SMS channel.
7.6 Conclusions
We have looked into different multi-factor authentication approaches using a mo-
bile phone as an additional factor. Of the presented approaches the Mobile PKI is the
most secure, although it is also the most costly solution and requires permission and
cooperation of the providers involved. The other approaches all have major security
concerns, whenusedas authentication to sensitive applications. If theSMSmTANap-
proach would not use an unaltered challenge as a response, it might be an acceptable
choice. However, such a solutionwould then need to store a secret on the user device,
which introduces new weaknesses. Perhaps in the future banks can take advantage
of smart phones offering NFC combined with RFID bank cards or national identity
cards [102]. Given the advent ofmobile banking apps, the primary log-in device would
then probably be themobile device, and the RFID bank card would then be the second
factor.
We have presented a ﬁrst look at the new ECB recommendations on the secur-
ity of internet payments, focusing on their deﬁnition of strong authentication. While
these are a usable deﬁnition, we would like to see some extra clariﬁcation on the de-
mand that at least one element used in the authentication “should not be capable of
being surreptitiously stolen via the internet.” It is not clear which attacks are meant
in this part of the deﬁnition. Also, placing this demand only to the internet seems too
restrictive as many banks use SMS as an extra channel. Furthermore, we regret see-
ing that the ECB included transaction authentication only as an optional feature: this
would seem to be the main point for online banking transactions.
We analysed a server-based signature service called Digidentity. We feel their
choice of using SMS mTAN as an additional factor for authentication is too weak for
qualiﬁed electronic signatures. Digidentity has since announced that they will move
away from SMS mTAN as second factor for authentication. Digidentity achieved all
necessary accreditation for their SMSmTAN solution. It is unfortunate that the value
of this accreditation cannot be judged, since so little is publicly known of the process
of accreditation of the SSCD for Digidentity. Since these types of evaluations allow
128
7.6 Conclusions
the user’s computer to be placed out-of-scope, it is unclear if for instance the iPad app
was included in the accreditation. Potential users should be able to rely on the ac-
creditation scheme, and it is therefore not good for the faith and trust placed in such
schemes, that somuch of the accreditation process and details can remain conﬁden-
tial.
Finally, we conclude that server-based signature services in general had a great
difﬁculty conforming to the legislation on qualiﬁed electronic signatures. With the
current state-of-the-artwe cannot imagine a setupwhere a user’s private key is stored
in an SSCD in the cloud, but the user can still be said to have the sole control over his
key. The eIDAS regulation [167], relaxes the legislation enough to allow for server-
based signature services, though in the current wording it is not clear how to evalu-
ate such solutions. Hopefully, a scientiﬁc debate on the acceptability of server-based
signatures will arise now that this new standard has gone into effect.
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Chapter 8
Defeating IMSI catchers
So far, this thesismostly attempted to assess the security ofmobile telephony in prac-
tice, pointing out several weaknesses in the process. Now we will look into whether
it is possible to improve the current situation. To that end, this chapter attempts to
protect against an attack that is prevalent in all generations of 3GPP technology: IMSI-
catching.
We propose a solution which defeats the IMSI catching attacks and increases the
credibility of the mutual authentication with the home network. The latter has sig-
niﬁcant impact against man-in-the-middle attacks such as presented in [120], and
provides additional security to 2G networks which currently only support a unilat-
eral authentication procedure. This solution was formally veriﬁed using ProVerif and
does not interfere with the workings of the networks as they are deﬁned today, and
is in fact backwards compatible with current implementations. The only party that
would need to make a change would be the mobile providers, as they provision the
user with an IMSI and the SIM that contains it and are also the only party in control
of the authentication server, where the IMSIs are linked to the authentication para-
meters (keys and algorithms). Every provider can independently decide whether to
implement this solution, and as our solution changes nothing in the message deﬁni-
tions a change happens transparently for any intermediate providers.
This chapter is based on the article Defeating IMSI Catchers, presented at the ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2015 [179]. Compared
to the original publication, this chapter contains some changes in the introduction
and some information was moved to chapter 2, the background chapter, for a better
integration with the rest of the thesis.
We are currently working with the Fraud and Security Architecture Group (FSAG)
of the GSMA (the GSM Association) to get this solution into the current cellular spe-
ciﬁcations.
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8.1 Introduction
In mobile telephony it is hard to avoid providers knowing the approximate location
of their users, because they have to be able to route incoming trafﬁc to the mast cur-
rently nearest to the user. Actually, there have been proposals for a TOR-like network
among mobile phones, in order to obscure the location of users for the network [15],
but such a scheme seems impractical with regard to the reliability we have come to
expect from the mobile network. This continuous location monitoring can lead to
serious (location) privacy issues for users. However, if we accept this issue, for in-
stance because we trust the providers, then there are still many other privacy issues
related to mobile telephony, such as apps sharing private data [115] or eavesdropping
phone conversations (whichwas discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). One of the ﬁrst prac-
tical privacy attacks againstmobile phoneswas the so-called IMSI catching attack, and
this attack persists even in today’s mobile network standards. This term refers to the
unique identiﬁer present in every SIM card, called the IMSI for International Mobile
Subscriber Identiﬁer. This identiﬁer is transmitted in plain-text over the wireless net-
work as (initial) identiﬁcation and can therefore easily be intercepted.
We continue with some background information about mobile networks in Sec-
tion 8.2. This section not only discusses identiﬁcation in mobile networks, but also
looks at authentication, since our solution requires a change of a parameter of one of
the authentication messages. Section 8.3 describes our solution against IMSI catch-
ing for the current technology and provides the general idea of our solution. Sec-
tion 8.4 describes our solutionmodiﬁed for the older, but still heavily used 2G techno-
logy. We formally verify our solution in Section 8.5, as well as analyse the effective-
ness and consequences of implementing it. Finally, we review related work in Sec-
tion 8.6 and draw conclusions in Section 8.7.
IMSI Catching
IMSI catching was one of the ﬁrst practical attacks on GSM, leading to the develop-
ment of devices called IMSI catchers, which gather all IMSIs that are active in a geo-
graphic area. An IMSI catcher can achieve this in two different ways: passive and
active. The passive way is by simply observing the wireless trafﬁc and storing all IM-
SIs observed. For themore effective active attack a fake base station is set up, towhich
cell phones in the neighbourhood will attempt to connect. The fake base station then
simply commands each phone to identify itself. This way IMSIs can be retrieved at
any time, while with the passive attack the attacker has towait for phones to send out
their IMSI. IMSI catchers are commercially available, though they are expensive and
usually sold restrictively to government ofﬁcials. However, in recent years cheap and
precise enough equipment has become available that can be used to create an (active)
IMSI catcher. Likewise, cheap base stations called femtocells are commercially avail-
able, several of which have been rooted, making them into very cheap (below $100,-)
IMSI catchers, as we discussed in Chapter 5.
Over time, the commercial IMSI catchers were extended with a lot of additional
functionality such as eavesdropping on wireless calls. However, they are still, rather
euphemistically, called IMSI catchers. This leads to a lot of confusion on what is
meant by an IMSI catching attack. For this article, we refer only to the gathering of
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IMSI numbers from the air waves (either passive or active) as IMSI catching.
Recent news stories uncovered widespread use of unregulated IMSI catchers. In
an article from The Washington Post researchers found 18 IMSI catchers in Wash-
ington D.C. within two days [33]. These IMSI catchers were present at airﬁelds and
embassies and could be detected since they actually ran active Man-in-the-Middle
attacks, possibly to eavesdrop on mobile connections. So, traditional IMSI catchers,
as discussed in this article, might be even more widespread. The FCC started an in-
ternal task force to study the use of IMSI catchers by criminals and foreign intelli-
gence agencies [32], indicating that these attacks are considered a serious issue.
Location privacy
IMSI catching attacks mostly relate to the issue of location privacy, as the transmis-
sion of your IMSI reveals your approximate location. Location privacy attacks attempt
to link an identity to a location. By keeping one of these (identity or location) ﬁxed and
trying to recover the other, we identify two different goals of location privacy attacks:
Retrieving identities at a location (monitoring)
A list of caught IMSIs can reveal who came at what time within, for example,
the near vicinity of a speciﬁc building, or was present at a certain rally. Such
monitoring is also used for commercial goals such as customer monitoring.
We have seen that shop keepers already collect WiFi signals from phones to
determine statistics such as returning customers or the effectiveness of their
shop front [154]. IMSI catching could be used not only to invade privacy but also
for actual physical attacks. Consider, as (dramatic) example, automated terror-
ist attacks that trigger bombs to explodewhenhigh-value targets come in range
of an IMSI catcher [85, 21].
Retrieving a person’s location (tracking)
Recovering a person’s geographic movements can reveal a lot about what they
do and who they meet. As IMSI catching requires the operation of rogue cell
towers or passive listening antennas in the vicinity of the victim(s), it seems
most useful for monitoring attacks. In GSM a cell tower can service an area up
to 34 kilometres in diameter, so the vicinity is in the order of several kilometres.
For actual tracking over a larger area, an attacker would need a mobile setup –
such as one connected to a drone [104] – or a network of antennas. This is not
unthinkable, for example the city of London initiated a project where trash cans
monitor WiFi signals of mobile phones to proﬁle people’s behaviour in order to
send them targeted advertisements [107].
Traditionally, IMSI catching is associated with a more hybrid attack where po-
lice forces use IMSI catching to recover information about the mobile subscription of
a target [159]. They follow a target and gather a list of active IMSI numbers in sev-
eral unrelated crowds on independent locations and intersect the recovered sets of
IMSI numbers. The legitimacy of this method is debatable, especially since they of-
ten transmit signals from fake cell-towers which interfere with genuine cell-towers.
Furthermore, this technique seems to be used unregulated by several entities, such
as intelligence agencies and malicious adversaries [33, 84].
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8.2 Background
IMSI catching is an issue in what is often called the 3GPP or GSM family of cellular
technology; world-wide this is by-far themost popular of themobile telecommunica-
tion systems. This family of algorithms started in the early 90s with the introduction
of GSM, which was then 2nd generation mobile technology. Currently, we are seeing
the deployment of the 4Gnetworks (LTE andLTE+). Within each generation there have
been incremental improvementsmostly to the up- and down-link speed (e.g. HSDPA+
over UMTS in 3G), but the protocols themselves only receive real changes with the
move to a newer generation. As previously stated, the IMSI catching problem exists
in all generations. This following sections give some background into speciﬁcs of the
3GPP networks that are relevant for the IMSI catching dilemma. In Section 8.2.4 we
describe 3G authentication in more detail, both as an example and because we use
the authentication messages in our solution.
8.2.1 Identiﬁcation within 3GPP networks
Cell towers in mobile networks identify themselves by broadcasting identiﬁers. Mo-
bile phones pick up these signals and decide whether to connect to a network or not.
This decision is based on data from the SIM, which instructs the phone to look out for
certain networks by both frequency and identiﬁer. When a mobile phone connects to
a network, it ﬁrst requests a channel to exchange information on with the cell tower.
On this channel the cell tower can always request the SIM’s identity. Identiﬁcation is
performed after a simple command from the cell tower to a mobile phone. This com-
mand, Identity request, speciﬁes a speciﬁc identiﬁer (IMSI, TMSI, IMEI or IMEI(SV), see
Section 8.2.2), to which the phone responds with a so-called Identity response contain-
ing the requested identiﬁer [52, 48]. Authentication can only take place after identi-
ﬁcation, because the authentication is based on a symmetric key shared between the
SIM and provider.
Interestingly, the speciﬁcations of the mobile standards acknowledge the prob-
lems of IMSI catching. In [68] several security goals for mobile networks are stated,
among which are conﬁdentiality of the IMSI (user identity conﬁdentiality), user loca-
tion conﬁdentiality and user untraceability (Section 5.1.1 of [68]). The same document
acknowledges the breach of user identity conﬁdentiality introduced with the request
identiﬁcation message (Section 6.2 of [68]), though no breach of the location privacy
issues is mentioned here. The speciﬁcations further mandate that a SIM does not an-
swer Identity request messages asking for any identiﬁer, other then the IMSI, when
no encryption context is yet established (Section 4.4.4.2 of [48]). This, of course, would
not prevent IMSI catching, but does prevent the leaking of the other identiﬁers to IMSI
catchers. However, our experiments show that all of the current 3G or 4G enabled
phones and SIM cards we tested also transmit the TMSI and IMEI unprotected when
requested.
8.2.2 3GPP identiﬁers
While this article ismostly concernedwith protecting the IMSI,manymore identiﬁers
exist in the 3GPP networks. We discuss the most important of these brieﬂy below.
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International Mobile Subscriber Identiﬁer (IMSI) The IMSI is the main identiﬁer in
3GPP networks and belongs to one speciﬁc SIM card. It is a 15 digit number
where the ﬁrst three digits identify the home country (MCC, Mobile Country
Code), the following two or three digits identify the home network (MNC,Mobile
Network Code). The remaining nine or ten digits identify the speciﬁc user/SIM
within the provider’s database.
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identiﬁer (TMSI) The TMSI is introduced to protect
against traceability of users. The TMSI is a temporary pseudonym provided to
the mobile device by the network, to use instead of the IMSI, essentially mask-
ing the IMSI against passive attacks. The TMSI is only valid within a certain
geographical area. When a mobile phone moves to another area it initiates a
location update procedure, which should provide it with a new TMSI. The time
a single TMSI remains valid is conﬁgurable by the access network. Since all
communication with the mobile phone should be based on the TMSI1, phones
are traceable via the TMSI during a validity period. TMSIs do not provide ad-
equate protection against IMSI catching attacks though, since a cell tower can
always request a phone’s IMSI. TMSIs are therefore easily defeated by active
IMSI catching attacks. Furthermore, research shows that in practice TMSIs re-
main valid for far too long and are re-used over different areas [5], making them
even usable in passive IMSI catching attacks.
International Mobile Equipment Identiﬁer (IMEI) The IMEI is a 15 digit number that
identiﬁes the mobile device itself. It is included to make black-listing of stolen
phones possible. There is a closely related alternative to the IMEI, often referred
to as IMEI(SV), which is one digit longer and also identiﬁes the software version
running on the phone.
Other identiﬁers
There are several other ways to identify a mobile device based on its trans-
missions, for instance the phone’s answer to authentication requests. Because
these requests are answered based on a shared secret key, the same challenge
always invokes the same response. There are also several ways to identify a
mobile device outside of the 3GPPprotocols. Examples of these include theMAC
address of the WiFi or Bluetooth adaptor.
8.2.3 Authentication within 3GPP networks
For all 3GPP systems the customer’s SIM card shares a (set of) secret key(s) with the
authentication server of his provider. Any authentication and encryption of mes-
sages is performed with temporary keys derived from these shared secret keys. The
link between aSIM’s unique identiﬁer (IMSI) and its secret keys ismade either through
a diversiﬁed key solution or a simple look-up table. Once the SIM has been identiﬁed,
the network can look-up the accompanying secret key and initiate authentication.
It is important to note that the party authenticating the mobile device does not
need to be the user’s own provider. A mobile device can be ‘roaming,’ i.e. using the
1Phones can also still be paged using their IMSI numbers, and listening on paging channels shows that
this occurs frequently.
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network of another provider. We call the network with which the mobile device is
currently connected the access network, and the network of the user’s provider the
home network (see Figure 8.1). Earlier, in the Background Chapter (Page 16) we already
introduced this division, but there we used core network instead of home network. In
this chapter we use the term ‘home network,’ to stress that this is the user’s own pro-
vider, possibly introducing the new features we propose, while other core networks
possibly keep everything unchanged.
Access network
Authentication server
Authentication server
Authentication server
Home network
Figure 8.1: Schematic overview of the division between the access network and the home network.
The access network starts a challenge-response protocol with the SIM, which au-
thenticates the SIM and establishes (a) sessions key(s). When using 3G or 4G tech-
nologies, the challenge sent by the access network also authenticates the home net-
work, for 2G technologies there is only SIM-only authentication. Since only the au-
thentication server within the home network and the SIM know the secret key, the
access network is not capable of authenticating (to) the SIM. Obviously, it would be
unacceptable for the different providers to share the secret keys among each other.
Therefore, all 3GPP protocols have the access network contact the SIM’s home net-
work to request authentication parameters for the IMSI. This is possible because part
of the IMSI identiﬁes the home network. The authentication parameters contain a
challenge, the associated response, resulting session key(s) and, in case of 3G and 4G
technology, an authentication token. This authentication token is used for the SIM
to be able to authenticate the home network and is essentially a sequence number
shared between the SIM and home network and a MAC over this sequence number
and the challenge. The access network forwards the challenge and authentication
token to the SIM, which veriﬁes the validity of the authentication token and responds
to the challenge. The SIM also uses the random challenge to compute the session
key(s) and forwards these to the phone. The access network compares the response
from the SIM with the response from the home network. If they are equal, then the
SIM is authenticated and both sides of the wireless interface share a (set of) session
key(s). In Section 8.2.4 the authentication protocol for the 3G technology is discussed
in more detail.
This set-up leads to an interesting a-symmetry in the authentication, whereby the
accessnetworkauthenticates theSIMand (in caseof 3Gand4G) theSIMauthenticates
the home network. It is also curious that for establishing the session key(s), no input
or freshness of the SIM is required.
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8.2.4 3G Authentication and key establishment
Since our solution against IMSI catching requires a change in the authentication pro-
cedure we will now take a detailed look at authentication in 3G networks. This so-
called Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol provides both mutual au-
thentication, between SIM and homenetwork, and establishes session keys. TheAKA
protocol for 4G is almost identical, with only one additional parameter used to diver-
sify the session keys. A difference that has no impact for this chapter.2 This AKA
protocol is deﬁned in [68] and we present an overview in Figure 8.2. The bit lengths of
important variables are summarised in Table 8.1.
To be more precise we ﬁrst introduce the variables and functions used in this
chapter to formalise the authentication protocol. The set of all available IMSI num-
bers is denoted by I and is available to the home network of the provider. The home
network stores the properties of a SIM card, IMSI (i), secret key (K) and sequence num-
ber (SQN), as a tuple s = 〈i,K,SQN 〉 for each i ∈ I in the set of all available SIM cards
S . To simplify the notation, we use subscript on a tuple to denote a single element
from the corresponding tuple, e.g. si denotes the IMSI number of the SIM card s. En-
cryption with key k is denoted by Ek() and decryption by E
−1
k (). Consequently, gener-
ation of a MAC with key k is denoted byMk(). We do not specify a speciﬁc algorithm,
but several standardised cryptographic primitives and methods are suitable for en-
cryption [75, 22, 36] and generating MACs [43, 76, 77]. The AKA protocol relies on ﬁve
encryption functions referred to as f1 to f5. The implementation of these functions is
provider-speciﬁc and not fully standardised. However, the standard that deﬁnes the
security architecture [68] suggest that the provider may use the example algorithm
implementation set, deﬁned in [46], for authentication and key generation. This im-
plementation set is based on Rijndael, combined with different provider codes that
get XORed with the random challenge, for each of the ﬁve algorithms. We assume
in this chapter that the operator uses functions with similar characteristics as those
proposed in [46].
The SIM has at some point identiﬁed itself before the authentication starts. The
access network can then request authentication parameters from the home net-
work. The home network computes the authentication parameters, which consist of
a freshly generated randomwhich acts as a challenge (RAND), the corresponding re-
sponse (SRES), conﬁdentiality key (CK), integrity key (IK), anonymity key (AK) and an
authorisation token (AUTN). The AUTN token, is the authorisation proof by the home
network. It consists of the sequence number XORed with the anonymity key, the Au-
thentication Management Field (AMF) and a MAC over SQN, AMF and RAND. The se-
quence number protects against re-play attacks, the AMF is for the provider to use,
for instance to signal a speciﬁc algorithm suite, or set a time validity for a key and the
MAC authenticates this message as coming from the home network. The authentic-
ation parameters are then transmitted to the access network. The challenge RAND
and the AUTN token are forwarded to the SIM.
The SIM, upon reception of an authentication request, ﬁrst retrieves the sequence
2In 4G AKA the access network is not trusted to verify the response to the challenge, as opposed to 2G
and 3G. However, this difference also has no inﬂuence on the rest of the chapter, as the access network still
requests the IMSI to ﬁnd the home network.
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SIM
IMSI,K,SQN
Access network Home network
AMF,
S = {s | ∀i ∈ I} where s = 〈i,K,SQN 〉
identity request
identity response (IMSI)
IMSI
K,SQN ← s ∈ S where si = IMSI
RAND← {0,1}128
MAC← f1(K,SQN,AMF,RAND)
XRES← f2(K,RAND)
CK ← f3(K,RAND)
IK ← f4(K,RAND)
AK ← f5(K,RAND)
AUTN ← 〈SQN ⊕AK,AMF,MAC〉
update sSQN ← SQN +1
RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, IK
authentication request (RAND, AUTN)
AK ←f5(K,RAND)
XSQN ←AK ⊕AUTNSQN⊕AK
XMAC←f1(K,XSQN,AUTNAMF ,RAND)
verify XMAC = AUTNMAC
verify SQN ≤ XSQN ≤ (SQN + range)
update SQN ← XSQN +1
SRES← f2(K,RAND)
CK ← f3(K,RAND)
IK ← f4(K,RAND)
authentication response (SRES)
verify SRES = XRES
encrypted using CK
authenticity protected with IK
Figure 8.2: A schematic representation of successful SIM authentication in 3G networks [47]
number (XSQN), by computing the anonymity key and XORing this with the sequence
number from the AUTN token. Then the SIM veriﬁes theMAC over the authentication
token. If the authentication token proves genuine, the SIM veriﬁes that the sequence
number from the network (XSQN) is higher than its own sequence number (SQN). If
the received sequence number is lower, or too high, then the SIM responds with an
error message and a genuine network will then start a re-synchronisation setup. By
howmuch the sequence numbers can deviate from each other is a setting chosen by
the home network.
If the sequence number falls within the range of allowed sequence numbers, the
SIM computes the conﬁdentiality key, integrity key and response. The response is
transmitted back to the access network and the two keys are stored in the phone.
The access network compares the response of the SIM (SRES) with the response of
the home network (XRES), and when found correct, the network can order the use of
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Table 8.1: Bit length overview, starred lines are newly added in the presented solution.
variable bit length
IMSI 60 (bcd encoded)
PMSI 34 ?
K 64 (2G) / 128 (3 and 4G)
RAND 128
SQN 62 ? (2G) / 48 (3 and 4G)
MAC 64 (3 and 4G)
Mκ 32 ? (2G)
integrity protection and ciphering.
TheAKAprotocol hadbeen formally veriﬁedusingenhancedBAN logic andshown
to provide both authentication and conﬁdentiality [57]. However, using ProVerif, a loc-
ation privacy attack was found by Arapinis et al. [4]. Replay attacks of the authentica-
tion token are prevented by the sequence number, but replaying this token will break
location privacy, as the SIM responds differently to an out of syncmessage than to an
incorrect MACmessage. Of course, IMSI catching is an even simpler way of breaking
location privacy.
8.3 Solution for 3G/4G
The underlying weakness enabling IMSI catching attacks is that the authentication
is based on symmetric cryptography. The use of a shared secret key, means a SIM has
to be identiﬁed before it can be authenticated. Identiﬁcation prior to (mutual) authen-
tication is a problem that crops up in other systems as well, such as in e-passports
[96] and RFID tags [116]. However, common solutions to this issue do not help for
the IMSI catching case. For instance randomising the IMSI is no solution, because
the IMSI needs to be identifying for the provider in order to provide cellular service.
Other solutions, such as encrypting the identiﬁer with the public key of the home net-
work, would require changes in themessages between the phone and network, as the
resulting ciphertext would not ﬁt inside the currently deﬁned identity response mes-
sages. Furthermore, some additional randomness would need to be added to every
encryption to ensure that the SIM does not simply use another long term identiﬁer
(the encryption of the IMSI) instead of the IMSI. The space for the IMSI in identity
response messages leaves too little room to add the randomness to the encryption
without changing the message size. Since it is unrealistic to expect such changes to
core message sizes being implemented in the current mobile phone technology, we
present a solution that works within the current implementations.
Wepropose a solutionwhere the IMSI is replacedwith a changing pseudonym that
only the SIM’s home network can link to the SIM’s identity. This hiding of the IMSI is
donewithout changing any of the systemmessages, thusmaking it transparent to the
access network. This allows our solution to be deployed by providers, on an individual
basis, on top of the currently available 3GPP networks.
139
8 Defeating IMSI catchers
SIM
PMSI,Pnew,κ,K,SQN
Access network Home network
AMF,
S = {s | ∀i ∈ I} where s = 〈i,K,SQN,κ,p,p′〉
identity request
update PMSI ← Pnew
identity response (PMSI)
PMSI
K,SQN,k,p,p′← s ∈ S where sp = PMSI ∨ sp′ = PMSI
if sp′ = PMSI then
update sp← sp′
update sp′ ← {0,1}34 < {sp, sp′ |∀s ∈ S}
RAND← Eκ(u = 〈p′ ,SQN 〉)
MAC← f1(K,SQN,AMF,RAND)
XRES← f2(K,RAND)
CK ← f3(K,RAND)
IK ← f4(K,RAND)
AK ← f5(K,RAND)
AUTN ← 〈SQN ⊕AK,AMF,MAC〉
update sSQN ← SQN +1
RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, IK
authentication request (RAND, AUTN)
AK ←f5(K,RAND)
XSQN ←AK ⊕AUTNSQN⊕AK
XMAC←f1(K,XSQN,AUTNAMF ,RAND)
verify XMAC = AUTNMAC
verify SQN ≤ XSQN ≤ (SQN + range)
update SQN ← XSQN +1
SRES← f2(K,RAND)
CK ← f3(K,RAND)
IK ← f4(K,RAND)
u←E−1κ (RAND)
verify XSQN = uSQN
update Pnew← up′
authentication response (SRES)
verify SRES = XRES
encrypted using CK
authenticity protected with IK
Figure 8.3: Solution proposed for 3G and 4G compatible authentication protocols. The black text shows
our additions to the standard protocols.
During authentication, the authentication server supplies the user’s SIM with a
random new IMSI, which we refer to as Pseudo Mobile Subscriber Identifier (PMSI). The
SIM uses the new PMSI the next time it is requested to reveal its IMSI. As discussed in
Section 8.2.4, the user’s provider operates an authentication server which generates a
random challenge-response pair and the corresponding session keys. We propose to
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use the randomchallenge (RAND) toprovide theSIMwith thePMSI. ThePMSIhas to be
encrypted in a semantically secure way, in order to keep it conﬁdential between SIM
and authentication server. The resulting ciphertext should be sufﬁciently random
and unpredictable to still serve as the challenge.
The changes we make in the authentication protocol for 3G are illustrated in Fig-
ure 8.3, though these changes canbeapplied the sameway to theauthentication in the
other generations of mobile networks. Comparing Figures 8.2 and 8.3 shows that no
changes aremade in themessages that are transmitted, but only in the end points, i.e.
the SIM and home network. This makes our solution compatible with all current im-
plementations of the different generations of mobile networks. The changes needed
for the authentication protocol used for 3G and 4G are discussed in detail in the next
section, the changes for the 2G authentication protocol are discussed in Section 8.4.
8.3.1 Authentication server
In our solution, authentication servers have to be extended to store three additional
values for each SIM: the new shared secret key κ and the two PMSI values p and p′ .
Here p is used to store the PMSI value the SIM s is currently using and p′ stores the
new PMSI value that the authentication server designates as the successor PMSI for
that SIM. A provider implementing this solution would change the normal routine
of its authentication server, when composing an authentication request for PMSI as
follows:
1. Validate if PMSI is known by the home network
∃s ∈ S, sp = PMSI ∨ sp′ = PMSI
2. Update the PMSI when the successor sp′ was used
if sp′ = PMSI then
sp← sp′
sp′ ← {0,1}34 < {sp, sp′ |∀s ∈ S}
3. Compute challenge RAND by encrypting sp′ and SQN
RAND← Eκ(u),where u = 〈sp′ ,SQN 〉
4. Compute other authentication parameters: MAC, XRES, CK, IK, AK and AUTN
5. Increase sequence number SQN and update s ∈ S
sSQN ← SQN +1
6. Transmit authentication parameters to access network
Steps 1 and 2 are new for our solution, while the computation of RAND in step
3, was changed from generating a random number in the standard procedure. The
other steps remain unchanged. The check in steps 1 and 2 has to be done for each
141
8 Defeating IMSI catchers
message parameters with an PMSI arriving at the authentication server, such as the
location update message3, essentially using this as conﬁrmation that the SIM card is
now using the pending PMSI sp′ as replacement for the previous PMSI sp . Because
of efﬁciency, access networks often request multiple authentication parameters for
a SIM at the same time. So, to keep a check on the number of pending PMSIs, the
authentication server will keep sending the same new PMSI number (with a different
sequence number) to the SIM, as long as a SIM identiﬁes itself with the same PMSI.
This means the authentication server needs to keep a running record of at most two
PMSI-numbers per SIM card.
8.3.2 SIM card
The SIM is extended to store the new shared secret key κ next to two PMSIs; the cur-
rently active PMSI (PMSI) and the future PMSI (Pnew). Upon receiving the challenge,
after normal veriﬁcation steps (e.g. verifying the MAC and the sequence number) a
SIM can decrypt the challenge and verify if the sequence number from the decrypted
challenge (uSQN ) is equal to the sequence number in the authentication token (SQN).
If so, the SIM retrieves the new PMSI (Pnew). Any future IMSI identiﬁcation request
can then be answered with the newly received PMSI, instead of the previous PMSI
by updating PMSI with Pnew . It is possible for PMSI and Pnew to temporarily have the
same value, if PMSI is updated to its successor (Pnew) and no new PMSI has yet been
received.
Additionally, the SIM could have a policy which determines the amount of time it
will wait for a new identity request, so it can refresh its PMSI, before forcing a refresh
itself. Forcing a PMSI update is performed by, for instance, signing on to the access
network as a freshly arrived SIM with the new PMSI.
To support our solution a SIM card’s handling of authentication requests should
be changed to include steps 5 and 6 in the following procedure:
1. Perform existing authentication steps to recover XSQN
2. Use existing authentication procedure to verify MAC
3. Verify sequence number and update SQN
SQN ← XSQN +1
4. Compute CK, IK and SRES
5. Decrypt RAND and verify sequence number uSQN
u←E−1κ (RAND)
verify XSQN = uSQN
6. Update the future PMSI Pnew to the supplied successor up′
Pnew← up′
3Technically the location update is directed to a logically separate entity: the Home Location Register.
However in practice this entity is always combined with the authentication server.
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In 2G authentication, the SIMauthenticates itself to the network, but the network does
not authenticate itself to the SIM. Figure 8.4 shows the 2G AKA protocol, with our
changes to hinder IMSI catching highlighted. These changes are primarily meant to
prevent IMSI catching attacks by supplying the SIMwith new PMSI numbers through
the challenge, same as before. However, as a side effect our solution gives the SIM
the capabilities to verify if a challenge presented to him actually came from his home
network.
Since standard 2G authentication has no sequence number, this has to be added
for our solution. Compared to 3G and 4G, the set of acceptable SQN values for the SIM
has to be much larger as there is no separate check on the SQN before the PMSI is
retrieved from the challenge. Furthermore, in 3G/4G their exist protocols to sync SQN
when the SIM and home network get out of sync. In the 2G environment we do not
have the room to implement a syncing protocol within the current speciﬁcations. An
attacker could therefore attempt to let the network issue many different challenges
for the same SIM, thereby increasing its SQN value, hoping to get the network out of
sync with the SIM. The SIM thus has to accept a much larger set of SQN values, e.g.
every uSQN value higher than its current value for SQN, which still prevents replay
attacks.
Since in 2G there is no guarantee that the challenge presented to the SIM is au-
thentic, our solution requires an additional integrity check on the encrypted PMSI.
Otherwise, an attacker could act as a base station and transmit a random number as
a challenge. In turn the SIMwould decrypt this, and if the SQNvalue is higher than the
current value, it would accept the ﬁrst part of the decoded challenge as the new PMSI
and the SIM will start to identify itself with a number unknown to the home network.
A cryptographicMAC (Mκ), computed by the home network, counters a Denial-of-
Service attack which aims to desynchronise the SQN numbers known by the SIM and
the home network. Such an authenticity check makes it very difﬁcult for an attacker
to forge a valid authentication request without knowledge of the secret key κ. This es-
sentially introduces an authentication of the home network to the SIM card, which is
not available in the default 2G authentication protocol.
8.5 Analysis
The previous sections presented our solution against IMSI catching, in this section
we analyse the effect of the proposed solution. It provides new pseudonyms to the
SIM to be used instead of the IMSI. The pseudonyms are provided in a conﬁdential
manner. An attacker, either active or passive, is unable to learn said pseudonym be-
fore it is used, as long as the attacker does not know the secret key κ. This provides
unlinkability between consecutive pseudonyms. Furthermore, this protocol changes
nothing in themessages as they are currently deﬁned for 3GPPmobile telephony. The
change is transparent for the access network and the challenge used to transmit the
PMSI should still be random due to the encryption and fresh due to the increasing
sequence number.
In the case of 2G there is an extra beneﬁt to our approach, as it adds a message
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SIM
PMSI,Pnew,SQN,κ,K
Access network Home network
S = {s | ∀i ∈ I} where s = 〈i,K,SQN,κ,p,p′〉
identity request
update PMSI ← Pnew
identity response (PMSI )
PMSI
K,SQN,k,p,p′← s ∈ S where sp = PMSI ∨ sp′ = PMSI
if sp′ = PMSI then
update sp← sp′
update sp′ ← {0,1}34 < {sp, sp′ |∀s ∈ S}
m←Mκ(p′ ,SQN )
RAND← Eκ(u = 〈p′ ,SQN,m〉)
XRES← A3(K,RAND)
CK ← A8(K,RAND)
update sSQN ← SQN +1
RAND, XRES, CK
authentication request (RAND)
u← E−1κ (RAND)
m←Mκ(up′ ,uSQN )
verifym = um
verify SQN ≤ uSQN
update SQN ← uSQN +1
update Pnew← up′
SRES← A3(K,RAND)
CK ← A8(K,RAND)
authentication response (SRES)
verify SRES = XRES
encrypted using CK
Figure 8.4: Solution proposed for 2G compatible authentication protocols. The black text shows our
additions to the standard protocols.
authentication to the challenge. This does not prevent a Man-in-the-Middle attack,
whereby an attacker simply passes on the challenge (though without learning the
PMSI it contains), but it does prevent the replaying of challenges or the insertion of
false challenges. Essentially achieving the same level of network authentication as
in the standard 3G and 4G AKA algorithms.
Thepresentedapproachdoesnot completely remove IMSI catchingas anattack. After
all, a SIM receives a new PMSI when authenticating, andwill only start using it on the
next identity requestmessage. So, after switching to anewPMSI, a SIMwill keepusing
that same PMSI for some time. Which means traceability remains until the switch to
a new PMSI is made. In practice though, this remaining traceability mostly coincides
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with the already existing traceability of the TMSI. Our solution even alleviates the
problems of TMSIs – too long validity periods over multiple geographical areas – as
switching PMSIs, will automatically refresh the TMSI, since the SIM will then appear
as a new SIM to the access network.
The country and home network code of the IMSI will need to remain intact for our
PMSI numbers, because these are needed to route messages to the user’s home net-
work. Thismeans, that even using our PMSI pseudonyms, there are still some privacy
issues, since a SIM will still reveal its home country and home network, when trans-
mitting their PMSI. In essence the use of a PMSI provides k-anonymity to users [161],
where k is the size of the group of expected users in this geographic area who have
the same home country and home network. In most countries there are only a small
number of mobile providers operational, they will mostly have fairly large consumer
bases and thus a large k can be expected [171]. In other words, this solution provides
stronger anonymity to users from a provider with a large consumer base, within their
home country. If those users use their phone abroad, their traceability will likely in-
crease dramatically, as there will be few other users transmitting an IMSI starting
with the same country code.
The sequence number is added to the encryption for three reasons: (I) it provides se-
mantically secure encryption, which is important because the same PMSI can be en-
crypted into several challenges, (II) it prevents replay attacks, and (III) it provides a
way for the SIM to check the integrity of the decrypted data (in 3G and 4G), effectively
preventing fake challenge attacks.
The use of the sequence number SQN suggests the possibility of the SIM and au-
thentication server getting out-of-sync. However, in the 3G and 4G case the sequence
number is already veriﬁed before the decryption of the challenge. Furthermore, there
is a protocol already in place to re-sync the sequence number. In the 2G case the se-
quence number is only needed to prevent replay attacks, so the set of acceptable se-
quence numbers can be big enough to assure that the home network’s SQN does not
get out-of-sync with the SIM’s. An attacker could attempt to start many fake sign-on
sessions with a victim’s current PMSI in a different cell, to force the home networks
SQN out-of-sync with the SIM. However, this can be detected by the home network
(many incoming requests for authentication parameters without a location update
following it), so this can be counteracted by delaying the handing out of authentica-
tion parameters, when such an attack is detected.
In the original protocol for 2G networks no sequence numbers are used during
authentication. Evenworse, there is nomutual authentication in 2G networks, which
means an active attacker can simply insert authentication challenges for the phone.
Our approach has the added beneﬁt of preventing such attacks, as both replay attacks
on challenges or insertion of fake challenges can be detected (due to the sequence
number and MAC).
As it is not possible for an attacker to create a correct PMSI update without the
secret key κ, and the sequence numbers cannot be forced out-of-sync, there is no in-
creased risk for a Denial-of-Service attack. A DoS attack could still be used to prevent
the SIM from getting new PMSIs. However, this is essentially the same as simply pre-
venting all service to the user, and as soon as the SIM connects to a genuine network,
this protocol provides it with a new PMSI.
When the secret key κ is compromised, an adversary is able to track users in the
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future. Moreover, ourmethod does not provide perfect forward secrecy [103] and lacks
protection against analysis of historical recordings of previous PMSI updates if the
secret key κ is known. However, recovery of key κ requires considerable computa-
tional power, which can most-likely better be utilised to attack other cryptographic
primitives used in 2G and 3G protocols.
Even with our solution in place, users might still have to take additional measures to
make tracking harder, e.g. by disabling their WiFi and Bluetooth services, as these are
also uniquely identifying.
Finally, our approach only protects from IMSI catching and not eavesdropping
or Man-in-the-Middle attacks, which are also often referred to as IMSI catching. A
powerful adversarymight be able to forward and relaymessages between the victim’s
phone and the genuine home network, while mounting various well-known crypto-
graphic attacks on 2Gnetworks [10, 9, 17, 25], aswe discussed extensively in Chapter 3.
In such scenario, we consider the security to be compromised since all 2G commu-
nication trafﬁc can be observed, and location privacy attacks can be re-introduced
through identiﬁcation based on the contents of data transmissions. However, our
solution hinders these attacks and others, such as sending malicious messages over
the air, as these can no longer rely on the IMSI to identify their target.
8.5.1 Parameter choice
Aswas explained in Section 8.2.2 the IMSI is a 15 digit number, containing a three digit
country code and amaximum of three digits for the home network code. This means
there can be at most 1010 different IMSIs per provider. Therefore, we need at most 34
bits for the PMSI in a challenge. Phones send the IMSI in BCD encoding (4 bits per
digit), but there is no reason to encode a PMSI encrypted inside the RAND in such an
inefﬁcient way. As the challenge is 16 bytes for all generations of mobile networks,
this leaves us 94 bits to use for the counter SQN, which is 48 bit, in the case of 3G/4G.
In the case of 2G, the remaining 94 bits would need to accommodate both the counter
SQN and the MAC (Mκ). This means the 2G case can accommodate a SQN of 62 bits
while allowing aMκ of 32 bits. Table 8.1 provides a short overview of the bit lengths
of different variables.
We introduced a new shared key for the encryption of the PMSIs: κ. While the
existing shared key K could be reused for κ, we do not recommend this. It is good
security design to use different keys for different functions. In fact, while we use κ
for both encryption and MAC generation in the 2G solution, it is again good design to
use two separate keys for this. The eventual choice for κ is naturally dependent on
the choice of encryption and MAC scheme and as such it is not included in Table 8.1.
Since asking the authentication server formultiple challenges for an IMSIwill give
several encryptions of the samePMSI, with only an increased counter, the cipher used
for encryption should be secure against related plaintext attacks. For the 3G and 4G
networks, the AES blockcipher is advised for the implementation of the authentica-
tion functions [46]. AES is secure under related plaintext attacks, so simply reusing
AES here would be enough. For 2G networks, the authentication functions are called
A3/A8 and can be chosen by the provider. The suggested algorithm, called COMP128,
is secret and proprietary. At least the ﬁrst version is known to beweak [83]. Also in the
2G case, the choice for a theMAC algorithm (Mκ) is not trivial, with a 32 bit output and
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a 96 bit input. One option would be to reuse 2G’s authentication algorithm A3, which
takes a 128 bit challenge and computes a 32 bit response, asMκ . So, a provider would
have to see whether their implementation for A3/A8 would be secure for both the en-
cryption of the PMSIs (so, related plaintexts) and theMAC generation. Then again, our
ﬁx demands an update of the SIM cards anyway, so updating the 2G authentication
algorithms could be added at minimal cost.
8.5.2 Roll-out scenario & overhead
We discussed our solution with a major telecom provider, both in terms of feasibil-
ity and possible roll-out scenarios. They considered our solution as a possible ﬁx to
prevent (long term) tracking of customers.
Swapping all SIMs is a costly operation for a provider. The SIMs themselves are
quite cheap, but the process of handing them out is costly. However, many SIM cards
currently out in the ﬁeld can be updated remotely through Over-The-Air (OTA) com-
mands. Not all SIMs in the ﬁeld that support such updates, accept updates to the
authentication procedure, but we could not obtain the numbers of updateable SIMs.
Still, since the presented solution is backwards compatible – a non-updated SIM will
simply answer the challenge as it always did, without ever switching to the new PMSI
– there are no big issues in rolling out our improvement to only a set of SIMs.
The overhead introduced by the additional computations in our solutions is ex-
pected to be very small for both the home network and SIM. We introduce one MAC
generation and veriﬁcation (only for 2G) and a symmetric encryption and decryp-
tion operation. Even for SIM cards with limited computational power this should not
present a problem, as this is functionality that is alreadyused in the original protocols.
Our solution introduces a small overhead for the access network, because a SIM
that switches to a new PMSI will look like a completely new phone to the access net-
work. Naturally, the SIM cannot sign off with the old PMSI ﬁrst, as this would defeat
the purpose of unlinkability. Networks are used to phones that do not sign off prop-
erly, and occasionally check whether phones registered in their area are still present.
Wide adoption of our solution is likely to increase these numbers. The exact inﬂu-
ence of this overhead is hard to estimate without ﬁeld trials, though access networks
are already resilient against high number of fastmoving SIMs, making it unlikely that
our change would signiﬁcantly impact their workings.
8.5.3 Formal veriﬁcation
To verify our solution formally we make use of ProVerif, an automatic cryptographic
protocol veriﬁer [19]. This tool is used to check for secrecy and authentication prop-
erties of security protocols, but can also be used to check privacy related properties
[20]. The usual Dolev-Yao attacker model is assumed, where the attacker has com-
plete control over the network but cannot break cryptography [41]. The analysis by
ProVerif is sound but not complete, i.e. ProVerif returns no false positives (claiming
that a property holds, though an attack still exists), but it might ﬁnd invalid attacks.
We modelled the original protocols and our proposed modiﬁed versions for both 2G
and 3G/4G in the typed applied pi-calculus.4 For these models we check whether an
4The models are available at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~deruitej/
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attacker can link different sessions of the AKA protocol that belong to the same user.
This is done by starting two sessions by different users. After this, a third sessions is
started and the attacker has to distinguish which of the two users started it. For the
original protocols for 2G and 3G/4G, no unlinkability is provided and a valid attack is
returned by ProVerif. Unlinkability is however proved by ProVerif for our solutions for
these mobile technology generations. In addition to unlinkability, we also check au-
thentication between the SIM and home network for 2G. As expected this fails for the
original protocol, but holds when our solution is used. These proofs give conﬁdence
that our solutions for both the 2G and 3G/4G protocols actually introduce protection
against IMSI catching – an attacker is no longer able to determine which sessions
belong to which users – while keeping the original functionality of the protocols (au-
thentication) intact.
8.6 Related work
We present a solution against one of the oldest practical attack against 3GPP net-
works: IMSI catching.
Independently from us, and largely concurrent, researchers from Royal Holloway
developed a very similar solution [108] as was presented in this Chapter. Their work
also uses the random challenge to transmit new IMSI values to the SIM, although se-
cured in a different fashion where the new IMSI value is XORed with a session key,
and the sequence number is included in a MAC. Both are then concatenated along
with a 16 bit random number to create the random challenge. Their solution is only
tailored towards 3G and 4G networks, without a similar solution for 2G networks or
the formal veriﬁcation, but otherwise seems to achieve the same results as the solu-
tion presented in this chapter.
In [160] Sung et al. propose a solution to prevent location tracing by the user’s home
provider. They achieve this by having the home provider offer sets of “virtual” SIM in-
stances via somemedium separate of themobile network (e.g. via internet which the
user can connect to viaWiFi). Users choose a successor instance for their current SIM
instance from this set, and at some point switch to the successor. Naturally, this solu-
tion does not support standard phone services, and can only use ﬂat rate subscrip-
tions. Furthermore, roaming is likely impossible for this solution, since the roaming
charges cannot be billed to a speciﬁc individual. Still, it is an impressive solution,
which even though it is not aimed at preventing IMSI catching attacks, it will hinder
these in exactly the same way as our solution.
Besides preventing IMSI catching attacks, there are also approaches aimed at detect-
ing IMSI catchers.
Dabrowski et al. [34] listed several indicators for the possible presence of IMSI
catchers. They also created both a network of stationary measurement devices and
an Android app, each capable of detecting IMSI catchers. Karsten Nohl and others
similarly introduced anAndroid app capable of detecting IMSI catchers [158]. This app
warns the user for the likely presence of IMSI catchers, where the term IMSI catchers
refers to the more inclusive meaning of the word and also includes eavesdropping.
Warning users of these attacks is very valuable and provides a basis for our claims
that these attacks are prevalent, but it does not prevent such attacks as our solution
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does.
We know of no other work speciﬁcally targeting IMSI catching, though there is a lot of
work regarding privacy issues in mobile telephony in general.
While not addressing IMSI catching, there has been research into other location
privacy issues caused by the 3GPP protocols. Arapinis et al. [4] used ProVerif to form-
ally verify the 3G speciﬁcations. This revealed two new privacy issues; linkability of
the IMSI to the TMSI using paging of mobile phones and a traceability attack that was
detailed in Section 8.2.4. They also present solutions for both attacks; encrypting the
IMSI in a paging command with a shared session key, and encrypting the response
of a failed authentication request with a public key of the provider. Interestingly, our
solution would diminish the effects of the IMSI - TMSI linkability, as a PMSI refresh
will appear to the access network as a new SIM arriving, which causes the assigning
of a new TMSI. Our presented solution therefore negates the need for encrypting the
IMSI. The solution for the traceability attack is still required whether or not our solu-
tion is implemented.
Hahn et al. [92] suggest a different solution for the Arapinis traceability attack. The re-
sponse of a failed authentication request is essentially encrypted with the new sym-
metric session key instead of the public key solution offered by Arapinis et al. This
solution might be more efﬁcient, though the consequences of switching to the ses-
sion key provided by a re-played challenge are not deeply explored.
In other work Arapinis et al. looked speciﬁcally at the TMSI reallocation protocol [5],
both formally and experimentally. Both the speciﬁcations and common implement-
ations were found to be having problems leading to privacy attacks. These privacy
attacks stem from possible linkability between different TMSIs or recovering the link
between an IMSI and a TMSI. These attacks mostly have even simpler counter meas-
ures than our solution against IMSI catching. However, again the implementation of
our solutionwould also prevent these TMSI attacks. If the SIMchanges its IMSI (PMSI),
the TMSI will get changed as well.
Han et al. [94] and Chen et al. [30], describe some issues with untrusted femtocells.
Femtocells are essentially small, low power cell towers consumers can buy to en-
hance the reception of cellular communication in speciﬁc spots. Theywere discussed
in detail in Chapter 5. Both publications introduce additional mutual authentication
steps to assure the communicationwith a registered femtocell and prevent aMitM at-
tack. However, both approaches can only be used after a phone has already identiﬁed
itself to the femtocell, and thus does not prevent IMSI catching.
8.7 Conclusions
Wepresent a solution against IMSI catching attacks that ﬁtswithin the current stand-
ards, making the change transparent for intermediate networks and backwards com-
patible. We propose the introduction of changing pseudonyms (PMSIs), to use for
identiﬁcation. This solution can be deployed within the current architecture by an
individual provider, as it controls the only two entities that need adapting: the SIM
cards providing the IMSI and the authentication server within the home network. Ad-
ditionally, this solution provides the SIM with a way to verify whether a given chal-
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lenge was generated by its home network, adding a form of mutual authentication
to the traditionally weak SIM-only authentication of 2G networks. Using the protocol
veriﬁer ProVerif, we veriﬁed that our solution indeed provides unlinkability between
succeeding pseudonyms without harming the original veriﬁcation.
In essence we bring the effectiveness of IMSI catching down to the effectiveness of
TMSI catching: learning a temporary id, which is unlinkable to future temporary ids.
This prevents long term tracking of individuals, as well as tracing individuals return-
ing to speciﬁc locations. Essentially, our proposal provides k-anonymity for users
[161], where k is the expected number of users from a speciﬁc home network provider
and country in a speciﬁc location.
Our solution need not interfere with lawful interception uses of IMSI catching, as au-
thorities can still go to a provider with a caught PMSI together with the time of the
catching. Based on this information the provider should be able to retrieve the cor-
responding account from its logs. Our solution, however, does interfere with unlawful
IMSI catching.
For future cellular communication standards (5G and on) the issue of IMSI catch-
ing could be easily tackled using a-symmetric cryptography, which we could not use
because the increase in resulting ciphertext sizeswouldnot ﬁt inside the currentmes-
sage speciﬁcations. However, it is still unclear whether the newer standards will in-
troduce such a ﬁx and even if they do, eventual roll-out is still far away. Even worse,
the current roll-out of second, third and fourth generation cellular communication
will not simply be replaced, and will likely remain functional for the foreseeable fu-
ture. The solution presented in this chapter could remedy the issue of IMSI catching
in the current systems. We are currently working with the Fraud and Security Archi-
tecture Group (FSAG) of the GSMAssociation (GSMA) to see if we can get this solution
into the current 3GPP speciﬁcations. Hopefully, our ﬁx will contribute to ﬁnally solve
the privacy and traceability attacks present in over 25 years of 3GPP protocols.
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Conclusions and future work
In this thesis we investigated how securemobile communication is in practice. More
in particular, we looked at the security on thewireless link of the 3GPP-style of cellular
networks from various perspectives, ranging from the abstract protocols, the crypto-
graphy used, down to the actual software inmobile phones and – on the network side
– in femtocells and the services deployed on top of the networks. Finally, we also
looked at the possibility to improve the current situation, when it comes to location
privacy with respect to IMSI catching.
9.1 Overview and discussion
Most chapters focused on one speciﬁc abstraction layer of the security of mobiles
communication. Speciﬁcally, Chapters 3 and 4 looked at the protocol and crypto-
graphy layer, Chapters 5 and 6 looked at the security of the actual implementations
of said protocols, Chapter 7 looked at the security offered by using mobile phones as
an additional factor in authentication and Chapter 8 investigated the possibility of
improving the current security status.
Starting on the layer of the protocols and wireless signals, Chapter 3 discussed
conﬁdentiality and authentication on the wireless link. After reviewing well-known
attacks on GSM we discussed the difﬁculty of performing these attacks in practice
using readily available hardware and software. The relevance of this discussion is
dependent on the attacker model: listening in on mobile phone calls is clearly pos-
sible for attackers with the ﬁnancial resources to buy equipment that performs this
attack, or by the telecom operator. However, this discussion focused on the feasibility
of these attacks by an attacker with limited ﬁnancial resources. All of these attacks
do not work out-of-the-box, using readily available hardware and software and typic-
ally require some investment on the programming side. So, while deﬁnitely feasible
for a skilled attacker, these attacks are quite complicated to perform for an attacker
of ‘script kiddy’ level.
Chapter 3 also analysed theweaknesses at the core of the attacks onGSM, possible
countermeasures against these weaknesses, and the countermeasures employed by
the newer generation protocols. We saw that despite substantial improvements on
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the security offered by UMTS and LTE protocols – mainly the use of better crypto-
graphy and mutual authentication – some weaknesses remain, such as the support
for a null-cipher. Irrespective of exactly which 3GPP protocol is used, much of the
offered security is dependent on provider settings, which makes it dangerous to ap-
ply general statements on the security of these 3GPP protocols to actual networks.
Overall, disabling GSM on your mobile phone will protect against the attacks
against conﬁdentiality on the wireless link.
Chapter 4 focused on the cryptography used in mobile networks, speciﬁcally dis-
cussing Time-Memory Trade-Off (TMTO) attacks on stream ciphers. The publicly
demonstrated eavesdropping attack against GSM in 2011 used a TMTO attack called
FuzzyRainbowTables. Weprovided the ﬁrst costs analysis (in both timeandmemory)
of the Fuzzy Rainbow Tables for multiple data samples. We also performed our ana-
lysis on well established TMTOmethods and compared the results.
Our analysis showed an advantage of the so-called Distinguished Point attack, es-
pecially for its speed. However, many aspects of these attacks remain unresearched,
such as possible parallelism beneﬁts, and the differences are small enough that the
particularities of a speciﬁc attack scenario and cipher can make other TMTO attacks
the better choice.
Chapters 5 and 6 focused on the implementation layer of the wireless protocols.
If the attacker can compromise an end point there is no need to break the secure
link. Even worse, a serious compromise of an end point will often give the attacker
more capabilities than he ever had on the link alone. These chapters focused on the
different sides of the wireless connection, femtocells in Chapter 5 and handsets in
Chapter 6.
Chapter 5 looked into the security of femtocells; low-margin, consumer-owned
cell towers. Introducing these devices in consumers’ homes could suddenlymake at-
tacks against a provider’s core network much easier, though some of these dangers
could be alleviatedbydesigning the 3GPPnetworks tonotnaively trust the cell towers.
Therefore the theoretical analysis in this chapter assessed the damage that could
come from a compromised femtocell in a setting where the provider puts minimal
trust in said femtocell. We showed that in this setting somehigh impact attacks, such
as eavesdropping, could be avoided, while other attacks, such as retrieving the secret
relation between phone number and unique identiﬁer, are still possible. In a practical
analysis we assessed the security offered by an actual femtocell, through attempts of
— and success in — compromising it.
Chapter 6 looked into the protocol implementation ofmobile handsets through the
testing technique known as fuzzing. With protocols as complicated and baroque as
the 3GPP protocols, the chances of mistakes, including security vulnerabilities, in the
speciﬁc implementation are high. We found that it is very easy to ﬁnd a surprisingly
large variety of bugs with fuzzing, which seems to indicate that manufacturers did
not incorporate fuzz testing in their development cycle. Indeed, about a year after
this research the biggest manufacturer of mobile protocol chips, Qualcomm, started
using fuzz testing and ended up rebuilding its’ software stack from scratch [188].
Despite the small number of manufacturers making baseband implementations
we found a surprisingly high diversity in behaviour between baseband implement-
ations even from the same manufacturer. This means that attacks found against a
speciﬁc implementations likely will not affect a large portion of the available mobile
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phones. However, ﬁnding an attack in a particularly popular phone would still have a
high impact, especially since these attacks can be performed wirelessly.
In Chapter 7 we focused on services deployed on top of mobile networks. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we discussed the different ways in which services bootstrap an additional
authentication factor with the use of mobile phones, thereby implicitly trusting the
authentication of the 3GPP protocols. Mobile phones offer an obvious improvement
as an additional factor in authentication, especially for parties unwilling or unable
to roll-out their own trusted hardware. However, this added security is not as strong
as dedicated trusted hardware, and we conclude that it is not sufﬁcient to solely rely
on the security of themobile networkwhen authentication for security-sensitive ser-
vices, such as server-based signing. Also, more and more services are offered from
themobile devices themselves; when the same device is used both to authenticate to
a service and to access that service, then this device can no longer be considered an
additional factor in the authentication.
The security shortcomingsdiscussed in earlier chapters raise the question if some
of these shortcomings can be alleviated without completely changing the infrastruc-
ture. In Chapter 8 we answer this for one speciﬁc attack, namely IMSI catching,
an attack against location privacy prevalent in all currently active 3GPP protocols.
The solution we propose can be introduced by individual providers, only requiring
a change in their authentication server and SIM cards. This change would be com-
pletely transparent to all other parties anddeployednetwork equipment. Additionally,
the proposed solution even introducesmutual authentication toGSM’s authentication
protocol, thereby preventing several of the attacks discussed in Chapter 3.
9.2 Conclusions
In this thesis we have seen that members of the 3GPP family of cellular networks
(GSM, GPRS, UMTS and LTE) have serious security issues on each of the abstraction
levels, such as weaknesses in the abstract protocols and security vulnerabilities in
the implementation of these protocols. This is not really surprising; the same has
happened when looking at other communication technologies, such as the internet.
However, in the case of the internet, vulnerable protocols are updated or replaced,
weaknesses in implementations of these protocols are patched with some regular-
ity, and additional security layers are deployed on top of the network stack to achieve
security on the higher layers. In contrast, 3GPP networks only see major security
updates with the introduction of a new generation, implementations are hardly ever
patched, and only recently in the post-Snowden upheaval are we seeing a serious
interest in deploying secure apps over the insecure networks. Moreover, internet pro-
tocols have seen a lot of public scrutiny over the last thirty years, while cellular net-
works are just starting to get serious attention.
Still, the security updates within the 3GPP protocols, while far between, have
deﬁnitely addressed themost seriousweaknesses. Especiallywith themove toUMTS,
all eavesdropping and MitM attacks on the wireless connection seem thwarted. For
security-sensitive transmissions it is therefore advisable to only use UMTS or LTE.
In recent years there has been a lot of research interest in GSM, especially from
the hacker community, because of the relatively easy access afforded by open-source
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software and a couple of cheap mobile phones. However, setting up a successful
eavesdropping attack still requires a lot of effort and knowledge, as essential parts
of the software were never released. For now, the community scrutinising GSM has
remained small compared to the old phone phreaks. GSM’s successors have received
even less attention, which is not just due to the increased security offered by UMTS
and LTE, but mainly due to a lack of available software to access their air interfaces.
A fake cell tower in UMTS or LTE could for example still fuzz several messages before
having to authenticate itself to the phone. As was the case with GSM, all it will take
is an open-source implementation of UMTS or LTE cell towers for researchers to start
looking hard at those protocols.
It would be tempting to disregard GSM completely, as an 20-odd year old techno-
logy that will be replaced by the newer technologies. This however might not be the
case: GSM/GPRS coverage is far more extensive than the coverage of the newer pro-
tocols and GSM uses less power and is more efﬁcient for voice calls. Also, a lot of
wireless machine-to-machine communication still relies on GSM/GPRS, for example
in some smart electricity meters. All this has prompted providers to speculate that
newer protocols such as LTE will replace their direct predecessor (in the case of LTE,
UMTS), but will still run alongside an active GSM/GPRS network. So, for the foresee-
able future, GSM is here to stay. Within the Netherlands GSM could be getting some
competition by the deployment of a nation-wide CDMA network in the 450MHz band
speciﬁcally for machine-to-machine communication in the critical infrastructures,
such as the electricity grid [117].
Attacks against the network side would have much higher impact than attacks
against single phones, and yet network equipment, such as cell towers, but also core
network devices seem to have received little scrutiny. The relative ease with which
fuzzing techniques reveal vulnerabilities on mobile phone implementations raises
serious concerns on the reliability and security of the network equipment.
Finally, there is the possibility of improving the current situation, without wait-
ing for the next generation. The network settings maintained by the providers offer
room for improvement inside the current deployment. For instance, we are seeing
a deﬁnite move to stronger encryption inside GSM, which prevents eavesdropping
attacks. Security updates are also possible in the protocol layer, as long as they do
not change anything in the core wireless protocols, so updates to the massively de-
ployed cell phones and cell towers are not necessary. It is nice to observe that all
the attacks we started with in Chapter 3 can be prevented just by only supporting the
strongest encryption for GSM and by introducing our mutual authentication presen-
ted in Chapter 8. This last improvement recently received interest from the GSMA
(the GSM Association) and might see actual rollout in the future.
9.3 Directions for future work
There are many areas within the ﬁeld of security of mobile communication that are
not covered within this thesis, but are deﬁnitely interesting to look at, such as satel-
lite telephony, GSM-R, or CDMA which have not received much attention from the
security community.
When just focusing on the security of 3GPP networks still many topics remain
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uncovered by this thesis. Nearly all security research until now has focused on the
wireless accessnetwork andhandsets, which everyonehas easy access to. Theweak-
nesses found there inspire little conﬁdence in the security of the core-network com-
ponents. These might be harder to access, but successful attacks against them will
have a much larger impact. With the advent of LTE and its all-IP back-end, access to
these components might come within easy reach of attackers.
The many components within a modern smart-phone, such as a GPS module,
WiFi, Blue Tooth, and NFC, all bring their own security implications. There can also
be several security(capable) components within a phone, such as the SIM card and
a secure element. There is a clear need to better understand the phone architecture,
and how all these components are linked, to assess the security of mobile phones.
Finally,more andmore security-sensitive services areusable frommobile devices,
such as mobile banking apps and ticketing apps (which provide the possibility to
buy tickets that provide access to venues by displaying a bar code or via the NFC-
interface). Looking into strong security architectures for such apps, even with the
untrusted hardware and software below it, is interesting to research.
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Summary
This thesis examines the security of mobile communication technology, with a the-
oretical and practical perspective. Speciﬁcally it examines the wireless interface
between cell tower and mobile phone for GSM and its successors (GPRS, UMTS and
LTE). In GSM the wireless interface can be eavesdropped with relative ease, making
it an unsuitable technology for sensitive information. While such eavesdropping is
much harder on GSM’s successors, it turns out that all currentmobile communication
technology still has potential weaknesses. In practice though, these weaknesses are
often hard to exploit without expensive equipment or speciﬁc knowledge and skills.
Besides, a lot of these potential weaknesses are dependent on provider speciﬁc set-
tings, which makes it hard to make generic statements on the security of the mobile
network. In practice we do see a clear trend of moving to more secure settings (such
as the use of strong encryption algorithms).
While we ﬁrst examined the security of thewireless interface, we later also looked
at the end-points of this interface: the mobile phone and the cell tower. For mobile
phones we looked at the quality of the software that processes the mobile signals.
Through a testing technique known as “fuzzing” (essentially automated, random test-
ing) we can quickly ﬁnd a large number of bugs. These bugs prove to be surprisingly
divers; software of the same vendor on different devices reveals different mistakes.
Since we did this research, at least one major vendor of this type of software rewrote
its entire software stack to remove most buggy behaviour.
Normally it is hard for an attacker to obtain prolonged physical access to the other
end-point of the wireless connection, cell towers. This changes with the introduction
of so-called “femtocells,” cheap low-powered cell towers for consumers, providing at-
tackers with easier access to a provider’s core network. To prevent an attacker from
doing too much damage once he gains full control of a femtocell, providers should
place as little trust as possible in these devices, by treating them essentially as a re-
lay to an actual cell tower and never sending them any conﬁdential information. Still,
even a low-trust femtocell introduces security risks for the mobile network, as they
offer attackers a cheap device which can handle a lot of the mobile phone protocols.
Mobile phones are often used as a second factor in authentication. During au-
thentication users then prove that they still have control over their mobile phone.
This can be a cheap way to quickly increase the security of a system. However, for
high-security services it is not sufﬁcient to only trust in the security offered by the
mobile network, as happens with the use of transaction numbers sent over SMS.
Where most of this thesis covers different security analyses, the ﬁnal part intro-
duces an improvement tomobile networks which signiﬁcantly increases their secur-
ity, while requiring only minimal changes. This improvement makes it impossible
to track a user’s location based on his permanent identity in the mobile network, by
replacing the permanent identities with temporary identities, which get renewed in
secret. A side effect of this process allows GSM phones to verify whether they are
communicating with an authentic cell tower, thereby ﬁxing the biggest security ﬂaw
in GSM. This improvement can be introduced by individual providers without the rest
of the network needing any changes or even noticing the change. We are currently
working with the GSM Association (GSMA) to get this improvement into the mobile
speciﬁcations.
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift behandelt de beveiliging van mobiele telefonie in zowel theoretisch
als praktisch opzicht. Meer speciﬁek kijken we naar de draadloze verbinding tussen
telefoon enmast voor GSM en haar opvolgers (GPRS, UMTS en LTE). De draadloze ver-
binding van GSM is vrij eenvoudig af te luisteren, waardoor het onverstandig is deze
technologie nog te gebruiken voor gevoelige informatie. Hoewel het veel moeilijker
is om de opvolgers van GSM draadloos af te luisteren, blijken ook alle huidige opvol-
gers potentiële zwakheden te bevatten. Het is in de praktijk echter wel lastig om deze
zwakheden te benutten, zonder dure apparatuur en voldoende kennis. Daarnaast zijn
veel van deze potentiële zwakheden afhankelijk van individuele instellingen van het
netwerk, wat het lastigmaakt om generieke uitspraken te doen over het beveiligings-
niveau van een mobiel netwerk. We zien echter een duidelijke trend naar veiligere
instellingen (zoals het gebruik van sterkere encryptie).
Waar de focus in het begin alleen ligt op de draadloze verbinding, kijkt dit proef-
schrift verder ook naar de eindpunten van deze verbinding: de mobiele telefoon en
de mast. Voor de telefoons hebben we gekeken naar de kwaliteit van de software
die de mobiele signalen verwerkt. Gebruikmakend van een testtechniek die bekend
staat als “fuzzing” (in essentie geautomatiseerdwillekeurig testen) vindenwe gemak-
kelijk een grote hoeveelheid bugs. De gevonden bugs blijken wel verrassend divers;
software van dezelfde fabrikant op verschillende telefoons, toont vaak verschillende
fouten. Sinds dit onderzoek heeft tenminste één software fabrikant besloten zijn ge-
hele mobiele telefoon-implemenatie opnieuw uit te voeren om het aantal fouten te
verminderen.
Normaliter is het lastig voor kwaadwillendenom langdurig fysieke toegang te krij-
gen tot het andere eindpunt van de draadloze verbinding, de zendmasten. Met de in-
voering van zogenaamde femtocells, goedkope lokale zendmasten voor consumen-
ten, krijgen aanvallers eenmakkelijkere methode om toegang te krijgen tot het kern-
netwerk van een provider. Om te voorkomen dat een aanvaller veel schade aan kan
richten als hij eenmaal volledige controle heeft over een femtocell, is het verstandig
dat providers zo min mogelijk vertrouwen in deze femtocells stellen Dit kan door ze
als het ware als verlengde antenne te gebruiken van een echte zendmast en ze nooit
vertrouwelijke informatie te sturen. Toch is zelfs een weinig vertrouwde femtocell
nog steeds een veiligheidsrisico, doordat het kwaadwillenden een goedkoop apparaat
biedt dat veel van het mobiele telefonie verkeer afhandelt.
Mobiele telefoons worden ook vaak als tweede factor gebruikt in authenticatie.
Gebruikers bewijzen tijdens inloggen te beschikken over hun mobiele telefoon. Dat
is vaak een goedkope manier om de beveiliging van een systeem behoorlijk op te ho-
gen. Voor beveiligingskritische applicaties is het echter niet voldoende om alleen te
vertrouwen op de veiligheid van het mobiele netwerk, zoals bij het gebruik van trans-
actienummers over SMS.
Na alle beveiligingsanalyses, introduceren we in het laatste deel van dit proef-
schrift een verbetering waardoor de huidige mobiele netwerken, met minimale aan-
passingen, signiﬁcant beter beveiligd kunnen worden. Deze verbetering zorgt ervoor
dat gebruikers nietmeer gevolgd kunnenworden op basis van hun permanente iden-
titeit in het mobiele netwerk, door deze te vervangen door een tijdelijke identiteit, die
heimelijk kan worden vernieuwd. Een mooi zijeffect van deze methode is dat het
GSM telefoons in staat stelt om te controleren of zij in verbinding staan met een au-
thentieke zendmast, waarmee de grootste beveiligingsfout van GSM wordt opgelost.
Deze verbetering kan ingevoerd worden door individuele providers zonder dat de rest
van het netwerk daar iets van merkt. We werken nu samen met de GSM Association
(GSMA) om deze aanpassing te realiseren in de standaarden.
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